Originally Posted by
birdstrike
Screening had its place pre-9/11 and I believe it still does today. Screening should be done to keep large edged weapons and firearms out of the cabin to the extent that it is possible with current procedures.
I agree that the prohibited items list can be trimmed down significantly. The irony behind all this is that the 9/11 screeners had the authority to prohibit box cutters if they had any suspicions about the passengers. It was a more random policy which may have been its downfall: screeners could also allow the items on board if they didn't see any reason to prohibit them.
Originally Posted by birdstrike
Let's start with the FAM program. I think it should be scaled back to pre-9/11 staffing levels with the marshals deployed to counter specific threats, not flown constantly around the country in the hopes that a threat will find them.
a) There are too few marshals to make it likely they will encounter a random threat.
b) Flying them around constantly must result in mission fatigue.
c) Fresh, rested marshals deployed for a specific purpose would give me a warm fuzzy feeling I don't have today.
I'm going to bow out of the FAM discussion other than to express my personal view that I think it can be streamlined by deploying FAMs on high-risk flight paths. In other words, if the data indicates that certain flight paths tend to be either lucrative terrorist targets or have a history of being attacked by terrorists, then that's where I would deploy the FAMs.
Originally Posted by birdstrike
As far as the TSA goes, I think the private sector can do things more efficiently than a government agency. See Team SFO, though others may disagree.
Team SFO is, for lack of a better term, TSA through a private contractor. In other words, the private screeners at SFO must meet the exact same hiring standards as TSOs; these screeners must receive the exact same training as TSOs; they must qualify and meet the exact same recertification standards as TSOs; and they are supervised by TSA screening managers under the authority of a TSA FSD. In other words, the only difference between these private screeners and TSOs is the uniform. Otherwise, they are government contractors.
Originally Posted by birdstrike
4) Stop SPOT. If I find a young woman gazing deeply into my eyes I don't want to have to question her intentions. I don't want any men gazing deeply into my eyes.
I don't have a problem with your other points, and I believe I addressed them in either another post or thread, so I won't repeat them. I wanted to focus on SPOT. I think TSA has out-voodoo'd itself with this program. I think EVERY TSO should be trained in basic behavior detection techniques not so much as staring down passengers and trying to start a conversation with "how 'bout them Spurs?" I think part of the basic package is to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior in general and responding to those suspicions. I think this is a basic trait for law enforcement, security enforcement and should be required for airport security screeners.
In my previous career, body language played a huge part in many operational decisions. Yes, we had the benefit of polygraphy, psychological screening and a host of other tests. But it all boiled down to that gut instinct which isn't so much instinct as it was trained observation (truth be told: I think we all have these capabilities and either are aware of it or are not; training only enhances what we already have).