FlyWorld

Think like a risk manager for a moment.

Whether we live or die on an aircraft is ultimately determined in large measure by an enormous array of probabilities and magnitudes. These produce a range of possible outcomes, which can be further influenced, in a good or bad way, by pilot skill and luck or lack thereof.

Put another way, every decision that's made about aviation safety is based on probabilities. We know that a failure of type x has a probability y of occurring over z period of time. And, we can measure the expected impact of such a failure. Based on the expected occurrence and magnitude of each failure type, we can build in additional margins of safety (i.e. it's OK if failure type 1 occurs because system 2, 3, and 4 will mitigate it) but we know that if failure type 1 occurs and systems 1, 2, 3, and 4 all fail, then there is no mitigation, and people die. The standards that govern what's required and what's allowable are determined by this matrix of probabilities, outcomes, and mitigating controls.

Over years of experience, the regulators and the industry have refined acceptable standards based on study of outcomes. Sometimes those outcomes involve failures that don't result in loss of life and are never known to the flying public. Other times, they result in catastrophes. We learn from each one, and we improve year by year.

Fortunately, a lot of this is controlled by federal regulators, so no matter how greedy $mi$ek or his kind might be, their hands are tied, there are limits to how hard they're allowed to push the limits in exchange for more profit, faster.

But, ultimately, only $mi$ek and his regime know what changes they have actually ordered, and it's not unheard of for airline executives to cut corners to the bare minimum, or even to violate the law, in the name of making more money and making it faster.

I'm not accusing anyone of anything. I've got no facts. But, what I do see is an airline that's cut everything I can see and is failing in every way I can measure and I've seen individuals posting credible theories on here that increased cancellations are due to shortages in equipment and maintenance and these comments make sense to me. Taken in the larger context, they appear entirely credible to me.

And, for me personally, this raises alarming questions about what's really going on behind the scenes and to what extent decisions might have been made that increase the probabilities of certain types of failures in order to make more money faster or eliminate compensating controls that would protect from such failures.

Since I'm not an airline person, this thinking and these concerns are based on a layperson's analysis, and I fully expect to be smashed by anyone with deeper industry knowledge who doesn't agree with what I've written. But, I will say this, I am truly afraid for my safety to fly on UA metal after what I've seen happening, what I've read here, and thinking it through. And, this is a feeling I never had before.

So, are pilots saving lives by rejecting faulty planes? It all depends on how tightly Jeff and his regime are pushing the envelope. If pilots are rejecting aircraft that are worthy to fly, and are properly maintained, and that have the right compensating controls in place for any items that are broken, then probably not. But, what if a 1 in 1,000,000 external event occurs, and that combines with a failure of a part that should have been maintained but wasn't maintained to save money, such that an airplane crashes whereas it wouldn't have crashed fi the 1 in 1,000,000 external event didn't occur? In that case, on that flight, the pilot rejecting that plane saved lives.

Just because an event is rare doesn't mean we shouldn't be concerned about it.