exerda

Apparently it took Brussels and Paris revealing that airport workers had been radicalized to make it national news, too. One of the reporters said something like, "Some of the workers have had their clearances to work in the airport revoked."

Of course, relying on a periodic background investigation and no screening at all is problematic. Look at the TSA screeners who have been busted for theft, for sexual assault, etc. And someone can become radicalized between investigations.

Screening them at the checkpoint will help prevent them from getting weapons through... it will still leave them open to potential sabotage, but at least it will help keep weapons out.

chollie

TSA's own arguments work against them on this issue.

The security justification for extremes at the checkpoint is that "it only takes one pax".

The same thing applies double for TSOs because their access and opportunites are so much greater than a pax's. It only takes one bad TSO - and we have ample evidence that TSOs are capable of manipulating the system and using their privileges to circumvent security.

What's worrisome to me is how many times the TSO shenanigans have involved multiple players, sometimes including folks from outside TSA. I'm not aware of any group pax efforts to circumvent security (unless you count the sorority sisters in Texas who were singled out for extra scrutiny because of the souvenir books they were all carrying. Very sneaky - unless TSA checked every single book, they couldn't be sure there wasn't one bad one in the bunch).

Boggie Dog

Anyone with possible access to the airplanes should be screened. Pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, baggage handlers, aircraft cleaners, and food service staff. Terrorist have demonstrated a willingness to forfeit their lives when attacking so no one should be exempt from screening.

Government fails in its responsibility to carry out an effective security plan because doing so would ruffle the feathers of various unions.

GUWonder

That (revocation) kind of thing has been going on in France for at least two decades. Periodically, they repeat the "cleansing".

For the airport "insider" threat issue to make the US nightly broadcast news after the Paris attacks, it took people revealing that amongst the Paris attackers one or more of the, had worked in the public mass transit (bus or local rail) system (in France and Belgium). Either as a driver or for "security".

But the "cleansing" cycle was already in process in France between the time of the Russian passenger flight destruction in the Sinai and the Paris attacks.

Section 107

the article at the link almost seems to have been written by Boggie! [NOTE: the following link is to JudicialWatch, a conservative organization - I am not endorsing the source).

Nearly 2 Million Airport Workers May Pose Security Threat as U.S. Studies Cost of Screening Them

Nearly 2 million workers with unescorted access to security restricted areas at airports throughout the U.S. could pose an “insider threat,” according to a new federal audit, yet the government is still studying how to effectively curb the risk. Congress has tasked the famously inefficient Transportation Security Administration (TSA), created after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to protect the nation’s transportation system, with submitting a plan examining the cost and feasibility of enhanced worker screening measures at American airports, but it seems that the agency cannot handle the task.

i0wnj00

Don't need an article to tell me this, been there, done that. Between the many access points and people who feel entitled with their special permissions to talk trash and get away with it, this is something no amount of money can solve. The best the TSA can do is to manage the risk and perform risk assessments on individuals with unescorted access to the ramp.

Boggie Dog

I can't take credit for the article. Simple observation reveals just how weak airport security really is and doesn't take a "security expert" to realize that when unscreened workers can waltz in with no more than ID credentials there really isn't any 'real' security. The question boils down to what risk level is acceptable? In the TSA security world apparently having a TWIC card checks the risk box 99.99% of the time.

I maintain that TSA should be a regulatory agency formulating security standards and monitoring screening operations instead of conducting screenings and all persons entering or having access to secure areas should be screened upon entry. There is a clear conflict of interest being both the regulatory and screening agency.

i0wnj00

That's only what you can see. What you can see looks "bad" but basically that's what risk management is about.
100% screening isn't possible with the amount of workers coming in, limited screening space and personnel or the many places to enter the back. That's why they have adapted the model of risk management as a means to balance security and business needs of an airport.

It's not an easy task when the TSA and airport stakeholders are butting heads with each other with their different goals. The TSA only cares about security, they don't care about business or economic needs. The airport stakeholders only care about business or economic needs, they don't think there should be zero security, it's just don't want security needs get in the way of their business or economic needs.

Sometimes, though the TSA pulls back a wee bit and yields to the airport stakeholders. Why?
Because airport stakeholders can kick them out and replace them with private security contractors.

The TWIC card , as mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act is intended to access to maritime facilities or facilities located near the shore (i.e ports, refineries, power plants, offices), in addition to any other requirements needed to enter said facility. You are referring to the SIDA badges which are issued by the airport authorities who manage the airports.They are responsible for the background checks and depending on what job you have, you need to attend classroom training.