Looking past all of the inflammatory rhetoric Rahn writes which just appeals to the emotions rather than the logic of some in here, this is
my take:
1. TSA screeners no longer ask for IDs at the entrance to the checkpoint. They should be asking for boarding passes, and this is where it may be somewhat frustrating for the traveller. The purpose of asking for the boarding pass is to make sure those who have been selected for additional screening by CAPSS, the dreaded "SSSS," are screened at the checkpoint. If not, then they will screened at the gate. It's much more convenient for both passenger and screener to get it over with at the checkpoint. Otherwise, the only time a passenger will be asked to present ID is whenever there is a truly legitimate reason to do so such as providing information for an official report or when asked to do so by a law enforcement officer for a security-related incident. I've said this before and will say it again, TSA needs to do away with selectee screening. It is a waste of time and effort. However, the 9/11 Commission strongly endorsed selectee screening, so it's a matter of Congressional direction that we still have it and will continue to have it for a very long time. Selectee screening, like it or not, is here to stay.
2. I agree with Rahn about how TSA should do a better job of anticipating peak periods and adjusting its manning accordingly. I know at my airport our managment staff has tried to tackle this issue with various strategies by rearranging our shifts. We have two main shifts (a morning and evening) augmented by various other overlapping part-time and full-time shifts all designed to accomodate these peak periods. Jury's still out on whether it's effective or not. I don't know if other airports are doing the same thing or not. However, from the Big Picture view, Congress is holding TSA to 45,000 screeners. This means that even if TSA presents a strong case for increasing its numbers based on solid evidence that it still cannot keep up with passenger peak periods, Congress will ignore it and still hold TSA to that fixed figure. In other words, a lot of this is politically driven for a variety of reasons.
3. I also agree with Rahn that our prohibited items list is too narrow, too restrictive and too focused on risk-avoidance rather than risk-management. I don't know how much of this is due to TSA's perception of risk as opposed to Congress' perception. The upcoming ban on lighters was a Congressional mandate. I think now that we've been doing this for a while we can modify the list and begin allowing small scissors, short bladed pocketknives and other innocuous objects through the checkpoint.
4. Because I know this will come up, I have to admit that I did see the validity of some of the complaints about shoes. However, I saw a Coast Guard film demonstrating the deadly effectiveness of a shoe bomb containing less explosives than what was found on Richard Reid and have changed my mind. I will agree that perhaps TSA can mitigate the threat by perhaps performing random shoe screening (say one out of every three passengers who come through or whatever number is satisfactory), but I do not dismiss the threat posed by shoe bombs.
I disagree with the rest of Rahn's article as nothing more than hyperbole and a gross distortion of facts. It seems that he takes delight at insulting public servants as do some of the forum members in here. But if you get past all the emotion, there are some valid points in Rahn's article, few as they may be.