Originally Posted by Peetah
Presumed terrorists will start using gloves when handling things. Then one day the DHS/TSA will decide to do DNA tests on everyone entering the country. So then the terrorists will start using clean rooms to build bombs and stuff.
But they haven't been doing that for the last five years. Presumably we've already built up a good database of fingerprints we've found that we think are terrorists, but there's no way to match them to anyone in time.
If terrorists have to start operating in clean rooms and wearing gloves all the time then we've seriously impaired their infrastructure. Only in the movies is it possible to not leave fingerprints when you're living in an house for a few days.
Eventually, some bright mind will figure out that identification doesn't mean better security because most terrorists will keep a low profile prior to the act making it near impossible to identify them on an inbound plane flight, ship, or car trip. The DHS response to that will be to close the border.
This will force them not to use the ones that have been to training camps. The low profile ones are the amateurs they talk into wearing a bomb vest or think they can mix up TATP in a lav. They're much more likely to get tripped up in other layers of security. They'll appear nervous, they'll buy one-way tickets, they'll pay cash, etc. We should be much more concerned about the ones who have been through Spetsnaz style training. Muhhammad Atta's replacement wouldn't be able to get through on a fake passport under this system.
Only Hollywood and politicians believe that terrorists carry a terrorist identification card which is used whenever they buy something or check into a hotel or airplane flight.
Sounds like a good reason to run their fingerprints.
It doesn't matter if we actually have their prints in the database. They don't know if we do or not, so we've just immensely complicated their planning.
Every layer of security added, even if by itself it's not sufficient, adds complications to the bad guys trying to pull something off. Add enough partial screens are pretty soon you've put the odds of success down so low that they don't even try.
The typical FlyerTalk security "expert" looks at any security measure and says "here's a way that can be defeated and it's inconvenient to me so it's stupid." Which is beside the point. Perhaps it can be defeated, but it's just added another layer of complication to the bad guy's plan. Perhaps they could find people whose prints aren't on file to come in and lead the operation. But the odds of success just went way down -- you've done the equivalent of making them use a brand new 2nd Lt. to lead the group instead of a Colonel. The opportunties for the other layers of security to be successful just went up considerably.
It's true that we have to be right 100% of the time and the bad guys only have to be right once in order to pull off a successful attack. But that one attack has to be right 100% of the time against each individual activity we're undertaking to thwart it. Each of our layers doesn't have to be 100%, it just has to add to their complication.