Must be borrowing the TWA playbook: "we're going to shrink the airline 'til its profitable"

This plan seems like a last minute thrown together copy/paste CO circa 1993 "from worst to first" strategy. However this time it's all about looking at ways to increase shareholder value and not necessarily build an airline for the longrun. Granted yes return on investment to shareholders is crucial, but how long can you sustain that? A few years at best? The biggest source of their cost savings comes out of fuel consumption $1B to be exact.....so when you have all the planes retrofitted with those dorky looking split winglets then what? Continue to outsource and replace eveyrthing at the airport with a kiosk?

What I am getting at is the core deficiency UA is experiencing in my opinion is they are chasing after how to increase revenue but not looking really where they could improve the airline in the longrun. I think the lack of network optimization and inconsistent hard/soft-product improvements are going to be an issue in the longrun.

Network Optimization
-too many hubs: again what purpose does CLE serve? Sure it "allegedly" holds its own but the resources used there could be better allocated elsewhere. You can call it reliever, focus city, what have you but I don't see how it will survive as 50 seaters head out the door. DEN...well my only thought there is that I would be curious to see how the yields are. I'm not saying to dump it completely but RJ's flying at WN/F9 fare levels can't be the best revenue strategy. Yes eliminating DEN would leave a substantial gap, but perhaps running things like DENSAN on everything from a CRJ to a 738 to a 757 five times a day isn't the best strategy. Sure they are trying to match demand with capacity, but I think actually that was a downfall of pmUA, and something that CO did right; frequency with pretty consistent capacity (5x 738s rather than a hodgepodge)

-and on that note too much mix: by this I mean running RJ's alongside mainline in competitive markets (SEASFO, ORD-LGA/DCA for example). Yes you increase frequency but the service isn't consistent. Meaning Express partners seem to have worse dispatch/on-time ratio's.....so from what I've seen, odd's are you'll be delayed on express but not on mainline because of how the aircraft are routed.....see IADEWR on ExpressJet for example.

Hard/soft product improvements
Look its obvious that UA or any American carrier is going to be LH or SQ when it comes to premium products. However UA could look at what DL, AA, or even US has done with their premium product improvements. Love them or hate them but they all seem to be consistent. With UA its hit or miss; sure you have two different fleets and configurations but what are they doing to address it? You could fly to LHR over one hub (on a 3 class plane) and fly back over another (on a two class) and the seats and service are completely different. And Global First is essentially a bigger seat and a bowl of soup....so either step it up or phase it out because there isn't anything distinctive about it.
Domestically the F product is a joke and what is clear is UA is looking more at upsells than retained loyalty/longterm high value clientle. Minimal improvements could be made that would potentially increase F fare purchases in lieu of upgrades/TOD's

Sure its a lot more complicated than what I've addressed but I think what UA outlined is a short-sighted kneejerk "oh crap we aren't making as much money as we did before" reaction. I really hope some new vision/leadership takes helm at UA