Originally Posted by
IADFlyer123
The blame here seems to be solely on Boeing's shoulders. They originally submitted FAA cert docs that mentioned the MCAS system could only manipulate the tail by 0.6 degrees. They then realized that 0.6 was not sufficient and decided to reprogram it allow for a 2.5 degree manipulation without letting the FAA know (atleast that is what the article implies).
If the article is correct, then it was much worse than what is mentioned above, as the system would reset itself each time there was a corrective pilot input, effectively allowing "endless" MCAS manipulation.
The proposed software update was/is to only allow a one-time automatic manipulation.
This, coupled with only one sensor being used for the MCAS evaluation and not both, and also not checking for sensor comparison errors pre-departure (Lio nAir sensors were apparently off by 20 degrees prior to take-off), tells me that there was some serious logic failures at Boeing.