Aug 11, 2018, 9:38 pm
Last edit by: jspira
The incident itself is covered here: Sea-Tac Horizon Air employee steals airplane, does stunts before crashing near Tacoma The errant pilot, Mr. Russell, apparently recognized he was in the midst of a crisis (From Theft of Aircraft in Seattle-Tacoma Raises Serious Security Questions): “I got a lot of people that care about me and it’s going to disappoint them to hear that I did this,” Mr. Russell said to air traffic controllers. “I would like to apologize to each and every one of them. Just a broken guy, got a few screws loose, I guess. Never really knew it until now.”
from post #10:
KSEA tower audio of the aircraft on RWY 16C: http://archive-server.liveatc.net/ks...2018-0230Z.mp3 (begins around 3:40)
from post #10:
KSEA tower audio of the aircraft on RWY 16C: http://archive-server.liveatc.net/ks...2018-0230Z.mp3 (begins around 3:40)
QX Q400 stolen by employee, crashed near SEA, no passengers onboard
Aug 13, 2018, 9:31 pm
#211
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: San Francisco, CA
Programs: AA (PPro/3MM/Admirals Club), AS, UA, Marriott (Gold), HHonors (Gold), Accor (Plat)
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And no system is going to be perfect from any potential misuse or abuse. While it was on the ground, I've been the sole person in the cockpit and even on the plane many times. Maybe I'm the first one on or the last one off. Or I went back on the aircraft because I forgot something up there. And having watched the pilots do it many times, I have a pretty good idea on how to start the engines.
This incident brings to mind something that happened to me maybe 12-24 months ago at SEA. I was flying to Vancouver. The agent told us the “spot” number, which for whatever reason is not the same as the door number that passengers use. I was possibly the first after wheelchairs. The door she said to use was open and led to a Q400, but there was no crew. That was the first sign something wasn’t right becuase I know you can’t board without minimum FA crew on board. The center controls had a yellow “out of service” overlay on them.
The first few of us turned back and eventually figured out where our actual plane was parked, but it was a strange experience to step inside an empty aircraft. I wasn’t alarmed as much as annoyed that the agent had misdirected us. I think it was at one of the Horizon stands that hadn’t been updated yet.
Last edited by makfan; Aug 13, 2018 at 9:57 pm
Aug 13, 2018, 11:04 pm
#212
Join Date: Feb 2014
Location: Frensham, Lincolnshire
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Posts: 5,093
The fact you saw an instance just now does not create a risk value or trend. I once saw someone get hit by a javelin at a track & field meet. I have no illusions about the Rampant Risk of Stray OMG Javelins suddenly at the forefront of my mind.
Aug 13, 2018, 11:58 pm
#213
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: SEA (the REAL Washington); occasionally in the other Washington (DCA area)
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And I'll say it again: what is the incidence rate?
The fact you saw an instance just now does not create a risk value or trend. I once saw someone get hit by a javelin at a track & field meet. I have no illusions about the Rampant Risk of Stray OMG Javelins suddenly at the forefront of my mind.
The fact you saw an instance just now does not create a risk value or trend. I once saw someone get hit by a javelin at a track & field meet. I have no illusions about the Rampant Risk of Stray OMG Javelins suddenly at the forefront of my mind.
seriously: as I mentioned earlier, the overarching issue is deciding what is an acceptable (non-zero) level of risk; that assessment has to consider both the probability and the consequence of occurrence, and since this sort of event has maximum (catastrophic) consequence, the only mitigation is to drive the probability as close to zero as possible
that said, a major factor in evaluating the effectiveness of any candidate risk reduction approach (i.e., what does it do to reduce the probability of occurrence) is the difficulty — if not the impossibility — of quantifying human behavior
Aug 14, 2018, 12:49 am
#214
Join Date: May 2006
Location: TUS/PDX
Programs: WN CP/A-List, AS MVPG75K
Posts: 5,798
The flight attendants must be on the plane, but the pilots do not. Passengers can be on board while pilots are doing a walk around, talking to operations, etc. They aren't required for a safe evacuation of the plane. A full complement of FAs are required for any passengers to be on board, to evacuate the plane if necessary.
Obviously other airlines have their own rules, but I’ve had plenty of WN thru flights with a crew swap and I’ve never been forced to deplane. Sometimes it’s strongly suggested if there’s an extended sit.
Aug 14, 2018, 4:43 am
#215
Join Date: Apr 2016
Location: BNA (Nashville)
Programs: HH Diamond
Posts: 6,229
And I'll say it again: what is the incidence rate?
The fact you saw an instance just now does not create a risk value or trend. I once saw someone get hit by a javelin at a track & field meet. I have no illusions about the Rampant Risk of Stray OMG Javelins suddenly at the forefront of my mind.
The fact you saw an instance just now does not create a risk value or trend. I once saw someone get hit by a javelin at a track & field meet. I have no illusions about the Rampant Risk of Stray OMG Javelins suddenly at the forefront of my mind.
Aug 14, 2018, 7:46 am
#216
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Location: Salt Lake City, Utah, USA
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Aug 14, 2018, 7:59 am
#217
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Nov 2013
Location: Los Angeles
Posts: 12,598
Flown by an experienced pilot who worked for the company who owned it. Under almost any access control system he'd have had effectively unrestricted access to the aircraft.
The problem you're trying to solve is "how do I keep a person with nefarious intent from getting a plane to implement that intent" and I'm not sure it's something that has a technical solution that doesn't add greater risk somewhere else.
Where you see a key that controls ability to operate the plane, I see a giant single-point failure in the ability to keep the plane in the air. What you've been suggesting is more a lockable "kill" switch than an "on" switch. If it can possibly turn off the plane in the air in any failure mode then there need to be multiple (typically two or more additional for a commercial passenger plane) independent systems to keep the plane *up*, only one of which needs to remain functional to keep the plane within the pilot's control.
The commercial aviation industry got to be as safe as it is (and it is incredibly safe) by being extremely conservative about the qualification process for making changes to equipment and spending enormous amounts of time looking at possible failure modes of the smallest things.
The problem you're trying to solve is "how do I keep a person with nefarious intent from getting a plane to implement that intent" and I'm not sure it's something that has a technical solution that doesn't add greater risk somewhere else.
Where you see a key that controls ability to operate the plane, I see a giant single-point failure in the ability to keep the plane in the air. What you've been suggesting is more a lockable "kill" switch than an "on" switch. If it can possibly turn off the plane in the air in any failure mode then there need to be multiple (typically two or more additional for a commercial passenger plane) independent systems to keep the plane *up*, only one of which needs to remain functional to keep the plane within the pilot's control.
The commercial aviation industry got to be as safe as it is (and it is incredibly safe) by being extremely conservative about the qualification process for making changes to equipment and spending enormous amounts of time looking at possible failure modes of the smallest things.
Aug 14, 2018, 8:32 am
#218
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: YYF/YLW
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Posts: 5,951
Flown by an experienced pilot who worked for the company who owned it. Under almost any access control system he'd have had effectively unrestricted access to the aircraft.
The problem you're trying to solve is "how do I keep a person with nefarious intent from getting a plane to implement that intent" and I'm not sure it's something that has a technical solution that doesn't add greater risk somewhere else.
Where you see a key that controls ability to operate the plane, I see a giant single-point failure in the ability to keep the plane in the air. What you've been suggesting is more a lockable "kill" switch than an "on" switch. If it can possibly turn off the plane in the air in any failure mode then there need to be multiple (typically two or more additional for a commercial passenger plane) independent systems to keep the plane *up*, only one of which needs to remain functional to keep the plane within the pilot's control.
The commercial aviation industry got to be as safe as it is (and it is incredibly safe) by being extremely conservative about the qualification process for making changes to equipment and spending enormous amounts of time looking at possible failure modes of the smallest things.
The problem you're trying to solve is "how do I keep a person with nefarious intent from getting a plane to implement that intent" and I'm not sure it's something that has a technical solution that doesn't add greater risk somewhere else.
Where you see a key that controls ability to operate the plane, I see a giant single-point failure in the ability to keep the plane in the air. What you've been suggesting is more a lockable "kill" switch than an "on" switch. If it can possibly turn off the plane in the air in any failure mode then there need to be multiple (typically two or more additional for a commercial passenger plane) independent systems to keep the plane *up*, only one of which needs to remain functional to keep the plane within the pilot's control.
The commercial aviation industry got to be as safe as it is (and it is incredibly safe) by being extremely conservative about the qualification process for making changes to equipment and spending enormous amounts of time looking at possible failure modes of the smallest things.
Anything that goes wrong in commercial aviation is big news because things going wrong in aviation are so rare. Cars -- complete with their keys and electronic ignition interlocks -- are stolen every day (albeit less frequently than they were before electronic ignition interlocks). They don't make news precisely because it's so common.
I'm sure that airlines and regulators will take a new look at security in light of this incident; they take a new look at safety and security in response to every minor incident, including many that go unreported. But I don't expect anything like the "obvious" proposals from lay FlyerTalkers to be a result of that look, unless the lay people in Congress and the White House decide to take it upon themselves without taking a real look at the evidence.
The set of people who can currently access and, with the right knowledge, start and taxi an airplane but don't need to have access to any key system as part of their job is pretty small. So even in the best case, any key system would have limited ability to prevent this sort of failure and would cause other problems.
Aug 14, 2018, 10:13 am
#219
Join Date: May 2012
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The flight attendants must be on the plane, but the pilots do not. Passengers can be on board while pilots are doing a walk around, talking to operations, etc. They aren't required for a safe evacuation of the plane. A full complement of FAs are required for any passengers to be on board, to evacuate the plane if necessary.
Aug 14, 2018, 10:18 am
#220
FlyerTalk Evangelist
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The flight attendants must be on the plane, but the pilots do not. Passengers can be on board while pilots are doing a walk around, talking to operations, etc. They aren't required for a safe evacuation of the plane. A full complement of FAs are required for any passengers to be on board, to evacuate the plane if necessary.
Aug 14, 2018, 4:12 pm
#221
Join Date: Jul 2015
Location: SEA
Programs: Hilton/Marriott Gold, Accor Silver
Posts: 2,036
The problem you're trying to solve is "how do I keep a person with nefarious intent from getting a plane to implement that intent" and I'm not sure it's something that has a technical solution that doesn't add greater risk somewhere else.
Where you see a key that controls ability to operate the plane, I see a giant single-point failure in the ability to keep the plane in the air. What you've been suggesting is more a lockable "kill" switch than an "on" switch.
Where you see a key that controls ability to operate the plane, I see a giant single-point failure in the ability to keep the plane in the air. What you've been suggesting is more a lockable "kill" switch than an "on" switch.
Aug 14, 2018, 8:22 pm
#222
Join Date: Feb 2014
Location: Frensham, Lincolnshire
Programs: RFC
Posts: 5,093
And, for the third time, what is the incidence rate? All planes with all potential access across, say, a one year period? And you can point to 2 instances? Rationally, you must be far more concerned about people being killed by lightning strikes, no? Those happen far far more often.
Aug 14, 2018, 8:34 pm
#223
Moderator: Budget Travel forum & Credit Card Programs, FlyerTalk Evangelist
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Yup, and two bridges blew up in a week's time in Italy. How shall we safeguard against bridges - perhaps only in Italy, or maybe Europe?
Aug 14, 2018, 9:13 pm
#224
Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Why? Why? Zed! / Why? You? Elle! / Gee! Are You!
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Posts: 3,543
Finally - some pragmatic and realistic press on an otherwise...
...extremely cringe worthy commentary by a myopic public.
https://www.businessinsider.com/airl...a-plane-2018-8
Main take-away: "Calm down, for one"
https://www.businessinsider.com/airl...a-plane-2018-8
Main take-away: "Calm down, for one"
Aug 16, 2018, 6:55 pm
#225
Join Date: Sep 2005
Posts: 1,028
I'm sure that airlines and regulators will take a new look at security in light of this incident; they take a new look at safety and security in response to every minor incident, including many that go unreported. But I don't expect anything like the "obvious" proposals from lay FlyerTalkers to be a result of that look, unless the lay people in Congress and the White House decide to take it upon themselves without taking a real look at the evidence.
The set of people who can currently access and, with the right knowledge, start and taxi an airplane but don't need to have access to any key system as part of their job is pretty small. So even in the best case, any key system would have limited ability to prevent this sort of failure and would cause other problems.
The set of people who can currently access and, with the right knowledge, start and taxi an airplane but don't need to have access to any key system as part of their job is pretty small. So even in the best case, any key system would have limited ability to prevent this sort of failure and would cause other problems.
One thing that could be done fairly easily (i'd think) would be to get YouTube and other similar sites to delete "how to start a Q-400" videos, and likewise for other types. I even saw one for how to start a railroad engine...