This is a truly shocking part, if true.
For example, there is a cutout switch in the control column so that when a pilot pulls or pushes in the opposite direction to a runaway stabilizer, it cuts electric power to the stabilizer. When MCAS is active, this cutout switch doesn’t work, which could surprise a pilot who didn’t know about the system.
(bolding mine)
That's is unconscionable. If the software actively TAKES AWAY a pilot's ability to control the aircraft and does so without notification - it's the opposite of safe.
The secrecy with which MCAS is designed to operate means that Boeing has made a sham out of its claim of safety being the top priority.
Time to market was its top priority.
Originally Posted by
chrisl137
Given the number of flights that never saw an AoA sensor failure, real life testing isn't likely to have led them to identify it as a failure mode to put in the simulator. Paper analysis should have recognized the failure mode, with real life testing to verify the behavior of the aircraft with a simulated AoA sensor failure.
Not true - AoA sensor failures is a known issue including the 2008 Airbus crash
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...lure-data-show
The failure to even test that scenario reflects the poor assumptions of Boeing's design team and why they should NOT be trusted when they claim it's safe via software-simulations Boeing controls.
Take the 737-Max out and do a full batter of FLIGHT tests before re-certifying it.