Is screening about to get LESS secure?
Mar 31, 2016 | 4:19 pm
#16
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Mar 31, 2016 | 11:31 pm
#18
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Maybe you're new here. 
From:
Widespread TSA Failures in Latest DHS Tests
http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-u...ry?id=31434881
and from:
http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/check...ectations.html
http://www.fox35orlando.com/news/loc...36990591-story
Of course, you could argue that the media was mistaken. But then you'd have to explain why John Pistole admitted that 95% was unacceptable, rather than claiming it was a mistake. And why Melvin Carraway lost his job over something that didn't happen:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local...44e_story.html
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/id...50602?irpc=932
Furthermore, as I wrote at the time:
From:
Widespread TSA Failures in Latest DHS Tests
http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-u...ry?id=31434881
Originally Posted by ABC News
An internal investigation of the Transportation Security Administration revealed security failures at dozens of the nations busiest airports, where undercover investigators were able to smuggle mock explosives or banned weapons through checkpoints in 95 percent of trials, ABC News has learned.
The series of tests were conducted by Homeland Security Red Teams who pose as passengers, setting out to beat the system.
The series of tests were conducted by Homeland Security Red Teams who pose as passengers, setting out to beat the system.
http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/check...ectations.html
http://www.fox35orlando.com/news/loc...36990591-story
Originally Posted by WOFL
Congressman John Mica, R-Winter Park, says the agency isn't doing well at security either based on a recent internal test.
"Screening is not that effective unfortunately. The media has revealed through some leaks that 95 percent of the time failed to detect items going through. That's up from 75 percent of the time."
"Screening is not that effective unfortunately. The media has revealed through some leaks that 95 percent of the time failed to detect items going through. That's up from 75 percent of the time."
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local...44e_story.html
Originally Posted by WaPo
This week, the acting head of the Transportation Security Administration got bounced from his job because in 95 percent of test cases, real guns or fake bombs made it past the TSA.
That left some travelers asking whether its safe to fly and others wondering whether security measures they often find strict and intrusive are as lax as those test results suggest.
The bottom line remains that its just completely unacceptable to have such a high failure rate, said John S. Pistole, who led the TSA for four years before resigning six months ago to become president of Anderson University in Indiana.
That left some travelers asking whether its safe to fly and others wondering whether security measures they often find strict and intrusive are as lax as those test results suggest.
The bottom line remains that its just completely unacceptable to have such a high failure rate, said John S. Pistole, who led the TSA for four years before resigning six months ago to become president of Anderson University in Indiana.
Originally Posted by Reuters
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson said on Monday he reassigned the acting administrator for the Transportation Security Administration after earlier ordering improved security at U.S. airports.
The moves follow media reports that checkpoint screeners failed to detect mock explosives and weapons in 95 percent of tests carried out by undercover agents.
The moves follow media reports that checkpoint screeners failed to detect mock explosives and weapons in 95 percent of tests carried out by undercover agents.
...However, TSA has not come forward with anything to refute the 95% score.
This suggests, to me, one of three possibilities:
a) They have far more "Red Team" results than the 70 reported here, and the larger sample size also shows 95% (or worse
) failure. (Because if they had, say, a few thousand "Red Team" results that showed a 10% or 30% or even 80% failure rate, they'd have jumped in to correct the story.) Or:
b) TSA management is so statistically clueless that they believe 70 tests (in whatever time period) is sufficient to evaluate the performance of the entire agency, or,
c) TSA management is so incredibly statistically clueless that they can't figure out that the folder labeled "8000 Red Team Tests - 40% failure" would paint a better picture than the "95% failure in 70 tests" headlines.
None of those options make the TSA look any more competent than the "95% failure rate" meme.
...
Secondly, missing 95% of Bad Things is not much of a deterrent. If, as the TSA would like you to believe, there are a huge number of determined Bad Guys probing the system day after day, by now they would have figured out they have a 95% chance of success.
This suggests, to me, one of three possibilities:
a) They have far more "Red Team" results than the 70 reported here, and the larger sample size also shows 95% (or worse
) failure. (Because if they had, say, a few thousand "Red Team" results that showed a 10% or 30% or even 80% failure rate, they'd have jumped in to correct the story.) Or:b) TSA management is so statistically clueless that they believe 70 tests (in whatever time period) is sufficient to evaluate the performance of the entire agency, or,
c) TSA management is so incredibly statistically clueless that they can't figure out that the folder labeled "8000 Red Team Tests - 40% failure" would paint a better picture than the "95% failure in 70 tests" headlines.
None of those options make the TSA look any more competent than the "95% failure rate" meme.
...
Secondly, missing 95% of Bad Things is not much of a deterrent. If, as the TSA would like you to believe, there are a huge number of determined Bad Guys probing the system day after day, by now they would have figured out they have a 95% chance of success.
Apr 1, 2016 | 12:46 am
#19
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Second, "ignoring security issues" and "doing what TSA tells them" should be contradictory (in theory, at least). Or are you saying that TSA management would tell them to ignore security issues?
Third, a profit-motivated business is driven - pretty much by definition - by a desire to make profits. It's not at all clear that ignoring security issues (and doing whatever TSA management tells them to) are going to lead to profits.
A profit-motivated business would supply adequate (note: adequate, not excessive, over-the-top, gold-plated) service with the optimum number of staff. If they hire excess staff who stand around (ala TSA), that will cut into profits. If they hire staff for rubbish like the BDO program, that will cut into profits. If they do a poor job of security - either by making it unpleasant for passengers or by failing to prevent a preventable incident, the airports/airlines will complain (after the customers complain to them) and another profit-motivated business will be found to take over the role.
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/fi...BIB-MASTER.pdf
Originally Posted by DHS official budget paper, page 10:
2015: $7,377,367,000
2016: $7,440,096,000
2017: $7,589,079,000
increase 2016 - 17: $148,983,000 or 2%
2016: $7,440,096,000
2017: $7,589,079,000
increase 2016 - 17: $148,983,000 or 2%
What kind of idiots would throw $7.6 BILLION at something that continues to fail year after year? (Oh, yeah. Those idiots.
)
Apr 1, 2016 | 5:29 am
#20
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No, it's not the idiots who throw that money at the problem, its the crooks in Washington, who make big money from defense and security contractors throwing money at their campaigns, from investment in such companies, and from lucrative post-political positions with those companies.
Apr 1, 2016 | 10:08 am
#22
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^^^
Apr 1, 2016 | 10:09 am
#23
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Sorry, I can't even figure out what you're trying to say. First, why would "a profit-motivated business" have incentive to do [things] based on TSA's past performance and TSA's management style? How does TSA's performance and management style have any influence on what a private business is going to do?
Second, "ignoring security issues" and "doing what TSA tells them" should be contradictory (in theory, at least). Or are you saying that TSA management would tell them to ignore security issues?
Third, a profit-motivated business is driven - pretty much by definition - by a desire to make profits. It's not at all clear that ignoring security issues (and doing whatever TSA management tells them to) are going to lead to profits.
Second, "ignoring security issues" and "doing what TSA tells them" should be contradictory (in theory, at least). Or are you saying that TSA management would tell them to ignore security issues?
Third, a profit-motivated business is driven - pretty much by definition - by a desire to make profits. It's not at all clear that ignoring security issues (and doing whatever TSA management tells them to) are going to lead to profits.
I don't know how to explain it better. TSA Management style has demonstrated IT WILL NOT be called out on security issues/violations.
A private security firm would be beholden to TSA Management - that is the LAW; ATSA mandates TSA oversight of private security. The same Management that has demonstrated IT WILL NOT be called out on security issues/violations.
Are you suggesting that private security firm - motivated by profit - would attempt to report security issues/violations to a TSA Management that has shown IT WILL NOT be called out on security issues/violations.
A for profit business has a greater interest - profit - in doing what it is told to do. Does anything suggest to that TSA has righted itself and has purged itself of what seems its retribution focused Management style and that it will take seriously security issues/violations?
So yes, a private company that provide poor service would not last long, maybe not even the duration of a contract. But if poor performance is only measured on customer service metrics, then other more serious poor performance can be easily covered up and remain unknown to the general public.
Prime example, TSA success rate at finding WIE is 5%. Reports from former TSA leadership state that the poor performance of airport screening has been known for a very long time. Yet, the general public only knew how poor it was within the past year.
Apr 1, 2016 | 10:42 am
#24
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Not true. It's been common knowledge (and reported) that the Red Team test metric numbers have been abyssmal (well beyond failure), since the creation of the Red Team.
Apr 1, 2016 | 12:00 pm
#25
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Apr 1, 2016 | 1:10 pm
#27
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Where to start? I suppose I am arguing semantics but words are important and JoeBas' statement is actually opinion and exaggeration.
Mostly I am challenging the assertion that it is common knowledge that the red team numbers have been abysmal. The actual results of DHS OI testing (the true "red teams") (not including the IG's testing), are held extremely closely, barely even shared with DHS' congressional oversight committees. So it cannot be common knowledge.
I do agree that it is common opinion the rates are abysmal.
Mostly I am challenging the assertion that it is common knowledge that the red team numbers have been abysmal. The actual results of DHS OI testing (the true "red teams") (not including the IG's testing), are held extremely closely, barely even shared with DHS' congressional oversight committees. So it cannot be common knowledge.
I do agree that it is common opinion the rates are abysmal.
Apr 1, 2016 | 1:43 pm
#28
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Where to start? I suppose I am arguing semantics but words are important and JoeBas' statement is actually opinion and exaggeration.
Mostly I am challenging the assertion that it is common knowledge that the red team numbers have been abysmal. The actual results of DHS OI testing (the true "red teams") (not including the IG's testing), are held extremely closely, barely even shared with DHS' congressional oversight committees. So it cannot be common knowledge.
I do agree that it is common opinion the rates are abysmal.
Mostly I am challenging the assertion that it is common knowledge that the red team numbers have been abysmal. The actual results of DHS OI testing (the true "red teams") (not including the IG's testing), are held extremely closely, barely even shared with DHS' congressional oversight committees. So it cannot be common knowledge.
I do agree that it is common opinion the rates are abysmal.
http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-u...ry?id=31434881
Sort of amusing how the TSA uses some my language in its discussions about itself.
Last edited by GUWonder; Apr 1, 2016 at 1:50 pm
Apr 1, 2016 | 1:47 pm
#29
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Where to start? I suppose I am arguing semantics but words are important and JoeBas' statement is actually opinion and exaggeration.
Mostly I am challenging the assertion that it is common knowledge that the red team numbers have been abysmal. The actual results of DHS OI testing (the true "red teams") (not including the IG's testing), are held extremely closely, barely even shared with DHS' congressional oversight committees. So it cannot be common knowledge.
I do agree that it is common opinion the rates are abysmal.
Mostly I am challenging the assertion that it is common knowledge that the red team numbers have been abysmal. The actual results of DHS OI testing (the true "red teams") (not including the IG's testing), are held extremely closely, barely even shared with DHS' congressional oversight committees. So it cannot be common knowledge.
I do agree that it is common opinion the rates are abysmal.
Some of these reports cover the same time periods but I think there are enough different accounts that makes it clear that TSA Screening Failures is not only very well known but covers many years.
We can look back at the soldier who had C4 in a backpack that TSA screeners missed, or the TSA tester who defeated DFW TSA screeners and the TSA's almighty Whole Body Imagers multiple times by carrying a handgun through security checkpoints multiple times, and of course the other Red Team and OIG Test results that have leaked to the public. Even Congress has alluded to the abysmal failure rates of TSA screeners.
I suspect if the public knew the whole story that TSA heads would roll. The level of incompetence displayed by the whole of TSA is just mind boggling.
So how much more is needed to classify this as common knowledge?
Does it have to be worse than "According to a report based on an internal investigation, "red teams" with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General were able to get banned items through the screening process in 67 out of 70 tests it conducted across the nation" to be abysmal or common knowledge?
Or the release of information that resulted in the Acting Administrator being fired made the national and local news across the country. Even though that wasn't meant to make it into the public domain I would think that still makes it "common knowledge".
As far as hard evidence:
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-conte...-Testimony.pdf
While I cannot talk about the specifics in this setting, I am able to say that we conducted the audit with sufficient rigor to satisfy the standards contained within the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, that the tests were conducted by auditors within our Office of Audits without any special knowledge or training, and that the test results were disappointing and troubling. We ran multiple tests at eight different airports of different sizes, including large category X airports across the country, and tested airports using private screeners as part of the Screening Partnership Program. The results were consistent across every airport.
In September 2014, we conducted covert testing of the checked baggage screening system and identified significant vulnerabilities in this area caused by human and technology based failures. We also determined
that TSA did not have a process in place to assess or identify the cause
for equipment-based test failures or the capability to independently
assess whether deployed explosive detection systems are operating at the
correct detection standards. We found that, notwithstanding an
intervening investment of over $550 million, TSA had not improved
checked baggage screening since our 2009 report on the same issue.
that TSA did not have a process in place to assess or identify the cause
for equipment-based test failures or the capability to independently
assess whether deployed explosive detection systems are operating at the
correct detection standards. We found that, notwithstanding an
intervening investment of over $550 million, TSA had not improved
checked baggage screening since our 2009 report on the same issue.
In January 2012, we conducted covert testing of access controls to
secure airport areas and identified significant access control
vulnerabilities, meaning uncleared individuals could have unrestricted
and unaccompanied access to the most vulnerable parts of the airport
the aircraft and checked baggage.
secure airport areas and identified significant access control
vulnerabilities, meaning uncleared individuals could have unrestricted
and unaccompanied access to the most vulnerable parts of the airport
the aircraft and checked baggage.
In 2011, we conducted covert penetration testing on the previous
generation of AIT machines in use at the time; the testing was far
broader than the most recent testing, and likewise discovered significant
vulnerabilities
generation of AIT machines in use at the time; the testing was far
broader than the most recent testing, and likewise discovered significant
vulnerabilities
Apr 1, 2016 | 1:52 pm
#30
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Don't forget that TSA employees get federal benefits on top of their wages.