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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
450 Fifth Street Northwest, Suite 8000
Washington, DC 20530
STATE OF ARIZONA
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, AZ 85007
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
441 Fourth Street Northwest, Suite 600 South
Washington, DC 20001
STATE OF FLORIDA
PL-01, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
14th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
STATE OF TENNESSEE
500 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville, TN 37202
STATE OF TEXAS
300 W.15th Street, 7th Floor
Austin, TX 78701
and
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 1 of 56
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Plaintiffs,
v.
US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC.
111 W. Rio Salado Parkway
Tempe, AZ 85281
and
AMR CORPORATION
4333 Amon Carter Boulevard
Fort Worth, TX 76155
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the Attorney General of the
United States, and the States of Arizona, Florida, Tennessee, Texas, the Commonwealths of
Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the District of Columbia (“Plaintiff States”), acting by and
through their respective Attorneys General, bring this civil action under federal antitrust law to
enjoin the planned merger of two of the nation’s five major airlines, US Airways Group, Inc.
(“US Airways”) and AMR Corporation (“American”), and to obtain equitable and other relief as
appropriate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. Millions of passengers depend on the airline industry to travel quickly, efficiently, and
safely between various cities in the United States and throughout the world. Since 1978, the
nation has relied on competition among airlines to promote affordability, innovation, and service
and quality improvements. In recent years, however, the major airlines have, in tandem, raised
fares, imposed new and higher fees, and reduced service. Competition has diminished and
consumers have paid a heavy price. This merger—by creating the world’s largest airline—
would, in the words of US Airways’ management, “finish[ ] industry evolution.” It would
reduce the number of major domestic airlines from five to four, and the number of “legacy”
airlines—today, Delta, United, American, and US Airways—from four to three. In so doing, it
threatens substantial harm to consumers. Because of the size of the airline industry, if this
merger were approved, even a small increase in the price of airline tickets, checked bags, or
flight change fees would cause hundreds of millions of dollars of harm to American consumers
annually.
2. American and US Airways compete directly on thousands of heavily traveled nonstop
and connecting routes. Millions of passengers benefit each year from head-to-head competition
that this merger would eliminate. With less competition, airlines can cut service and raise prices
with less fear of competitive responses from rivals.
3. This merger will leave three very similar legacy airlines—Delta, United, and the new
American—that past experience shows increasingly prefer tacit coordination over full-throated
competition. By further reducing the number of legacy airlines and aligning the economic
incentives of those that remain, the merger of US Airways and American would make it easier
for the remaining airlines to cooperate, rather than compete, on price and service. That enhanced
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cooperation is unlikely to be significantly disrupted by Southwest and JetBlue, which, while
offering important competition on the routes they fly, have less extensive domestic and
international route networks than the legacy airlines.
4. US Airways’ own executives—who would run the new American—have long been
“proponents of consolidation.” US Airways believes that the industry—before 2005—had “too
many” competitors, causing an “irrational business model.” Since 2005, there has been a wave
of consolidation in the industry. US Airways has cheered these successive mergers, with its
CEO stating in 2011 that “fewer airlines” is a “good thing.” US Airways’ President explained
this thinking that same year: “Three successful fare increases – [we are] able to pass along to
customers because of consolidation.” (emphasis added). Similarly, he boasted at a 2012 industry
conference: “Consolidation has also . . . allowed the industry to do things like ancillary revenues
[e.g., checked bag and ticket change fees] . . . . That is a structural permanent change to the
industry and one that’s impossible to overstate the benefit from it.” In essence, industry
consolidation has left fewer, more-similar airlines, making it easier for the remaining airlines to
raise prices, impose new or higher baggage and other ancillary fees, and reduce capacity and
service. This merger positions US Airways’ management to continue the trend—at the expense
of consumers.
5. US Airways intends to do just that. If this merger were approved, US Airways would no
longer need to offer low-fare options for certain travelers. For example, US Airways employs
“Advantage Fares,” an aggressive discounting strategy aimed at undercutting the other legacy
airlines’ nonstop fares with cheaper connecting service. US Airways’ hubs are in cities that
generate less lucrative nonstop traffic than the other legacy airlines’ hubs. To compensate, US
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Airways uses its Advantage Fares to attract additional passengers on flights connecting through
its hubs.
6. The other legacy airlines take a different approach. If, for example, United offers
nonstop service on a route, and Delta and American offer connecting service on that same route,
Delta and American typically charge the same price for their connecting service as United
charges for its nonstop service. As American executives observed, the legacy airlines “generally
respect the pricing of the non-stop carrier [on a given route],” even though it means offering
connecting service at the same price as nonstop service. But American, Delta, and United
frequently do charge lower prices for their connecting service on routes where US Airways
offers nonstop service. They do so to respond to US Airways’ use of Advantage Fares on other
routes.
7. If the merger were approved, US Airways’ economic rationale for offering Advantage
Fares would likely go away. The merged airline’s cost of sticking with US Airways’ one-stop,
low-price strategy would increase. Delta and United would likely undercut the merged firm on a
larger number of nonstop routes. At the same time, the revenues generated from Advantage
Fares would shrink as American’s current nonstop routes would cease to be targets for
Advantage Fares. The bottom line is that the merged airline would likely abandon Advantage
Fares, eliminating significant competition and causing consumers to pay hundreds of millions of
dollars more.
8. Consumers will likely also be harmed by the planned merger because American had a
standalone plan to emerge from bankruptcy poised to grow. American planned to expand
domestically and internationally, adding service on nearly 115 new routes. To support its plan,
American recently made the largest aircraft order in industry history.
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9. American’s standalone plan would have bucked current industry trends toward capacity
reductions and less competition. US Airways called American’s growth plan “industry
destabilizing” and worried that American’s plan would cause other carriers to react “with their
own enhanced growth plans . . . .” The result would be to increase competitive pressures
throughout the industry. After the merger, US Airways’ current executives—who would manage
the merged firm—would be able to abandon American’s efforts to expand and instead continue
the industry’s march toward higher prices and less service. As its CEO candidly stated earlier
this year, US Airways views this merger as “the last major piece needed to fully rationalize the
industry.”
10. Passengers to and from the Washington, D.C. area are likely to be particularly hurt. To
serve Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (“Reagan National”), a carrier must have
“slots,” which are government-issued rights to take off and land. US Airways currently holds
55% of the slots at Reagan National and the merger would increase the percentage of slots held
by the combined firm to 69%. The combined airline would have a monopoly on 63% of the
nonstop routes served out of the airport. Competition at Reagan National cannot flourish where
one airline increasingly controls an essential ingredient to competition. Without slots, other
airlines cannot enter or expand the number of flights that they offer on other routes. As a result,
Washington, D.C. area passengers would likely see higher prices and fewer choices if the merger
were approved.
11. Notwithstanding their prior unequivocal statements about the effects of consolidation, the
defendants will likely claim that the elimination of American as a standalone competitor will
benefit consumers. They will argue that Advantage Fares will continue, existing capacity levels
and growth plans will be maintained, and unspecified or unverified “synergies” will materialize,
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creating the possibility of lower fares. The American public has seen this before. Commenting
on a commitment to maintain service levels made by two other airlines seeking approval for a
merger in 2010, the CEO of US Airways said: “I’m hopeful they’re just saying what they need
. . . to get this [transaction] approved.” By making claims about benefits that are at odds with
their prior statements on the likely effects of this merger, that is precisely what the merging
parties’ executives are doing here—saying what they believe needs to be said to pass antitrust
scrutiny.
12. There is no reason to accept the likely anticompetitive consequences of this merger. Both
airlines are confident they can and will compete effectively as standalone companies. A
revitalized American is fully capable of emerging from bankruptcy proceedings on its own with
a competitive cost structure, profitable existing business, and plans for growth. US Airways
today is competing vigorously and earning record profits. Executives of both airlines have
repeatedly stated that they do not need this merger to succeed.
13. The merger between US Airways and American would likely substantially lessen
competition, and tend to create a monopoly, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 18. Therefore, this merger should be permanently enjoined.
II. JURISDICTION, INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND VENUE
14. The United States brings this action, and this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over
this action, under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25, to prevent and
restrain US Airways and American Airlines from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
15. The Plaintiff States bring this action under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26,
to prevent and restrain US Airways and American Airlines from violating Section 7 of the
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Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18. The Plaintiff States, by and through their respective
Attorneys General, bring this action as parens patriae on behalf of the citizens, general welfare,
and economy of each of their states.
16. The defendants are engaged in, and their activities substantially affect, interstate
commerce, and commerce in each of the Plaintiff States. US Airways and American Airlines
each annually transport millions of passengers across state lines throughout this country,
generating billions of dollars in revenue while doing so.
17. Venue is proper under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22. This Court also
has personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Both defendants are found and transact business
in this judicial district.
III. THE DEFENDANTS AND THE TRANSACTION
18. Defendant US Airways Group, Inc., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Tempe,
Arizona. Last year, it flew over fifty million passengers to approximately 200 locations
worldwide, taking in more than $13 billion in revenue. US Airways operates hubs in Phoenix,
Charlotte, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.
19. US Airways is performing exceptionally well. In 2012, it enjoyed record profits. It is
operating at high load factors—the percentage of seats sold on its flights—and has a national and
international route network, alliances with international airlines, a strong brand name, modern
equipment, and a competitive cost structure. In mid-2012, US Airways’ CEO, touting the
airline’s “record second quarter results,” told Dow Jones that the company “has a great business
model that works and we certainly don’t need to merge with another airline.”
20. Defendant AMR Corporation is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Fort Worth,
Texas. AMR Corporation is the parent company of American Airlines. Last year, American
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flew over eighty million passengers to approximately 250 locations worldwide, taking in more
than $24 billion in revenue. American operates hubs in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Dallas, and Miami. The American Airlines brand is “one of the most recognized . . . in the
world.”
21. In November 2011, American filed for bankruptcy reorganization and is currently under
the supervision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. American
adopted and implemented a standalone business plan designed “to restore American to industry
leadership, profitability and growth.” While in bankruptcy, American management “pursued and
successfully implemented” key provisions of this plan, including revenue and network
enhancements, as well as “restructuring efforts [that] have encompassed labor cost savings,
managerial efficiencies, fleet reconfiguration, and other economies . . . .” That work has paid
off. American reported that its revenue growth has “outpaced” the industry since entering
bankruptcy and in its most recent quarterly results reported a company record-high $5.6 billion
in revenues, with $357 million in profits. Under experienced and sophisticated senior
management, American’s restructuring process has positioned it to produce “industry leading
profitability.” As recently as January 8, 2013, American’s management presented plans to
emerge from bankruptcy that would increase the destinations American serves in the United
States and the frequency of its flights, and position American to compete independently as a
profitable airline with aggressive plans for growth.
22. US Airways sees American the same way. Its CEO observed in December 2011 that
“A[merican] is not going away, they will be stronger post-bankruptcy because they will have less
debt and reduced labor costs.” A US Airways’ executive vice president similarly wrote in July
2012 that “[t]here is NO question about AMR’s ability to survive on a standalone basis.”
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23. US Airways and American agreed to merge on February 13, 2013. US Airways
shareholders would own 28 percent of the combined airline, while American shareholders,
creditors, labor unions, and employees would own 72 percent. The merged airline would operate
under the American brand name, but the new American would be run by US Airways
management.
IV. THE RELEVANT MARKETS
A. Scheduled Air Passenger Service Between Cities
24. Domestic scheduled air passenger service enables consumers to travel quickly and
efficiently between various cities in the United States. Air travel offers passengers significant
time savings and convenience over other forms of travel. For example, a flight from
Washington, D.C. to Detroit takes just over an hour of flight time. Driving between the two
cities takes at least eight hours. A train between the two cities takes more than fifteen hours.
25. Due to time savings and convenience afforded by scheduled air passenger service, few
passengers would substitute other modes of transportation (car, bus, or train) for scheduled air
passenger service in response to a small but significant industry-wide fare increase. Another
way to say this, as described in the Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (2010), and endorsed by courts in this Circuit, is that a hypothetical
monopolist of all domestic scheduled air passenger service likely would increase its prices by at
least a small but significant and non-transitory amount. Scheduled air passenger service,
therefore, constitutes a line of commerce and a relevant product market within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
26. A “city pair” is comprised of a flight’s departure and arrival cities. For example, a flight
departing from Washington and arriving in Chicago makes up the Washington-Chicago city pair.
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Passengers seek to depart from airports close to where they live and work, and arrive at airports
close to their intended destinations. Most airline travel is related to business, family events, and
vacations. Thus, most passengers book flights with their origins and destinations predetermined.
Few passengers who wish to fly from one city to another would likely switch to flights between
other cities in response to a small but significant and non-transitory fare increase.
27. Airlines customarily set fares on a city pair basis. For each city pair, the degree and
nature of the competition from other airlines generally plays a large role in an airline’s pricing
decision.
28. Therefore, a hypothetical monopolist of scheduled air passenger service between specific
cities likely would increase its prices by at least a small but significant and non-transitory
amount. Accordingly, each city pair is a relevant geographic market and section of the country
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
29. Consumer preferences also play a role in airline pricing and are relevant for the purpose
of analyzing the likely effects of the proposed merger. Some passengers prefer nonstop service
because it saves travel time; some passengers prefer buying tickets at the last minute; others
prefer service at a particular airport within a metropolitan area. For example, most business
customers traveling to and from downtown Washington prefer service at Reagan National over
other airports in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Through a variety of fare restrictions
and rules, airlines can profitably raise prices for some of these passengers without raising prices
for others. Thus, the competitive effects of the proposed merger may vary among passengers
depending on their preferences for particular types of service or particular airports.
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B. Takeoff and Landing Slots at Reagan National Airport
30. Reagan National is one of only four airports in the country requiring slots for takeoffs
and landings. Slots are expensive (often valued at over $2 million per slot), difficult to obtain,
and only rarely change hands between airlines. There are no alternatives to slots for airlines
seeking to enter or expand their service at Reagan National.
31. Reagan National is across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C., and, due to its
proximity to the city and direct service via the Metro, airlines actively seek to serve passengers
flying into and out of Reagan National. Airlines do not view service at other airports as adequate
substitutes for service offered at Reagan National for certain passengers, and thus they are
unlikely to switch away from buying or leasing slots at Reagan National in response to a small
but significant increase in the price of slots. Airlines pay significant sums for slots at Reagan
National, despite having the option of serving passengers through the region’s other airports. A
hypothetical monopolist of slots at Reagan National likely would increase its prices by at least a
small but significant and non-transitory amount. Thus, slots at Reagan National Airport
constitute a line of commerce, section of the country, and relevant market within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
V. THE MERGER IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS
A. Industry Background
32. Today, four network or “legacy” airlines remain in the United States: American,
US Airways, United, and Delta. These four have extensive national and international networks,
connections to hundreds of destinations, established brand names, and strong frequent flyer
reward programs. In addition, there are non-network airlines, including Southwest Airlines and a
handful of smaller firms, which typically do not offer “hub-and-spoke” service.
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33. Airlines compete in many ways. One is the price of a ticket. Airlines also compete based
on: nonstop versus connecting flights; number of destinations served; convenient flight
schedules; passenger comfort and seating policies; choices for classes of service; carry-on
baggage policies; the degree of personal service at ticket counters and boarding areas; onboard
meal and drink service; in-flight entertainment; and the quality and generosity of frequent flyer
programs.
34. Since 2005, the U.S. airline industry has undergone significant consolidation. The
consolidation “wave” started with the 2005 merger between US Airways and America West,
creating today’s US Airways. In 2008, Delta and Northwest Airlines merged; in 2010, United
and Continental merged; and in 2011, Southwest Airlines and AirTran merged. The chart below,
in which one of US Airways’ executive vice presidents referred to industry consolidation as the
“New Holy Grail,” demonstrates that since 2005 the number of major airlines has dropped from
nine to five.
New Order: New Holy Grail - Industry Consolidation
2005 2008 2010
The major airlines have consolidated to 5 from 9 since 2005
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35. Increasing consolidation among large airlines has hurt passengers. The major airlines
have copied each other in raising fares, imposing new fees on travelers, reducing or eliminating
service on a number of city pairs, and downgrading amenities. An August 2012 presentation
from US Airways observes that consolidation has resulted in “Fewer and Larger Competitors.”
The structural change to “fewer and larger competitors” has allowed “[t]he industry” to “reap the
benefits.” Those benefits to the industry are touted by US Airways in the same presentation as
including “capacity reductions” and new “ancillary revenues” like bag fees.
B. Many Relevant Markets Are Highly Concentrated and the Planned Merger
Would Significantly Increase that Concentration
36. In 2005, there were nine major airlines. If this merger were approved, there would be
only four. The three remaining legacy airlines and Southwest would account for over 80% of the
domestic scheduled passenger service market, with the new American becoming the biggest
airline in the world.
37. Market concentration is one useful indicator of the level of competitive vigor in a market,
and the likely competitive effects of a merger. The more concentrated a market, and the more a
transaction would increase concentration in a market, the more likely it is that a transaction
would result in a meaningful reduction in competition. Concentration in relevant markets is
typically measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”). Markets in which the HHI
exceeds 2,500 points are considered highly concentrated. Post-merger increases in HHI of more
than 200 points are considered to be significant increases in concentration.
38. In more than 1,000 of the city pair markets in which American and US Airways currently
compete head-to-head, the post-merger HHI would exceed 2,500 points and the merger would
increase the HHI by more than 200 points. For example, on the Charlotte-Dallas city pair, the
post-merger HHI will increase by 4,648 to 9,319 (out of 10,000). In these markets, US Airways
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and American annually serve more than 14 million passengers and collect more than $6 billion in
fares. The substantial increases in concentration in these highly concentrated markets
demonstrate that in these relevant markets, the merger is presumed, as a matter of law, to be
anticompetitive. The relevant markets described in this paragraph are listed in Appendix A.
39. Other city pairs across the country would likely be affected by the loss of competition
stemming from this planned merger. In some of these markets, US Airways and American
compete head-to-head, often offering consumers discounted fares. If approved, this merger will
likely end much of that discounting, significantly harming consumers in the process. Moreover,
the loss of competition in these markets would increase the likelihood that the remaining airlines
can coordinate to raise price, reduce output, and diminish the quality of their services. In these
relevant markets, the merger is likely also to substantially lessen competition.
40. In the market for slots at Reagan National, the merger would result in a highly
concentrated market, with a post-merger HHI of 4,959. The merger would also significantly
increase concentration by 1,493 points. As a result, the merger should be presumed, as a matter
of law, to be anticompetitive.
C. This Merger Would Increase the Likelihood of Coordinated Behavior Among
the Remaining Network Airlines Causing Higher Fares, Higher Fees, and More
Limited Service
41. The structure of the airline industry is already conducive to coordinated behavior: Few
large players dominate the industry; each transaction is small; and most pricing is readily
transparent.
42. For example, the legacy airlines closely watch the pricing moves of their competitors.
When one airline “leads” a price increase, other airlines frequently respond by following with
price increases of their own. The initiating carrier will lead the price increase and then see if the
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other carriers will match the increase. If they do not, the initiating carrier will generally
withdraw the increase shortly thereafter.
43. The legacy airlines also use what they call “cross-market initiatives,” or “CMIs,” to deter
aggressive discounting and prevent fare wars. A CMI occurs where two or more airlines
compete against each other on multiple routes. If an airline offers discounted fares in one
market, an affected competitor often responds with discounts in another market—a CMI—where
the discounting airline prefers a higher fare. CMIs often cause an airline to withdraw fare
discounts. For example, in the fall of 2009, US Airways lowered fares and relaxed restrictions
on flights out of Detroit (a Delta stronghold) to Philadelphia. Delta responded by offering lower
fares and relaxed restrictions from Boston to Washington (a US Airways stronghold).
US Airways’ team lead for pricing observed Delta’s move and concluded “[w]e have more to
lose in BOSWAS . . . I think we need to bail on the [Detroit-Philadelphia] changes.”
44. There is also past express coordinated behavior in the industry. For example, all airlines
have complete, accurate, and real-time access to every detail of every airline’s published fare
structure on every route through the airline-owned Airline Tariff Publishing Company
(“ATPCO”). US Airways’ management has called ATPCO “a dedicated price-telegraph network
for the industry.” The airlines use ATPCO to monitor and analyze each other’s fares and fare
changes and implement strategies designed to coordinate pricing. Airlines have previously used
ATPCO to engage in coordinated behavior. In 1992, the United States filed a lawsuit to stop
several airlines, including both defendants, from using their ATPCO filings as a signaling device
to facilitate agreements on fares. That lawsuit resulted in a consent decree, now expired.
45. US Airways also has communicated directly with a competitor when it was upset by that
competitor’s efforts to compete more aggressively. In 2010, one of US Airways’ larger rivals
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extended a “triple miles” promotion that set off a market share battle among legacy carriers. The
rival airline was also expanding into new markets and was rumored to be returning planes to its
fleet that had been mothballed during the recession. US Airways’ CEO complained about these
aggressive maneuvers, stating to his senior executives that such actions were “hurting [the rival
airline’s] profitability – and unfortunately everyone else’s.” US Airways’ senior management
debated over email about how best to get the rival airline’s attention and bring it back in line
with the rest of the industry. In that email thread, US Airways’ CEO urged the other executives
to “portray[ ] these guys as idiots to Wall Street and anyone else who’ll listen.” Ultimately, to
make sure the message was received, US Airways’ CEO forwarded the email chain—and its
candid discussion about how aggressive competition would be bad for the industry—directly to
the CEO of the rival airline. (The rival’s CEO immediately responded that it was an
inappropriate communication that he was referring to his general counsel.)
46. Coordination becomes easier as the number of major airlines dwindles and their business
models converge. If not stopped, the merger would likely substantially enhance the ability of the
industry to coordinate on fares, ancillary fees, and service reductions by creating, in the words of
US Airways executives, a “Level Big 3”of network carriers, each with similar sizes, costs, and
structures.
47. Southwest, the only major, non-network airline, and other smaller carriers have networks
and business models that differ significantly from the legacy airlines. Traditionally, Southwest
and other smaller carriers have been less likely to participate in coordinated pricing or service
reductions. For example, Southwest does not charge customers for a first checked bag or ticket
change fees. Yet that has not deterred the legacy carriers from continuing, and even increasing,
those fees. In November 2011, a senior US Airways executive explained to her boss the reason:
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“Our employees know full well that the real competition for us is [American], [Delta], and
[United]. Yes we compete with Southwest and JetBlue, but the product is different and the
customer base is also different.”
1. The Merger Would Likely Result in the Elimination of US Airways’
Advantage Fares
48. On routes where one legacy airline offers nonstop service, the other legacies “generally
respect the pricing of the non-stop carrier,” as American has put it. Thus, if American offers
nonstop service from Washington to Dallas at $800 round-trip, United and Delta will, “[d]espite
having a service disadvantage,” price their connecting fares at the level of American’s nonstop
fares. The legacy carriers do this because if one airline, say Delta, were to undercut fares in
markets where American offers nonstop service, American would likely do the same in Delta’s
nonstop markets. To Delta, the cost of being undercut in its nonstop markets exceeds the benefit
it would receive from winning additional passengers in American nonstop markets.
49. US Airways, alone among the legacy carriers, has a different cost-benefit analysis for
pricing connecting routes. Although it too is a national network carrier, US Airways has hubs in
cities that generate less revenue from passengers flying nonstop than the other legacy airlines’
hubs. Because US Airways’ hubs generate less revenue from passengers flying nonstop,
US Airways must gain more revenue from connecting passengers. It gets that revenue by
offering connecting service that is up to 40% cheaper than other airlines’ nonstop service. US
Airways calls this program “Advantage Fares.”
50. Millions of consumers have benefitted. Advantage Fares offer consumers, especially
those who purchase tickets at the last minute, meaningfully lower fares. The screenshot below
from ITA Software, Airfare Matrix (“ITA”), taken on August 12, 2013, for travel departing on
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August 13 and returning August 14 from Miami to Cincinnati, shows the benefits of US
Airways’ Advantage Fare program to passengers1:
American is the only airline on this route to offer nonstop service, charging $740. Delta and
United do not meaningfully compete. Both charge more for their connecting service than
American charges for nonstop service. Thus, on this particular route, a passenger who chose
Delta or United would pay more for an inferior product. In contrast, US Airways’ fares today
are significantly lower than American’s fares, and offer consumers a real choice. Those
consumers who are more price conscious receive the benefit of a substantially lower-fare option.
In this case, a customer who purchased a US Airways one-stop ticket would save $269 compared
to American’s nonstop service.
51. The benefits from Advantage Fares extend to hundreds of other routes, including those
where more than one carrier offers nonstop service. The screenshot below from ITA, taken on
August 12, 2013, for travel departing on August 13 and returning August 14 from New York to
Houston, demonstrates just how dramatic the savings can be:
1 “Multiple Airlines” refers to an itinerary where a passenger uses different airlines for their
departing and returning flights.
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US Airways’ connecting fare is $870 cheaper than the other legacy carriers’ nonstop flights, and
beats JetBlue and AirTran’s fares by more than $300. Although Southwest does not participate
in the standard online travel sites, a cross-check against the Southwest website demonstrates that
US Airways also beats Southwest’s $887 nonstop fare by more than $300.
52. Other airlines have chosen to respond to Advantage Fares with their own low connecting
fares in markets where US Airways has nonstop service. That is, the other legacy airlines
undercut US Airways’ nonstop fares the same way that US Airways undercuts their nonstop
fares. The screenshot below from ITA, taken on August 12, 2013, for travel on August 13 and
returning August 14 from Charlotte to Syracuse, shows how the other legacy carriers respond to
Advantage Fares to the benefit of consumers:
Here, US Airways is the only airline to offer nonstop service, charging $685. Delta and United
undercut that price by charging $375 and $395, respectively, for connecting service. Once again,
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consumers benefit by having the option of far less expensive connecting service. A customer
who buys a Delta one-stop flight saves $310 over US Airways’ nonstop service.
53. There are over 100 routes where other carriers offer nonstop service on which US
Airways does not offer Advantage Fares. Consumers in these markets are not given the option
of a low-cost connecting alternative and are forced to pay significantly more for service. For
example, US Airways does not currently offer Advantage Fares on flights from Cincinnati to
Pittsburgh. Without the option of a low connecting fare, consumers see significantly higher
prices, as illustrated by a screenshot from ITA, taken on August 12, 2013, for travel on August
13 and returning August 14:
.
54. Advantage Fares have proven highly disruptive to the industry’s overall coordinated
pricing dynamic. An American executive expressed her frustration in September 2011 with
US Airways’ Advantage Fares, noting that US Airways was “still way undercutting us [on flights
from Boston and New York to Dallas] and getting significant share.” One response American
considered was to lower its fares on the same route. Another option was “to take up this battle
w/them again,” in an attempt to force US Airways to limit or abandon its strategy.
55. US Airways’ President acknowledged in September 2010 that its Advantage Fare
strategy “would be different if we had a different route network . . . .” Currently, US Airways’
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network structure precludes Delta and United from preventing US Airways’ aggressive “onestop
pricing.” Because US Airways’ hubs have relatively less nonstop traffic, the other legacy
airlines cannot respond sufficiently to make Advantage Fares unprofitable. But by increasing the
size and scope of US Airways’ network, the merger makes it likely that US Airways will have to
discontinue its Advantage Fares.
56. American’s executives agree. American believes that Advantage Fares will be eliminated
because of the merger. Internal analysis at American in October 2012 concluded that “[t]he
[Advantage Fares] program would have to be eliminated in a merger with American, as
American’s large non-stop markets would now be susceptible to reactionary pricing from Delta
and United.” Another American executive observed that same month: “The industry will force
alignment to a single approach—one that aligns with the large legacy carriers as it is revenue
maximizing.”
57. US Airways believes that it currently gains “most of its advantage fare value from AA,”
meaning that Advantage Fares provide substantial value for US Airways on routes where
American is the legacy airline offering nonstop service. Post-merger, continuing Advantage
Fares would mean that US Airways was taking that value away from itself by undercutting its
own nonstop prices. Plainly, this would make no sense. Thus, for US Airways post-merger, the
benefits of Advantage Fares would go down, and its costs would go up.
58. By ending Advantage Fares, the merger would eliminate lower fares for millions of
consumers. Last year, more than 2.5 million round-trip passengers—including more than
250,000 passengers from the greater Washington, D.C. area; another 250,000 passengers in the
Dallas-Fort Worth area; half a million passengers in the greater New York City area; and
175,000 passengers from Detroit—bought an Advantage Fare ticket. Hundreds of thousands of
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other passengers flying nonstop on US Airways, particularly from their hubs in Phoenix,
Charlotte, and Philadelphia, benefited from responsive fares offered by the legacy airlines.
2. The Merger Would Likely Lead to Increased Industry-Wide “Capacity
Discipline,” Resulting in Higher Fares and Less Service
59. Legacy airlines have taken advantage of increasing consolidation to exercise “capacity
discipline.” “Capacity discipline” has meant restraining growth or reducing established service.
The planned merger would be a further step in that industry-wide effort. In theory, reducing
unused capacity can be an efficient decision that allows a firm to reduce its costs, ultimately
leading to lower consumer prices. In the airline industry, however, recent experience has shown
that capacity discipline has resulted in fewer flights and higher fares.
60. Each significant legacy airline merger in recent years has been followed by substantial
reductions in service and capacity. These capacity reductions have not consisted simply of
cancellation of empty planes or empty seats; rather, when airlines have cut capacity after a
merger, the number of passengers they carry on the affected routes has also decreased.
61. US Airways has recognized that it benefitted from this industry consolidation and the
resulting capacity discipline. US Airways has long taken the position that the capacity cuts
achieved through capacity discipline “enabled” fare increases and that “pricing power” results
from “reduced industry capacity.” US Airways’ CEO explained to investors in 2006 that there is
an “inextricable link” between removing seats and raising fares.
62. In 2005, America West—managed then by many of the same executives who currently
manage US Airways—merged with US Airways. America West had hubs in Phoenix and Las
Vegas while the former US Airways had hubs in Pittsburgh, Charlotte, and Philadelphia.
Following the merger, the combined firm reduced capacity, including significant cuts in
Pittsburgh and Las Vegas. In 2010, the Chief Financial Officer for US Airways explained:
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We believe in the hub system. I just think there’s too many hubs. If you look
across the country, you can probably pick a few that are smaller hubs and maybe
duplicative to other hubs that airlines have that they could probably get out of. In
our example, we merged with US Airways [and] . . . what we have done over
time, which is unfortunate for the cities, but we couldn’t hold a hub in Pittsburgh
and we couldn’t hold a hub in Las Vegas. So over time we have consolidated and
condensed our operation back, which is really important, condensed it back to our
major hubs.
A post-merger US Airways analysis confirmed that it succeeded in obtaining a “3% to 4%
capacity reduction.”
63. In 2006, on the heels of the America West/US Airways merger, the combined firm
submitted an ultimately unsuccessful hostile bid for Delta Air Lines. US Airways’ management
had concluded that a merged US Airways/Delta could reduce the combined carrier’s capacity by
10 percent, which would lead to higher revenues for the combined firm and for the industry. In
2007, following the rejection of the hostile bid, US Airways’ CEO explained to investors how
the deal would have increased industry profits:
It’s part of what we tried to impress upon people as we were going through our
run at Delta, was that . . . it was good for US Airways [and] good for the entire
industry. We’re going to take out 4% of the industry capacity as we did that.
Everyone’s 2008 numbers would look a (expletive) of a lot better had that
transaction happened . . . .
64. In 2008, Delta merged with Northwest Airlines. Despite promises to the contrary, the
combined airline reduced capacity, including significant cuts at its former hubs in Cincinnati and
Memphis. US Airways’ CEO was “quite happy” to see the merger and advocated for further
consolidation. He explained that an industry structure of “five different hub and spoke airlines
with who knows how many hubs across the United States . . . results in all of us fighting for the
same connecting passengers over numerous hubs.” Left unsaid was that fewer airlines meant
less competition and higher fares.
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65. In May 2010, United Airlines and Continental Airlines announced their planned merger.
The announcement caused speculation about the future of each airline’s hubs, including
Continental’s Cleveland hub. In Congressional testimony, an industry analyst stated that he did
not believe the merger would cause reductions in Cleveland. On June 18, 2010, upon seeing the
testimony, US Airways’ CEO wrote an email to other US Airways executives stating, “[s]urely
these guys [United/Continental] aren’t really planning to keep Cleveland open. I’m hopeful
they’re just saying what they need to (including to [the analyst]) to get this approved.” United
and Continental closed their deal on October 1, 2010. The combined firm has reduced capacity
at nearly all of its major hubs (including Cleveland) and at many other airports where the two
airlines previously competed. Similarly, Southwest/AirTran has reduced service in a number of
its focus cities and on many of AirTran’s former routes following its 2011 merger.
66. The defendants are fully aware of these earlier mergers’ effects. A 2012 American
Airlines analysis concluded that “following a merger, carriers tend to remove capacity or grow
more slowly than the rest of the industry.” US Airways’ management concluded that although
industry consolidation has been a success, as its CEO stated publicly in 2010, the industry had
yet to hit its “sweet spot,” and additional consolidation was needed because the industry
remained “overly fragmented.”
67. A merger with American would allow US Airways to hit the “sweet spot.” For
consumers, however, it would be anything but sweet. US Airways believes that merging with
American “finishes industry evolution” by accomplishing US Airways’ goal of “reduc[ing]
capacity more efficiently.” When first considering a combination with American, US Airways
projected that the merged firm could reduce capacity by as much as 10 percent. Similarly,
American expects that the merger will lead to capacity reductions that would negatively impact
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“communities,” “people,” “customers,” and “suppliers.” Higher fares would be right around the
corner.
3. The Planned Merger Would Likely Block American’s Standalone Expansion
Plans, Thwarting Likely Capacity Increases
68. American does not need this merger to thrive, let alone survive. Before the
announcement of this merger, a key component of American’s standalone plan for exiting
bankruptcy revolved around substantial expansion, including increases in both domestic and
international flights. Thus, in 2011, American placed the largest order for new aircraft in the
industry’s history.
69. US Airways executives feared that American’s standalone growth plan would disrupt the
industry’s capacity discipline “momentum.” In a 2012 internal presentation, US Airways
executives recognized that while “[i]ndustry mergers and capacity discipline expand margins,”
American’s standalone “growth plan has potential to disrupt the new dynamic” and would
“Reverse Industry Capacity Trends.” Moreover, US Airways believed that if American
implemented its growth plans, other airlines would “react to AMRs plans with their own
enhanced growth plans destabilizing industry.” US Airways believed that American’s
standalone capacity growth would “negatively impact” industry revenues and threaten industry
pricing.
70. US Airways thought that a merger with American was a “lower risk alternative” than
letting American’s standalone plan come to fruition because US Airways management could
maintain capacity discipline. American’s executives have observed that “the combined network
would likely need to be rationalized,” especially given the merged carrier’s numerous hubs, and
that it is “unlikely that [a combined US Airways/American] would pursue growth . . . .”
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4. The Merger Would Likely Result in Higher Fees
71. Since 2008, the airline industry has increasingly charged consumers fees for services that
were previously included in the price of a ticket. These so-called ancillary fees, including those
for checked bags and flight changes, have become very profitable. In 2012 alone, airlines
generated over $6 billion in fees for checked bags and flight changes. Even a small increase in
these fees would cost consumers millions.
72. Increased consolidation has likely aided the implementation of these fees. The levels of
the ancillary fees charged by the legacy carriers have been largely set in lockstep. One airline
acts as the “price leader,” with others following soon after. Using this process, as a US Airways
strategic plan observed, the airlines can raise their fees without suffering “market share impacts.”
For example, American announced that it would charge for a first checked bag on May 21, 2008.
On June 12, 2008, both United and US Airways followed American’s lead. Similarly, over a
period of just two weeks this spring, all four legacy airlines increased their ticket change fee for
domestic travel from $150 to $200.
73. The legacy airlines recognize that the success of any individual attempt to impose a new
fee or fee increase depends on whether the other legacies follow suit. When, in July 2009,
American matched the other legacy carriers by raising its checked bag fee to $20, but did not join
the others in offering a $5 web discount, US Airways was faced with the decision of whether to
“match” American by either eliminating its own web discount, or raising its price to $25, with a
$5 discount. US Airways’ CEO gave his view:
I can’t believe I’m saying this, but I think we should stand still on this for now. I
recognize that increases the chances of everyone standing still . . . the [dollars]
aren’t compelling enough for us to stick our necks out first. I do think D[elta] or
U[nited] won’t let them have an advantage, so it’ll get matched – I’m just not sure
we should go first. If a couple weeks go by and no one’s moved, we can always
jump in.
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74. Similarly, when US Airways was considering whether to raise its second checked bag fee
to $100 to match Delta’s fee, a US Airways executive observed: “Wow - $100 is a lot for second
bag. I would think there’s big passenger gag reflex associated with that, but if we can get it, we
should charge it. Do you think we should wait for [United] or [American] to move first,
though?”
75. Conversely, in 2008, when US Airways began charging passengers for soft drinks, the
other legacy airlines did not follow its lead, and US Airways backed off. US Airways’ CEO
explained: “With US Airways being the only network carrier to charge for drinks, we are at a
disadvantage.” Had US Airways not rescinded this fee, it would have lost passengers to the
other legacy airlines.
76. At times, the airlines consider new fees or fee increases, but hold off implementing them
while they wait to see if other airlines will move first. For example, on April 18, United
announced that it was increasing its ticket change fee from $150 to $200. American decided that
“waiting for [Delta] and then moving to match if [Delta] comes along” would be its best strategy.
Over the next two weeks, US Airways, Delta, and American each fell in line, leading a US
Airways executive to observe on May 1: “A[merican] increased their change fees this morning.
The network carriers now have the same $200 domestic . . . change fees.”
77. Post-merger, the new American would likely lead new fee increases. A December 2012
discussion between US Airways executives included the observation that after the merger, “even
as the world’s largest airline we’d want to consider raising some of the baggage fees a few
dollars in some of the leisure markets.”
78. New checked bag fees on flights from the United States to Europe are a likely target.
Both US Airways and American have considered imposing a first checked bag fee on flights to
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Europe but have refrained from doing so. US Airways seriously considered leading such a price
move but was concerned that other airlines would not match: “We would hope that [other
airlines] would follow us right away . . . but there is no guarantee . . . .” Ultimately, US Airways
concluded it was “too small” to lead additional checked bag fees for flights to Europe. Postmerger,
that would no longer be true. The merged firm would be the world’s largest airline,
giving it sufficient size to lead industry fee and price increases across the board.
79. Some fee increases are likely to result from US Airways raising American’s existing fees.
Today, “US Airways generally charges higher bag fees than AA” for travel from the United
States to international destinations. Post-merger, US Airways would likely raise American’s
ancillary fees to US Airways’ higher fee levels as part of a “fee harmonization” process. US
Airways’ own documents estimate that “fee harmonization” would generate an additional $280
million in revenue annually—directly harming consumers by the same amount. A US Airways
presentation from earlier this year analyzing the merger identifies American’s lower bag fees as a
“value lever” that US Airways “will likely manage differently with tangible financial upside.”
The analysis concludes that “[i]ncreasing AA baggage fees to match US creates significant
revenue impact.” US Airways also plans to institute its fees ($40 on average) for the redemption
of frequent flyer tickets on American’s existing frequent fliers, who currently are not charged for
mileage redemption.
80. The merger would also likely reduce the quality and variety of ancillary services offered
by the legacy airlines—a side effect of consolidation anticipated and embraced by US Airways’
CEO. In a 2011 email exchange lamenting the need for US Airways to deploy wireless internet
on all of its airplanes, a senior US Airways executive groused:
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[N]ext it will be more legroom. Then industry standard labor contracts. Then
better wines. Then the ability to book on Facebook. Penultimately, television
commercials. Then, finally, we will pay the NYSE an exorbitant fee to change
our ticker symbol [from LCC].
US Airways’ CEO responded: “Easy now. Consolidation will help stop much of the stupid
stuff but inflight internet is not one of them.”
81. If the planned merger is enjoined, both American and US Airways will have to compete
against two larger legacy rivals, and against each other. The four legacy airlines will not look
exactly the same. As the smallest of the legacy airlines, American and US Airways will have
greater incentives to grow and compete aggressively through lower ancillary fees, new services,
and lower fares.
D. The Merger Would Eliminate Head-to-Head Competition in Hundreds of
Relevant Markets and Entrench US Airways’ Dominance at Reagan National
Airport
82. American and US Airways engage in head-to-head competition with nonstop service on
17 domestic routes representing about $2 billion in annual industry-wide revenues. American
and US Airways also compete directly on more than a thousand routes where one or both offer
connecting service, representing billions of dollars in annual revenues. The merger’s elimination
of this head-to-head competition would create strong incentives for the merged airline to reduce
capacity and raise fares where they previously competed.
83. The combined firm would control 69% of the slots at Reagan National Airport, almost six
times more than its closest competitor. This would eliminate head-to-head competition at the
airport between American and US Airways. It would also effectively foreclose entry or
expansion by other airlines that might increase competition at Reagan National.
84. The need for slots is a substantial barrier to entry at Reagan National. The FAA has
occasionally provided a limited number of slots for new service. In almost all cases, however, a
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carrier wishing to begin or expand service at Reagan National must buy or lease slots from an
airline that already owns them.
85. This merger would thwart any prospect for future entry or expansion at Reagan National.
US Airways, which already has 55% of the airport’s slots, does not sell or lease them because
any slot that goes to another airline will almost certainly be used to compete with US Airways.
The merger would only increase US Airways’ incentives to hoard its slots. Today, US Airways
provides nonstop service to 71 airports from Reagan National, and it faces no nonstop
competitors on 55 of those routes. After this merger, the number of US Airways routes with no
nonstop competition would increase to 59, leaving, at best, only 21 routes at the entire airport
with more than one nonstop competitor. Unsurprisingly, Reagan National is US Airways’
second most-profitable airport.
86. Potential entrants would likely not be able to turn to other airlines to obtain slots. When
allocating their slots, airlines prioritize their most profitable routes, typically those where they
have a frequent, significant pattern of service. If a carrier has a small portfolio of slots, it is
likely to allocate almost all of its slots to its most profitable routes. If it has additional slots
beyond what is needed to serve those routes, a carrier will then work its way down to other
routes or sell or lease those slots to other airlines. Over the last several years, US Airways has
purchased nearly all of the slots that might otherwise be available to interested buyers. Thus,
before this planned merger, American was the only airline at Reagan National with the practical
ability to sell or lease additional slots.
87. In March 2010, American and JetBlue entered into an arrangement in which JetBlue
traded slots at New York’s JFK International Airport to American in exchange for American
trading slots at Reagan National to JetBlue. And until American reached agreement with
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US Airways to merge, it had been negotiating to sell those slots and ten other Reagan National
slots to JetBlue.
88. JetBlue’s entry on four routes, particularly Reagan National to Boston, has generated stiff
price competition. Fares on the route have dropped dramatically. US Airways estimated that
after JetBlue’s entry, the last-minute fare for travel between Reagan National and Boston
dropped by over $700. The combined firm will have the right to terminate the JetBlue leases and
thereby eliminate, or at least diminish, JetBlue as a competitor on some or all of these routes.
89. The merger would also eliminate the potential for future head-to-head competition
between US Airways and American on flights at Reagan National. In 2011, US Airways
planned to start service from Reagan National to Miami and St. Louis, which would directly
compete with American’s existing service. US Airways argued to the Department of
Transportation that this new competition would “substantial[ly] benefit[]” consumers, and so
asked DOT to approve the purchase of slots from Delta that would make the service possible.
DOT ultimately approved that purchase. When it developed its plan to merge with American,
however, US Airways abandoned its plans to enter those markets and deprived consumers of the
“substantial benefits” it had promised.
90. By acquiring American’s slot portfolio, US Airways would eliminate existing and future
head-to-head competition, and effectively block other airlines’ competitive entry or expansion.
VI. ABSENCE OF COUNTERVAILING FACTORS
91. New entry, or expansion by existing competitors, is unlikely to prevent or remedy the
merger’s likely anticompetitive effects. New entrants into a particular market face significant
barriers to success, including difficulty in obtaining access to slots and gate facilities; the effects
of corporate discount programs offered by dominant incumbents; loyalty to existing frequent
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flyer programs; an unknown brand; and the risk of aggressive responses to new entry by the
dominant incumbent carrier. In addition, entry is highly unlikely on routes where the origin or
destination airport is another airline’s hub, because the new entrant would face substantial
challenges attracting sufficient local passengers to support service.
92. United and Delta are unlikely to expand in the event of anticompetitive price increases or
capacity reductions by the merged airline. Indeed, those carriers are likely to benefit from and
participate in such conduct by coordinating with the merged firm.
93. The remaining airlines in the United States, including Southwest and JetBlue, have
networks and business models that are significantly different from the legacy airlines. In
particular, most do not have hub-and-spoke networks. In many relevant markets, these airlines
do not offer any service at all, and in other markets, many passengers view them as a less
preferred alternative to the legacy carriers. Therefore, competition from Southwest, JetBlue, or
other airlines would not be sufficient to prevent the anticompetitive consequences of the merger.
94. There are not sufficient acquisition-specific and cognizable efficiencies that would be
passed through to U.S. consumers to rebut the presumption that competition and consumers
would likely be harmed by this merger.
VII. VIOLATION ALLEGED
95. The effect of the proposed merger, if approved, likely will be to lessen competition
substantially, or tend to create a monopoly, in interstate trade and commerce in the relevant
markets, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
96. Unless enjoined, the proposed merger likely would have the following effects in the
relevant markets, among others:
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(a) actual and potential competition between US Airways and American Airlines
would be eliminated;
(b) competition in general among network airlines would be lessened substantially;
(c) ticket prices and ancillary fees would be higher than they otherwise would;
(d) industry capacity would be lower than it otherwise would;
(e) service would be lessened; and
(f) the availability of slots at Reagan National would be significantly impaired.
VIII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF
97. Plaintiffs request:
(a) that US Airways’ proposed merger with American Airlines be adjudged to violate
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18;
(b) that Defendants be permanently enjoined from and restrained from carrying out
the planned merger of US Airways and American or any other transaction that would
combine the two companies;
(c) that Plaintiffs be awarded their costs of this action, including attorneys’ fees to
Plaintiff States; and
(d) that Plaintiffs be awarded such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
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Appendix - Introduction
CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
APPENDIX A
• HHIs in this appendix are calculated based on publicly available airline ticket revenue
data from Department of Transportation’s Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B)
database, available at:
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Databas..._ID=125&Link=0
• Routes are listed only once but include flights at all airports within the metropolitan area
and in both directions. For example, the entry
CITY PAIR ROUTE Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 9319 4648
includes flights from Charlotte, North Carolina, to airports in and around Dallas, Texas,
including both Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) and Love Field (DAL),
and it includes flights from both airports to Charlotte.
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APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 1
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Durango, CO (DRO) 10000 4742 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 6099 2905
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 9319 4648 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 8312 2899
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 9067 4491 Fresno, CA (FAT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 6197 2895
Kahului, HI (OGG) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 9040 4478 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 7991 2892
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 8930 4448 Raleigh, NC (RDU) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6493 2845
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 8659 4259 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6178 2843
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 8920 4205 Austin, TX (AUS) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 6428 2839
Miami, FL (MIA) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 9540 4079 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 6861 2808
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 8174 4006 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 6320 2801
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 8320 3866 Austin, TX (AUS) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 7074 2795
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 7704 3703 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 6274 2772
Miami, FL (MIA) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 8042 3634 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 8978 2770
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Miami, FL (MIA) 8439 3619 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 6793 2753
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 8415 3612 Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 6867 2717
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10000 3600 Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 6680 2700
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 8117 3559 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Reno, NV (RNO) 6887 2672
Hilo, HI (KOA) - Miami, FL (MIA) 7329 3528 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 6671 2664
Hilo, HI (KOA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 7785 3418 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 6057 2662
Kahului, HI (OGG) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 8888 3331 Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 5691 2656
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 7780 3316 Columbus, OH (CMH) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 8177 2621
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10000 3299 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 6759 2575
Salinas, CA (MRY) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6982 3277 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 9515 2574
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 9185 3206 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 5717 2571
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 8016 3185 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5647 2567
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 7903 3165 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 5750 2503
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 7185 3164 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 6024 2501
St. Thomas, VI (STT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 6528 3137 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 5443 2491
Riverside, CA (PSP) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6753 3085 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 6473 2484
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 8339 3085 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 6077 2475
Austin, TX (AUS) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 6499 3068 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 5473 2455
Charleston, WV (CRW) - New York, NY (NYC) 6407 3034 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 6410 2455
Kahului, HI (OGG) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 6897 3033 Hilo, HI (KOA) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 5588 2454
Austin, TX (AUS) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 6547 3027 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 7040 2449
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 10000 3022 Hartford, CT (BDL) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5373 2444
Austin, TX (AUS) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 6499 3006 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6691 2438
Riverside, CA (PSP) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 6968 2985 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 8959 2428
Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 6319 2966 Miami, FL (MIA) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 7592 2423
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Charlottesville, VA (CHO) 8865 2949 Denver, CO (DEN) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5838 2407
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 9061 2948 Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 5878 2402
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 7448 2938 Miami, FL (MIA) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 7973 2388
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 6446 2932 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 7136 2383
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 8116 2923 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 7871 2354
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 44 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 2
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 8140 2349 Nashville, TN (BNA) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5903 1877
Chicago, IL (CHI) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5759 2333 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 7451 1855
Riverside, CA (PSP) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5514 2313 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 5637 1845
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 5708 2305 Charleston, SC (CHS) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5230 1844
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5699 2278 Orlando, FL (MCO) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4514 1834
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Key West, FL (EYW) 5573 2268 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5844 1831
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 5196 2265 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 8601 1831
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 7026 2237 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 5038 1815
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 8361 2227 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 8179 1805
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 5692 2227 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Wilmington, NC (ILM) 6957 1801
Salinas, CA (MRY) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 7706 2199 Kahului, HI (OGG) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 5506 1800
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 5055 2198 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 4635 1799
Fresno, CA (FAT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 5756 2185 Miami, FL (MIA) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 4349 1798
Dallas, TX (DFW) - New York, NY (HPN) 5037 2168 Austin, TX (AUS) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 5961 1791
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 8299 2144 Anchorage, AK (ANC) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 7220 1789
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 6764 2137 Boston, MA (BOS) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5168 1780
Miami, FL (MIA) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5006 2126 Houston, TX (HOU) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 7185 1771
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 5169 2119 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Greenville, SC (GSP) 6372 1759
Columbia, SC (CAE) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 7648 2113 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 5123 1750
Houston, TX (HOU) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5695 2112 San Juan, PR (SJU) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4022 1739
Raleigh, NC (RDU) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4765 2109 Kahului, HI (OGG) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5099 1728
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4757 2098 Boston, MA (BOS) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 5173 1713
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4755 2075 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 4959 1705
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Charlotte, NC (CLT) 6008 2061 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5258 1702
Detroit, MI (DTW) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 8834 2039 Key West, FL (EYW) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4530 1697
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Chicago, IL (CHI) 6818 2039 Austin, TX (AUS) - Charlotte, NC (CLT) 5600 1693
Charleston, SC (CHS) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5380 2037 Austin, TX (AUS) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5300 1687
Boston, MA (BOS) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4871 2021 San Diego, CA (SAN) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4198 1678
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Reno, NV (RNO) 8619 2009 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 4883 1669
Austin, TX (AUS) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 5363 2008 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 7380 1667
Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 7273 2004 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 7530 1665
Boston, MA (BOS) - Key West, FL (EYW) 6327 1984 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 7085 1645
Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5239 1968 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 7120 1638
San Juan, PR (SJU) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 4709 1950 Miami, FL (MIA) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5692 1619
Boston, MA (BOS) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 4922 1947 San Juan, PR (SJU) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4512 1599
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 5457 1946 San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4923 1597
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5466 1944 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 7794 1590
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 7094 1936 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4835 1574
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Key West, FL (EYW) 4983 1931 Orlando, FL (MCO) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 4336 1571
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 6048 1909 Buffalo, NY (BUF) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4703 1555
Kahului, HI (OGG) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5275 1901 Hartford, CT (BDL) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4699 1547
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4883 1885 Dallas, TX (DFW) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 9396 1546
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 45 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 3
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Syracuse, NY (SYR) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4609 1545 Riverside, CA (PSP) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4360 1300
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4711 1541 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4786 1292
St. Louis, MO (STL) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6580 1541 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 3874 1292
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Charlotte, NC (CLT) 4986 1540 New York, NY (NYC) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 4283 1278
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 4545 1531 St. Louis, MO (STL) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4306 1273
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5158 1519 Nashville, TN (BNA) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4957 1262
Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5474 1517 Austin, TX (AUS) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4531 1259
Miami, FL (MIA) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4566 1502 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 8308 1249
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 6622 1495 Key West, FL (EYW) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 4746 1247
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 5045 1492 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 5087 1237
Dallas, TX (DFW) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3842 1491 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 5000 1225
New York, NY (HPN) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4437 1484 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 3984 1225
Boston, MA (BOS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3631 1479 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 4797 1223
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 4745 1476 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3728 1215
Richmond, VA (RIC) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5002 1466 Boston, MA (BOS) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 5009 1210
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4209 1462 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 6239 1205
Savannah, GA (SAV) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 5215 1462 Miami, FL (MIA) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 3821 1203
Seattle, WA (SEA) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3824 1462 Kahului, HI (OGG) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5157 1199
Charleston, SC (CHS) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 5315 1457 St. Thomas, VI (STT) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5006 1192
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 7993 1449 Raleigh, NC (RDU) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4878 1190
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 4974 1446 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 4656 1187
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4286 1431 Washington, DC (WAS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4195 1185
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4426 1430 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3980 1184
New Orleans, LA (MSY) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5276 1418 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 4661 1179
Durango, CO (DRO) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5283 1417 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4761 1179
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4701 1410 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Cape Coral, FL (RSW) 7914 1179
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4010 1409 Boston, MA (BOS) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 5013 1174
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Des Moines, IA (DSM) 5161 1397 Cleveland, OH (CLE) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3567 1156
Denver, CO (DEN) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3816 1381 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5578 1152
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4340 1380 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - New York, NY (NYC) 5408 1150
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4537 1377 New York, NY (NYC) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3573 1148
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4983 1371 Columbus, OH (CMH) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4530 1146
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4282 1350 New York, NY (HPN) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 4898 1145
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9330 1331 Hilo, HI (KOA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4981 1138
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 3926 1328 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 6180 1137
Boston, MA (BOS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4474 1327 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 7828 1136
Dallas, TX (DFW) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 6896 1323 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3722 1134
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 5134 1322 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3868 1133
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 6867 1319 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 7635 1133
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 5268 1317 Tampa, FL (TPA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3663 1128
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 5037 1311 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 5393 1121
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Jacksonville, FL (JAX) 7090 1309 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3779 1116
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 46 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 4
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4623 1115 Boston, MA (BOS) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 3387 969
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 8367 1113 Key West, FL (EYW) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5114 968
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Washington, DC (WAS) 7111 1111 Chicago, IL (CHI) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 5089 966
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 4729 1110 New York, NY (HPN) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3559 965
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6199 1105 New York, NY (NYC) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3967 963
Miami, FL (MIA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3350 1099 Knoxville, TN (TYS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4759 958
Boston, MA (BOS) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3228 1097 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 5509 956
Miami, FL (MIA) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5213 1089 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3526 954
Tampa, FL (TPA) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4809 1089 Louisville, KY (SDF) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4899 951
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 4812 1089 New York, NY (NYC) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 3084 950
Houston, TX (HOU) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 4827 1087 New York, NY (NYC) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 3873 947
New York, NY (NYC) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4238 1074 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Miami, FL (PBI) 6542 929
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3998 1073 Boston, MA (BOS) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 3066 928
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 4704 1072 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3978 925
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3776 1067 Nashville, TN (BNA) - New York, NY (NYC) 3518 923
Cape Coral, FL (RSW) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4835 1066 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4235 917
Chicago, IL (CHI) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 2806 1059 Riverside, CA (ONT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4014 914
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3508 1059 Charleston, SC (CHS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5048 912
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 9283 1058 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3776 910
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3640 1055 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 4549 908
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 4494 1054 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4515 907
Dallas, TX (DFW) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6531 1050 Boston, MA (BOS) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 5624 900
Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4322 1049 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 3588 893
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4751 1047 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3780 890
Fresno, CA (FAT) - New York, NY (NYC) 4255 1046 St. Louis, MO (STL) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3539 890
Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 4720 1043 Birmingham, AL (BHM) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5001 889
Austin, TX (AUS) - Columbia, SC (CAE) 4351 1043 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3944 885
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4112 1038 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 5451 883
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Houston, TX (HOU) 4575 1036 Detroit, MI (DTW) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 3512 879
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3293 1027 Grand Junction, CO (GJT) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4499 878
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 3113 1021 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 4819 878
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3462 1018 Richmond, VA (RIC) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4157 873
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 7965 1014 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3287 869
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Miami, FL (PBI) 8074 1013 Detroit, MI (DTW) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 4561 864
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3763 1013 New York, NY (NYC) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 4872 863
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4164 1012 New York, NY (HPN) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4657 863
San Francisco, CA (SFO) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3252 1009 Miami, FL (MIA) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3750 862
Durango, CO (DRO) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5052 1007 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4567 860
San Juan, PR (SJU) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4985 1000 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 3066 855
San Francisco, CA (SFO) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4846 995 Austin, TX (AUS) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 4490 852
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5457 993 Montgomery, AL (MGM) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5064 848
Riverside, CA (ONT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3341 992 Montgomery, AL (MGM) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5152 846
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 47 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 5
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Tucson, AZ (TUS) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4247 845 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 8376 746
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3902 843 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3272 736
Austin, TX (AUS) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 3439 843 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 2808 734
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3700 838 Birmingham, AL (BHM) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3583 732
New York, NY (HPN) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3322 838 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 4474 729
Miami, FL (MIA) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 3305 837 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - New York, NY (NYC) 3025 728
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3482 832 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 4387 728
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 7233 823 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4243 726
Birmingham, AL (BHM) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10000 821 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4481 726
Lexington, KY (LEX) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4181 819 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3403 725
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4812 816 Gainesville, FL (GNV) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 6576 724
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5930 816 New York, NY (HPN) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 3744 723
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 5004 814 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3651 718
Miami, FL (MIA) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 3423 814 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4795 718
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3847 807 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5224 718
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 2953 805 Columbia, SC (CAE) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5277 716
Cape Coral, FL (RSW) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5127 801 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 3495 714
New Orleans, LA (MSY) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5674 799 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5159 711
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3500 799 Buffalo, NY (BUF) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 3590 708
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4887 796 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4584 707
Louisville, KY (SDF) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4886 795 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 3665 706
Detroit, MI (DTW) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3117 791 Rochester, NY (ROC) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4513 705
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3397 785 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 2905 699
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5219 784 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 4569 698
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Denver, CO (DEN) 4302 784 Miami, FL (MIA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4278 696
Boston, MA (BOS) - Gainesville, FL (GNV) 5346 783 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 3707 693
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3900 782 Raleigh, NC (RDU) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3411 690
Austin, TX (AUS) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 2837 777 San Jose, CA (SJC) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3553 689
Austin, TX (AUS) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3835 776 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 2862 687
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3255 773 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3045 687
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4199 772 Miami, FL (PBI) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3238 684
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Portland, OR (PDX) 4837 770 Durango, CO (DRO) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 5017 682
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 5375 764 Boston, MA (BOS) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4044 682
Kahului, HI (OGG) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4700 761 Miami, FL (MIA) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2993 682
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2842 755 Richmond, VA (RIC) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 2976 681
Dallas, TX (DFW) - New York, NY (NYC) 5211 754 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 7529 677
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4719 751 Nashville, TN (BNA) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9444 671
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2923 750 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Cape Coral, FL (RSW) 2711 670
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 4050 750 New York, NY (HPN) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3511 668
Seattle, WA (SEA) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4204 748 Columbus, OH (CMH) - New York, NY (NYC) 3137 666
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 3570 748 Reno, NV (RNO) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3854 663
Denver, CO (DEN) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 4845 747 Savannah, GA (SAV) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4952 659
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 48 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 6
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3419 659 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 3258 599
Key West, FL (EYW) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3829 657 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3161 596
Columbia, SC (CAE) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3605 657 New York, NY (HPN) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 3448 596
New York, NY (NYC) - Reno, NV (RNO) 2886 656 Columbus, OH (CMH) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3131 594
Los Angeles, CA (SNA) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2872 655 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 6997 592
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3204 655 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 5356 591
New York, NY (HPN) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 2975 655 Key West, FL (EYW) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 6164 591
San Juan, PR (SJU) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5177 651 New York, NY (HPN) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4688 589
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4816 649 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5095 588
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 7180 647 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 5385 587
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3270 645 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3257 586
Houston, TX (HOU) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 5285 645 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4543 580
Richmond, VA (RIC) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3125 645 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Miami, FL (PBI) 5020 580
Boston, MA (BOS) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 5303 644 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 6547 580
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 4227 644 Boston, MA (BOS) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 3335 577
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4665 643 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4426 577
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Key West, FL (EYW) 5219 641 Miami, FL (MIA) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3313 577
Orlando, FL (MCO) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 2754 640 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3439 573
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5109 639 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Wilmington, NC (ILM) 5027 570
Chicago, IL (CHI) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 4974 639 Lexington, KY (LEX) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3795 570
Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4545 636 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3840 567
Columbus, OH (CMH) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3066 635 Miami, FL (PBI) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5232 566
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - New York, NY (HPN) 4686 634 Hilo, HI (KOA) - New York, NY (NYC) 2683 565
Miami, FL (PBI) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3204 633 Nashville, TN (BNA) - New York, NY (HPN) 4351 565
Boston, MA (BOS) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4454 630 St. Thomas, VI (STT) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 5261 564
San Juan, PR (SJU) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4579 628 Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3050 564
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5211 624 Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 2857 563
Pensacola, FL (PNS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4492 622 Cape Coral, FL (RSW) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2681 563
Riverside, CA (ONT) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3569 620 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5970 560
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Denver, CO (DEN) 5343 614 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 2903 560
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3085 612 Columbus, OH (CMH) - New York, NY (HPN) 6310 560
Los Angeles, CA (SNA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3356 609 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3275 558
Columbia, SC (CAE) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4511 606 Charleston, SC (CHS) - Key West, FL (EYW) 5545 557
Boston, MA (BOS) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 3047 606 San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 4287 555
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 4599 605 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 5320 555
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3250 605 Austin, TX (AUS) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 4018 552
Riverside, CA (ONT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2910 604 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 2905 552
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 4921 602 Salinas, CA (MRY) - New York, NY (NYC) 5542 551
Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 2533 602 San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4405 551
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4523 602 San Antonio, TX (SAT) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 4077 548
New York, NY (HPN) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 4494 601 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4300 548
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 2798 601 New York, NY (HPN) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3258 548
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 49 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 7
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Denver, CO (DEN) 5192 547 Miami, FL (MIA) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 2774 503
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3298 544 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3442 502
Richmond, VA (RIC) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3084 544 Greenville, SC (GSP) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5272 501
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4015 544 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 4506 500
Birmingham, AL (BHM) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5331 543 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 6388 500
New York, NY (NYC) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 2993 543 Boston, MA (BOS) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 4509 498
Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3132 541 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 3832 498
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 2750 537 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 9022 496
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4938 535 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 5346 495
Austin, TX (AUS) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4193 534 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Jacksonville, FL (JAX) 4522 495
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 5285 534 Riverside, CA (ONT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3842 493
Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 5304 533 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3346 491
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - New York, NY (NYC) 4830 533 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3641 490
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Jacksonville, FL (JAX) 2940 532 San Jose, CA (SJC) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3037 490
Montgomery, AL (MGM) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 5057 529 Orlando, FL (MCO) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3072 488
Hilo, HI (KOA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4514 529 Charleston, SC (CHS) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9341 488
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3189 529 Raleigh, NC (RDU) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2590 487
Raleigh, NC (RDU) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2582 528 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3342 484
San Diego, CA (SAN) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2600 528 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4445 478
Chicago, IL (CHI) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9841 528 Denver, CO (DEN) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 5661 476
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5112 528 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Charlottesville, VA (CHO) 6270 476
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 5886 527 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4533 476
Denver, CO (DEN) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 3415 526 Kahului, HI (OGG) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4623 475
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4543 526 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 3620 474
Nashville, TN (BNA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4006 524 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3941 474
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 3274 524 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3105 473
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5470 523 Houston, TX (HOU) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3072 472
Key West, FL (EYW) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 5612 523 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 2507 472
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 4832 522 Boston, MA (BOS) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4142 472
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4171 520 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 4152 471
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4916 519 Richmond, VA (RIC) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3411 466
Boston, MA (BOS) - Des Moines, IA (DSM) 2605 518 Durango, CO (DRO) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5257 466
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4343 517 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3576 465
Denver, CO (DEN) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 2855 516 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Gulfport, MS (GPT) 4883 465
Miami, FL (MIA) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4933 514 Wilmington, NC (ILM) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 5396 464
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - New York, NY (NYC) 2752 514 Miami, FL (MIA) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 4094 463
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 3529 512 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 4541 461
Denver, CO (DEN) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 4782 511 Key West, FL (EYW) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4897 460
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 4602 510 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 5393 456
Omaha, NE (OMA) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3521 508 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 5000 456
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5315 504 San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5781 455
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3349 504 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 2713 455
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 50 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 8
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Detroit, MI (DTW) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 2931 454 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2991 413
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2628 453 Montgomery, AL (MGM) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 5549 412
Houston, TX (HOU) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 3960 451 Houston, TX (HOU) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 5437 411
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Cape Coral, FL (RSW) 4582 451 Memphis, TN (MEM) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4082 404
El Paso, TX (ELP) - New York, NY (NYC) 4710 450 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Key West, FL (EYW) 4663 404
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 5225 450 Boston, MA (BOS) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3632 404
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6079 449 Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 3969 404
Denver, CO (DEN) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 3761 446 Richmond, VA (RIC) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 3512 403
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Miami, FL (PBI) 3421 445 Miami, FL (PBI) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3500 403
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 4073 443 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 3136 403
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5347 442 Boston, MA (BOS) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 3855 402
Miami, FL (MIA) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 3141 442 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 4478 402
Rochester, NY (ROC) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 3431 441 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5150 402
Key West, FL (EYW) - New York, NY (NYC) 3767 441 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) 5950 398
Nashville, TN (BNA) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4010 440 San Jose, CA (SJC) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2594 397
New York, NY (HPN) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3029 439 Jackson, MS (JAN) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 2850 397
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3193 437 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3460 396
Omaha, NE (OMA) - Miami, FL (PBI) 4576 436 Austin, TX (AUS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 2692 396
Anchorage, AK (ANC) - Columbus, OH (CMH) 3993 435 Reno, NV (RNO) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2700 395
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 3129 433 Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4121 395
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2625 431 Austin, TX (AUS) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3369 394
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Portland, OR (PDX) 4077 431 Salinas, CA (MRY) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 9083 393
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 4718 431 Boston, MA (BOS) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 3126 393
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 3480 431 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 3086 392
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 6570 431 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 3863 390
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 5739 431 Denver, CO (DEN) - Miami, FL (PBI) 3280 390
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3540 430 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5023 390
Raleigh, NC (RDU) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2819 429 Austin, TX (AUS) - Durango, CO (DRO) 3946 389
San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2502 428 Austin, TX (AUS) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3121 388
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5296 428 Austin, TX (AUS) - Charlottesville, VA (CHO) 4508 386
Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2619 427 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Columbus, OH (CMH) 4922 386
Raleigh, NC (RDU) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2545 426 Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 3346 385
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3770 423 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Houston, TX (HOU) 5565 384
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 4118 421 Memphis, TN (MEM) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4378 383
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 2632 418 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 5633 383
New York, NY (NYC) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 2619 416 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 5381 381
Mobile, AL (MOB) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3393 415 Miami, FL (MIA) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3146 381
Tallahassee, FL (TLH) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5582 415 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3073 380
Key West, FL (EYW) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 5533 415 Austin, TX (AUS) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 2774 379
Mobile, AL (MOB) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4683 415 Lexington, KY (LEX) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4516 377
Riverside, CA (ONT) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3463 414 Miami, FL (MIA) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 3320 375
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 5736 413 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 3352 373
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 51 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 9
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 6979 372 New York, NY (NYC) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 3065 344
Memphis, TN (MEM) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4175 372 Rochester, NY (ROC) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3063 343
New York, NY (NYC) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3201 372 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 5718 343
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2947 372 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Des Moines, IA (DSM) 4459 343
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Wilmington, NC (ILM) 5639 372 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3640 342
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4120 371 Cape Coral, FL (RSW) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2930 342
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Portland, OR (PDX) 3709 371 Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2638 342
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 5129 371 Los Angeles, CA (SNA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2798 341
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 3145 371 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3012 340
Kahului, HI (OGG) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 3497 370 Reno, NV (RNO) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3938 340
Cape Coral, FL (RSW) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4369 368 Miami, FL (PBI) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3470 339
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3284 368 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Cape Coral, FL (RSW) 2683 339
San Diego, CA (SAN) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 2967 367 Lexington, KY (LEX) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3416 338
Columbus, OH (CMH) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2702 366 San Francisco, CA (SFO) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 2644 338
Anchorage, AK (ANC) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3503 365 Austin, TX (AUS) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4331 337
Buffalo, NY (BUF) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 2779 365 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 4564 336
Houston, TX (HOU) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 2778 362 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 4641 336
Reno, NV (RNO) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4524 361 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Miami, FL (MIA) 6537 335
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 6035 360 Austin, TX (AUS) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 4641 334
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3479 360 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Cincinnati, OH (CIN) 4797 333
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5407 358 Orlando, FL (MCO) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4022 333
Austin, TX (AUS) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 3323 357 Key West, FL (EYW) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 5833 332
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 5869 356 San Jose, CA (SJC) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5027 331
Orlando, FL (MCO) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4353 355 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 5006 330
Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 5688 353 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 3922 328
Houston, TX (HOU) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 5668 353 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 5947 328
Boston, MA (BOS) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 5456 352 Boston, MA (BOS) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 5419 328
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4636 352 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 2541 327
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3973 352 Pensacola, FL (PNS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4740 327
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 3046 351 El Paso, TX (ELP) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 5326 327
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Miami, FL (PBI) 5040 350 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4185 326
Denver, CO (DEN) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 5380 350 Durango, CO (DRO) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 6192 326
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 2629 350 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Boston, MA (BOS) 2885 325
Seattle, WA (SEA) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 3723 349 Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3678 325
Austin, TX (AUS) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 3718 349 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3715 324
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Greenville, SC (GSP) 4251 348 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 3917 323
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4617 348 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Gulfport, MS (GPT) 4617 323
Lexington, KY (LEX) - New York, NY (NYC) 4458 348 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 4599 321
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Detroit, MI (DTW) 4006 347 Anchorage, AK (ANC) - Charlotte, NC (CLT) 4572 321
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 5418 346 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2599 321
St. Louis, MO (STL) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 5379 345 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3201 320
Miami, FL (MIA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3736 345 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3532 319
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 52 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 10
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Wilmington, NC (ILM) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 5191 319 Austin, TX (AUS) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 2846 299
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 4815 318 Seattle, WA (SEA) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6209 298
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3776 318 Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3796 298
Columbus, OH (CMH) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2615 317 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 4230 297
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4540 317 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 3885 297
Grand Junction, CO (GJT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 5003 317 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 2818 297
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 5067 317 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3345 296
Wilmington, NC (ILM) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 6101 317 New York, NY (HPN) - Memphis, TN (MEM) 4067 295
St. Louis, MO (STL) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5690 316 Hilo, HI (KOA) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4454 295
Greenville, SC (GSP) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3094 316 Salinas, CA (MRY) - Washington, DC (WAS) 5619 295
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4397 315 Austin, TX (AUS) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 2609 295
Hartford, CT (BDL) - New Orleans, LA (MSY) 2920 315 Gulfport, MS (GPT) - New York, NY (NYC) 4484 295
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 2594 314 Boston, MA (BOS) - Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) 4280 293
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5910 313 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3986 293
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2844 313 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3930 293
Hartford, CT (BDL) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2509 312 Key West, FL (EYW) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 6170 293
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 2667 311 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 4099 293
Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 3358 311 San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 3454 293
Nashville, TN (BNA) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3909 310 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 4246 293
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3291 310 Cape Coral, FL (RSW) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2676 291
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3126 310 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 9574 290
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - New York, NY (HPN) 4704 310 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 4094 290
Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5288 310 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4704 289
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - New Orleans, LA (MSY) 6253 309 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Gulfport, MS (GPT) 4618 289
Boston, MA (BOS) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 4955 309 Charleston, SC (CHS) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3071 289
San Juan, PR (SJU) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 4901 309 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3884 288
Austin, TX (AUS) - Hartford, CT (BDL) 2809 309 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 2888 288
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3185 308 Denver, CO (DEN) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 3382 287
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 6035 307 St. Louis, MO (STL) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9073 287
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3387 307 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 3581 287
Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3322 307 Lexington, KY (LEX) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4320 287
Omaha, NE (OMA) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6189 307 Jackson, MS (JAN) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 4719 287
Columbia, SC (CAE) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 4527 306 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 5478 287
San Diego, CA (SAN) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 2797 306 Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4028 286
New York, NY (HPN) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 4195 305 Montgomery, AL (MGM) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 6343 286
Boston, MA (BOS) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5024 304 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Cape Coral, FL (RSW) 3056 286
Dallas, TX (DFW) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10000 303 Syracuse, NY (SYR) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4611 286
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 4050 303 Miami, FL (PBI) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3433 286
San Juan, PR (SJU) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 6112 301 Sacramento, CA (SMF) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2501 285
Seattle, WA (SEA) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 2852 301 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 3660 285
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Key West, FL (EYW) 3494 300 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 4733 285
Sacramento, CA (SMF) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 2582 299 St. Louis, MO (STL) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3561 284
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 53 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 11
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Gainesville, FL (GNV) 6248 283 Mobile, AL (MOB) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3410 261
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3346 283 Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2876 260
New York, NY (NYC) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 4681 282 Omaha, NE (OMA) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2766 260
Jackson, MS (JAN) - New York, NY (NYC) 3886 282 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4309 259
New York, NY (HPN) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4864 280 Columbia, SC (CAE) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3457 259
Denver, CO (DEN) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 3366 280 Austin, TX (AUS) - Chattanooga, TN (CHA) 5587 258
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 5509 278 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 3604 257
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 5237 278 Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4338 257
Key West, FL (EYW) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3483 277 Boston, MA (BOS) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 3307 257
Columbus, OH (CMH) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 4590 276 Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 6289 256
Houston, TX (HOU) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4404 276 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3508 256
Louisville, KY (SDF) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3612 275 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3311 255
Miami, FL (MIA) - New Orleans, LA (MSY) 4056 275 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3396 255
Greenville, SC (GSP) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 2929 274 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5014 255
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 3293 273 Austin, TX (AUS) - Cincinnati, OH (CIN) 3879 254
Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 4131 272 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 5733 254
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 2756 272 Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 2934 254
Hartford, CT (BDL) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2651 271 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 3827 253
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 2970 271 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 5972 252
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3775 271 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 5590 252
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 4014 270 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4697 251
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5804 270 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5168 250
Dallas, TX (DFW) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 4033 270 Raleigh, NC (RDU) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5133 249
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 3273 270 Boston, MA (BOS) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 4940 249
St. Thomas, VI (STT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 4436 269 Grand Junction, CO (GJT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5388 249
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Miami, FL (PBI) 3537 269 Austin, TX (AUS) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4141 249
Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 5458 268 Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 5173 248
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Riverside, CA (PSP) 6530 268 El Paso, TX (ELP) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 5400 248
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2515 267 Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2916 248
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 4591 266 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Houston, TX (HOU) 4051 248
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 2572 266 Boston, MA (BOS) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3887 248
Anchorage, AK (ANC) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 5094 266 Birmingham, AL (BHM) - Key West, FL (EYW) 4205 247
New Orleans, LA (MSY) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3952 265 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Jackson, MS (JAN) 3698 247
Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4213 265 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Jackson, MS (JAN) 4440 247
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Miami, FL (PBI) 4823 264 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3892 246
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4883 263 Charleston, SC (CHS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5979 246
Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3661 262 Wilmington, NC (ILM) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 6043 246
Cape Coral, FL (RSW) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2839 262 Columbia, SC (CAE) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3428 245
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 7869 261 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4913 245
Sacramento, CA (SMF) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2686 261 St. Louis, MO (STL) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 5733 245
Austin, TX (AUS) - Cape Coral, FL (RSW) 2913 261 Austin, TX (AUS) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4814 244
Richmond, VA (RIC) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 2720 261 Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3399 230
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 54 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 12
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Houston, TX (HOU) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4044 244 Key West, FL (EYW) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 5747 230
Denver, CO (DEN) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4020 244 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Durango, CO (DRO) 4052 230
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 3146 244 Key West, FL (EYW) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 6277 229
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 4450 244 St. Croix, VI (STX) - Washington, DC (WAS) 8150 229
Boston, MA (BOS) - Jackson, MS (JAN) 3999 243 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6416 229
Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3832 243 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4759 229
Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3887 242 Boston, MA (BOS) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 5003 228
Huntsville, AL (HSV) - New York, NY (NYC) 4033 242 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 2935 227
San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3400 242 Columbia, SC (CAE) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 4515 227
Miami, FL (MIA) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 2831 240 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 5156 226
Lexington, KY (LEX) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 4466 240 Memphis, TN (MEM) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4421 226
Montgomery, AL (MGM) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 5257 239 Memphis, TN (MEM) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3520 226
Huntsville, AL (HSV) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3449 239 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4887 226
Savannah, GA (SAV) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3791 239 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3666 226
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Raleigh, NC (RDU) 5092 239 Charleston, SC (CHS) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3380 226
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4822 238 San Diego, CA (SAN) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3233 226
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3355 238 Seattle, WA (SEA) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3046 225
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 4288 237 Denver, CO (DEN) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5975 225
Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 4742 237 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 3907 224
Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3441 237 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 3815 223
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 6507 236 Denver, CO (DEN) - New York, NY (HPN) 3819 223
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - New York, NY (NYC) 3093 235 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4745 222
Birmingham, AL (BHM) - Des Moines, IA (DSM) 4292 235 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3060 222
Hartford, CT (BDL) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2916 235 Salinas, CA (MRY) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 6650 221
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 5054 234 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 6569 220
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 4517 234 San Diego, CA (SAN) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6434 219
Pensacola, FL (PNS) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3713 234 Key West, FL (EYW) - Memphis, TN (MEM) 6557 219
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2772 233 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - New York, NY (HPN) 3464 219
Pensacola, FL (PNS) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2909 233 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4389 219
Austin, TX (AUS) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 4674 233 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3435 219
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 4929 233 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - New York, NY (NYC) 3718 218
Omaha, NE (OMA) - Cape Coral, FL (RSW) 3008 233 Jackson, MS (JAN) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4304 218
Wilmington, NC (ILM) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5337 232 Mobile, AL (MOB) - New York, NY (NYC) 4452 218
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3945 232 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3054 218
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Riverside, CA (ONT) 3941 232 Boston, MA (BOS) - Gulfport, MS (GPT) 5213 218
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 4397 232 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Los Angeles, CA (SNA) 3839 217
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 6662 231 Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3247 217
Greenville, SC (GSP) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 4770 231 Mobile, AL (MOB) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 5888 217
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 2586 231 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 2594 215
Grand Junction, CO (GJT) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 4457 231 Denver, CO (DEN) - Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 2598 215
Key West, FL (EYW) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 6973 230 Wilmington, NC (ILM) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6783 215
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4463 230 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6205 215
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 55 of 56
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix 13
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI Δ HHI
Columbia, SC (CAE) - Houston, TX (HOU) 3633 215
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3556 215
New York, NY (NYC) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2806 214
Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4647 214
San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3547 214
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 4997 214
New York, NY (NYC) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 2996 214
Jackson, MS (JAN) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 5568 213
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4598 213
Omaha, NE (OMA) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3596 213
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 4240 212
Charleston, WV (CRW) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 4244 212
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3919 212
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Cape Coral, FL (RSW) 3859 211
Houston, TX (HOU) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 6373 211
New York, NY (HPN) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 3142 210
Pensacola, FL (PNS) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5346 210
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4872 209
Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 3659 208
Houston, TX (HOU) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3267 207
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2610 207
Austin, TX (AUS) - Greenville, SC (GSP) 2984 207
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Boston, MA (BOS) 3294 207
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 2755 207
Houston, TX (HOU) - Salinas, CA (MRY) 6287 206
Jackson, MS (JAN) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 6244 205
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - New York, NY (NYC) 5046 205
Miami, FL (MIA) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 5066 204
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3462 203
Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Greenville, SC (GSP) 4923 203
Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5030 203
New York, NY (NYC) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 2810 203
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2858 203
Austin, TX (AUS) - Charleston, SC (CHS) 3275 201
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Detroit, MI (DTW) 5080 201
Case 1:13-cv-01236 Document 1 Filed 08/13/13 Page 56 of 56

Microwave

As this topic is already being discussed (and a link to this document included) in the relevant thread (on page one of the thread list), this thread will be closed.

Please keep in mind that, until the merger is approved, discussion regarding the merger should be confined to the relevant extant threads. Furthermore, OPs of this length are not conducive at all to discussion and are not recommended.

~Moderator