Yes and Yes.

The boarding pass and id checks are examples of the "appearance of security" and not actually effective security measures.

There are several ways of looking at systematic errors.

First is the "design error" element. In other words -- if implemented perfectly -- is a particular security measure designed to achieve a specific result. The boarding pass is an unsecure document, and as such susceptible to effective forgery even by amatuers. Driver's licenses and other forms of government-issued photo id are a bit more effort, but routinely achievable by high school football players across the country.

However, even assuming the ID is not forged and the boarding pass is not forged, they are only useful in potentially identifying identity after a security breach has taken place.

Second, is the "operator error" element. In other words, you can have the absolute most theoretically effective tool, but if the person performing the task does not perform it correctly, then the process is a failure.

In this case, you take a process with ample design flaws and complicate it with the kind of operator error you experienced. From a statistics perspective, its a multiplicative situation.

So if you start with a flawed design and combine it with inattentive personnel, it's fairly easy to reach the point where the mere toss of coin is a more effective security screening procedure.