Originally Posted by
jkhuggins
I realize I've probably said this before ... but what the heck, I'll say it again ...
1. What makes you think that the enemy doesn't already have your playbook? Do you believe that all 50,000 TSA employees have adequately protected TSA's secrets, so that there's no possibility that someone --- deliberately or accidentally --- has made TSA's playbook available to the enemy?
And, if not ... then since the enemy already has the playbook, what value is there in continuing to pretend that the playbook is still a secret?
2. What's the harm in giving the playbook to the enemy? TSA's objective is supposed to be to secure commercial travel, not make arrests. If you tell people "this is how we're going to search for bombs", and terrorists decide not to bring bombs on-board as a result, haven't you achieved your goal?
The enemy, some of them, “may” have our “playbook”. “May”. Most wont, and giving it to them would be stupid beyond belief.
Giving them the play book would allow them to analyze our process and find ways around it. As I continually say, no security system is perfect. So, given that simple little fact, it would be foolish to give them our plans. Giving it to the flying public as some here want (JSmith1969 being one it seems), is just as good as sending it FedEx to OBL himself.
Originally Posted by
N965VJ
The security of nuclear power plants are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, including the caliber of weapons the guards are carrying, physical fitness standards and tests for guards, standards for fencing construction around facilities, etc, etc.
CHAPTER I--NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED)
PART 73_PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS--Table of Contents
Sec. 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures.
Also-
Domestic Safeguards Regulations, Guidance, and Communications
* Part 11 - Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to or Control Over Special Nuclear Material
* Part 25 - Access Authorization for Licensee Personnel
* Part 26 - Fitness for Duty
* Part 70.51 - Material balance, inventory, and records requirements
* Part 73 - Physical Protection of Plants and Materials
* Part 74 - Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material
* Part 76 - Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants
* Part 95 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguards of National Security Information and Restricted Data
* All current rulemakings
Last time I checked, no nuclear facilities have 'sploded.
And you seriously think that these things contain specifics of Nuclear Power Plant security procedures? Wow, I guess one really
can convince themselves of anything with enough effort.