Originally Posted by
Maxwell Smart
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True, there appear to be serious shortcomings and downright failures at Boeing in how MCAS was designed, implemented, and in the related risk assessments. But opinion pieces like this by so-called "experts" don't help the cause in investigating and fixing such failures.
Here's a link to an article that corrects many of the IEEE "article's" errors:
https://abnormaldistribution.org/ind...liner-crashes/
The issue is not any general instability inherent with the way the aircraft was designed.
However, within the normal flight envelope there were occasionally certain situations occurring that would have the aircraft handle in variance with the behavior with other 737 models in the same situations.
If pilots were specifically trained on how to handle the MAX8 in those situation (with simulator time, lists etc.) then there would be less likely to be an issue.
But by doing that, it almost certainly would have required a new type certificate for pilots.
The manufacturer wished to avoid this since for revenue/expediency reasons.
To avoid this, they came up with software to make the plane emulate how, say, a 737NG would handle in those situations and it would function in such a manner so that aircrew would be oblivious to its operation.
And then, they basically did not tell the pilots about it.
Down the track, it appears the software has flaws that had it crash two aircraft.
Yes, the IEEE article has levels of hyperbowl, but the rebuttal posted does not change the above.