SOP dissection.
Dec 10, 2009 | 8:12 am
#1
Original Poster
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Florida
Posts: 3,006
SOP dissection.
While it has been fun watching the TSA, media and a Congress committee lose their collective minds over this security breach, I think it is time we buckle down and dissect the SOP.
I am placing this discussion here to separate it from the media watch the SOP discussion has become. (Don't get me wrong we need the media watch)
We already know that TSO screenings before work don't happen in some airports in violation of 4.3.13 (A) of the SOP and in violation of Title 49 1540.107 (A)
But what about all the people listed in 4.3.13 (C)?
How can the TSA even pretend the sterile area is not a muddy pit when a large portion of the people that are allowed in under the guise "working" without being screened.
p.s. I can't post from work anymore, my boss got paranoid because of the way the media is portraying us. 
I am placing this discussion here to separate it from the media watch the SOP discussion has become. (Don't get me wrong we need the media watch)
We already know that TSO screenings before work don't happen in some airports in violation of 4.3.13 (A) of the SOP and in violation of Title 49 1540.107 (A)
But what about all the people listed in 4.3.13 (C)?
How can the TSA even pretend the sterile area is not a muddy pit when a large portion of the people that are allowed in under the guise "working" without being screened.
4.3.13.TSA PERSONNEL
A.TSOs who enter the sterile area through the screening checkpoint must undergo screening at the beginning of their shift. TSOs who exit the screening checkpoint to perform work within the scope of their screening duties (such as assisting with passengers or collecting divest bins) need not be rescreened upon reentering the screening checkpoint. Where the FSD has waived TSO rescreening, TSOs who leave the screening checkpoint area and are completely out of sight for rest breaks, lunch, etc. need not be rescreened upon returning to the screening checkpoint after presenting their TSA employee ID or local airport ID for review by a TSO or designated TSA representative. However, where the FSD has elected to waive TSO rescreening, the FSD must implement random screening of TSOs returning from breaks.
B.FSDs may exempt themselves, DFSDs, AFSDs/DAFSDs for Screening, training coordinators, training specialists, scheduling operations officers, TSMs, Stakeholder Managers/Liaisons, STSOs, and LTSOsfrom screening, while on duty, after presenting their TSA employee ID or local airport ID for review by a TSO or TSA representative designated by the FSD. On duty includes meals and rest breaks.
C.The following credentialed TSA employees on official business at an airport with a valid TSA credential (and badge, if issued) are exempt from screening while performing official duties at that airport after presenting the credential (and badge) for review by a TSO. TSA credentialed employees are NOT exempt from screening when boarding an aircraft as part of official duty travel. These TSA credentialed employees are not permitted to escort individuals around or through the screening checkpoint to bypass screening unless otherwise permitted by this SOP.
1)TSA Inspector (credential only)
2)TSA Executive (credential only)
3)TSA Critical Personnel (credential only)
4)TSA Transportation Security Specialist (credential only)
5)Federal Security Director (credential and badge)
6)Deputy Federal Security Director (credential and badge)
7)Assistant Federal Security Director for Law Enforcement (credential and badge)
8)Assistant Federal Security Director for Inspections (credential and badge) 9)Other Assistant Federal Security Directors (credential only)
10)TSA Office of Inspection Special Agent (credential and badge)
11)TSA Office of Inspection Inspector (credential and badge)
12)TSA Explosives Security Specialist (credential only)
13)Bomb Appraisal Officer (credential only)
14)Attorney Advisor (credential only)
15)TSA Investigator (credential only)
16)TSA Field Intelligence Officer (credential and badge)
A.TSOs who enter the sterile area through the screening checkpoint must undergo screening at the beginning of their shift. TSOs who exit the screening checkpoint to perform work within the scope of their screening duties (such as assisting with passengers or collecting divest bins) need not be rescreened upon reentering the screening checkpoint. Where the FSD has waived TSO rescreening, TSOs who leave the screening checkpoint area and are completely out of sight for rest breaks, lunch, etc. need not be rescreened upon returning to the screening checkpoint after presenting their TSA employee ID or local airport ID for review by a TSO or designated TSA representative. However, where the FSD has elected to waive TSO rescreening, the FSD must implement random screening of TSOs returning from breaks.
B.FSDs may exempt themselves, DFSDs, AFSDs/DAFSDs for Screening, training coordinators, training specialists, scheduling operations officers, TSMs, Stakeholder Managers/Liaisons, STSOs, and LTSOsfrom screening, while on duty, after presenting their TSA employee ID or local airport ID for review by a TSO or TSA representative designated by the FSD. On duty includes meals and rest breaks.
C.The following credentialed TSA employees on official business at an airport with a valid TSA credential (and badge, if issued) are exempt from screening while performing official duties at that airport after presenting the credential (and badge) for review by a TSO. TSA credentialed employees are NOT exempt from screening when boarding an aircraft as part of official duty travel. These TSA credentialed employees are not permitted to escort individuals around or through the screening checkpoint to bypass screening unless otherwise permitted by this SOP.
1)TSA Inspector (credential only)
2)TSA Executive (credential only)
3)TSA Critical Personnel (credential only)
4)TSA Transportation Security Specialist (credential only)
5)Federal Security Director (credential and badge)
6)Deputy Federal Security Director (credential and badge)
7)Assistant Federal Security Director for Law Enforcement (credential and badge)
8)Assistant Federal Security Director for Inspections (credential and badge) 9)Other Assistant Federal Security Directors (credential only)
10)TSA Office of Inspection Special Agent (credential and badge)
11)TSA Office of Inspection Inspector (credential and badge)
12)TSA Explosives Security Specialist (credential only)
13)Bomb Appraisal Officer (credential only)
14)Attorney Advisor (credential only)
15)TSA Investigator (credential only)
16)TSA Field Intelligence Officer (credential and badge)
Title 49 1540.107 Submission to screening and inspection.
(a) No individual may enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her person and accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access to that area or aircraft under this subchapter.
(a) No individual may enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her person and accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access to that area or aircraft under this subchapter.
Dec 10, 2009 | 8:27 am
#2
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No offense, but your boss is a moron. Can you use your phone to post, or maybe get a remote desktop connection to your home computer so you can still participate during the day?
Dec 10, 2009 | 8:56 am
#3
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Location: PSM
Posts: 69,232
Prefacing my comments with "I know that this version is six revisions old," here is my favorite.
Particularly the "may be reduced from 100%" bit of paragraph A. While I do occasionally see 100% checking with the light/loupe it is MUCH less common than occasional checking with one or the other. I would bet that either the requirement has changed or that the TSOs are not in compliance with this section. Or the FSDs have declared "exigent circumstances" to be the norm.
Let me be VERY clear - I don't want them to be. The lines would be worse and for no value. But it seems that this is an issue.
2A-3. ALTERNATIVE TRAVEL DOCUMENT CHECKING PROCEDURES
During peak travel periods, the FSD or his/her designee may authorize alternative travel document checking
procedures at screening checkpoints equipped with ultraviolet lights and magnifying loupes.
A. The use of black lights/loupes may be reduced from 100% of individuals processing through the
screening checkpoint to no less than 25%.
B. This alternative procedure must not be used for more than 30 minutes at a time and may be used no more
than three times during an 8 hour shift, unless authorized by the FSD due to exigent circumstances.
During peak travel periods, the FSD or his/her designee may authorize alternative travel document checking
procedures at screening checkpoints equipped with ultraviolet lights and magnifying loupes.
A. The use of black lights/loupes may be reduced from 100% of individuals processing through the
screening checkpoint to no less than 25%.
B. This alternative procedure must not be used for more than 30 minutes at a time and may be used no more
than three times during an 8 hour shift, unless authorized by the FSD due to exigent circumstances.
Let me be VERY clear - I don't want them to be. The lines would be worse and for no value. But it seems that this is an issue.
Dec 10, 2009 | 9:02 am
#4
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: San Francisco, USA
Posts: 79
Identity Project analysis and pending FOIA requests
The Identity project has posted an analysis of what we think is significant about the Screening Management SOP (including a comparison with the redacted excertps we obtained ealrier under FOIA) and an update on our pending FOIA appeal for the current Screening Management SOP and our other pending FOIA requests for other screening SOPs and related documents:
http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2009/...ld-procedures/
http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2009/...ld-procedures/
Dec 10, 2009 | 4:20 pm
#6
Original Poster
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Florida
Posts: 3,006
On a good note he is finally waking up to the nastiness of the TSA.
Dec 10, 2009 | 5:48 pm
#7
Join Date: Mar 2008
Posts: 3,004
He really isn't a moron, he is trying to protect me. If the Government shows up at work it could spell disaster for me, and then again maybe not. Some of my bigger bosses would most likely give any agent the bums rush for interfering in my 1st amendment right.
On a good note he is finally waking up to the nastiness of the TSA.
On a good note he is finally waking up to the nastiness of the TSA.
Dec 11, 2009 | 8:28 am
#8
Join Date: Sep 2004
Location: Colorado
Programs: TSA
Posts: 2,745
Hmmm
You seem to be overlooking the fact that all those positions are positions of "public trust." Granted there may be cases that are abuse of the priveledge but I can say that it has not resulted in any events worthy of revoking the policy. As a society we have to be able to grant trust to some positions, and there are individuals that are not able to uphold the trust that is placed on them. This is true of any position whether it is a mechanic or an FBI agent. Can you rely on anyone or everyone to "do the right thing 100% of the time? No. IT is totally subjective and therefore subject to the whims of the person setting the standards.
Dec 11, 2009 | 8:37 am
#9
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: boca raton, florida
Posts: 621
You seem to be overlooking the fact that all those positions are positions of "public trust." Granted there may be cases that are abuse of the priveledge but I can say that it has not resulted in any events worthy of revoking the policy. As a society we have to be able to grant trust to some positions, and there are individuals that are not able to uphold the trust that is placed on them. This is true of any position whether it is a mechanic or an FBI agent. Can you rely on anyone or everyone to "do the right thing 100% of the time? No. IT is totally subjective and therefore subject to the whims of the person setting the standards.
Dec 11, 2009 | 9:09 am
#11
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: boca raton, florida
Posts: 621
Perhaps your Federal Security Director (DEN)'s copy of the management SOP was redacted in that section?
Also sort of like the aviation security inspector in ORD who damaged 13 American Eagle SAAB 340s but still has a job with TSA.
And trained document checkers at various airports who do not accept US passport cards, DOD IDs, etc.
I guess those individuals (and those similar) have a trust that there is a lot that the TSA won't fire them for.
Also sort of like the aviation security inspector in ORD who damaged 13 American Eagle SAAB 340s but still has a job with TSA.
And trained document checkers at various airports who do not accept US passport cards, DOD IDs, etc.
I guess those individuals (and those similar) have a trust that there is a lot that the TSA won't fire them for.
Dec 11, 2009 | 1:59 pm
#12
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: San Francisco, USA
Posts: 79
Complaint against discriminatory procedures in SOP
The Identity Project has filed a formal complaint with the DHS and TSA Offices of Civil Liberties against the blatant discrimination on the basis of national origin in the Screening Management SOP:
http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2009/...iscrimination/
http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2009/...iscrimination/
Dec 11, 2009 | 3:06 pm
#13
Join Date: Oct 2004
Programs: UA 2P
Posts: 707
The Identity Project has filed a formal complaint with the DHS and TSA Offices of Civil Liberties against the blatant discrimination on the basis of national origin in the Screening Management SOP:
http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2009/...iscrimination/
http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2009/...iscrimination/
Dec 11, 2009 | 4:06 pm
#14
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Location: Chicago
Posts: 11,657
Their response will be that they aren't discriminating on the basis of national origin, just based on the country that issued the ID. They will say that those governments are corrupt or unreliable and therefore the ID's issued by those governments cannot be trusted. It would ovbiously be a lie since there are many more corrupt countries than those listed, and the countries that are listed clearly have been chosen based on the "undesiribility" of the nationals of those countries. But it isn't written that way and that's what they will respond if they respond at all.
Dec 11, 2009 | 7:24 pm
#15
Original Poster
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Florida
Posts: 3,006
You seem to be overlooking the fact that all those positions are positions of "public trust." Granted there may be cases that are abuse of the priveledge but I can say that it has not resulted in any events worthy of revoking the policy. As a society we have to be able to grant trust to some positions, and there are individuals that are not able to uphold the trust that is placed on them. This is true of any position whether it is a mechanic or an FBI agent. Can you rely on anyone or everyone to "do the right thing 100% of the time? No. IT is totally subjective and therefore subject to the whims of the person setting the standards.
The right thing to do is make sure the sterile area remains sterile. If the TSA allows every self important person to breach the sterile area without a proper screening then the TSA is just putting on a very costly show.
If we are just going to pretend to do security and waste money at least get some Hooter's quality screeners so I have something to divert my attention from the draft blowing through the gaping security hole created by TSA policy.