Not always. There are plenty of types of LES/FOUO/SBU (whichever term you prefer) information which is easily as sensitive as some classified stuff. Informant identities, upcoming LE enforcement actions, undercover operations, and "Title III" wiretaps are just a few off the top of my head. They are rarely ever classified but certainly need to be protected from inadvertant disclosure.

Logic?

And to think that I thought SSI was a placebo used to keep the TSOs from feeling outraged at the job's senselessness.

I appreciate the sentiment and will say that, unequivocally, in every conversation I have had with anyone about the topic I have explained that the document was mentioned on FlyerTalk and that FT was my impetus to go read it. I even mention that another member actually realized the text was not redacted before I did (there is a post 2 minutes prior to mine in the FOIA request thread noting the same). At this point I've been credited with "discovering" this the same way that Columbus was credited with discovering America. It was there; I have simply raised the level of attention that it receives.

I honestly have no idea why my blog post became the tipping point for the story. Looking at the few logs I have it seems that the story was posted on news.ycombinator.com at some point on Sunday. It made it to Wired's ThreatList and BoingBoing on Sunday or early Monday as well. SlashDot picked it up on Tuesday, as did the AP, the Washington Post and the Cleveland Plain Dealer. This morning has seen a rather significant amount of traffic from a BBC News story and the Register UK.

I've had hits from over 100 countries in the past 72 hours. This story has most definitely gone global. I'm happy that I've been able to help raise the issue and bring it to the forefront. I just hope that something good comes from it. I continue to press the TSA press contacts I have and will be contacting some elected officials today in an effort to delve more into the FOIA issue that was identified yesterday.

sbm12/Wandering Aramean.

This made it to Fark.com.

Unless I missed it, the ABC report failed to mention that the SOP manual was available online for 9 months, we here at FT just happened to discover it a few days ago. I think the news media is starting to crank up the fear machine in the middle of the holiday travel season.

Anyway, I see about 100 guests visiting our forum right now. Welcome to FlyerTalk!

I just got a copy of the 93 page document off the internet. I like the fact that I could see the CIA, ATF and the Federal Air Marshals IDs. Take note of the page that shows the Air Marshals ID.

I also took note that TSA hardly inspects people who wear casts or have a fake leg or arm. So if a bad guy reads this then they could try and hide drugs or a IED in these.

Also read that TSA only hand searches about 20 percent of the bags.

The list goes on. I have been slowly reading my new TSA SOP that I got off the internet. I can now read policy to the screeners the next time I fly. I will even carry a copy of it when I fly home for XMAS just in case I need it.

TSA in part is a joke and a waist of our tax payers money.

Welcome to Flyertalk, Madashell.

Are you a collector of public employee badges and documents? Maybe you just think it's nice to be able to recognize a real federal I.D. card when presented with one? I think it's kind of interesting, though not as useful as other parts of the SOP manual, since this stuff can be found elsewhere.

That was the case prior to publication of this document. Nothing changed in this regard.

Interesting, huh? I would have guessed that the number is lower. In my experience at airports, it does not appear that one in five bags are searched by hand. That takes a lot of time compared to using an X-ray machine to perform the search, and unless the bag inspector is very thorough, it's easy for him or her to miss things that the X-ray would show.

I'm sorry, list of what?

It's nice, isn't it? Other people and I have been asking TSA for well over a year to publish all the rules we're required to follow in order to pass a TSA airport checkpoint, but TSA refuses to publish those rules. How can we be expected to follow the rules if we're not allowed to see them? Similarly, how can we tell if our public employees are doing their jobs properly if we can't read what they're supposed to do? This is particularly important with employees whose job involves interaction with the public.

Until we discovered that this manual was published, it was very difficult to tell if TSA staff, when searching us and our belongings, were performing the procedures we hired them to follow, or making it up as they go and lying to us about TSA policy.

Those are harsh words, but there are plenty of us who agree with you.

Thanks for joining the discussion. I look forward to your replies to my questions.

It's not just the TSA. My parents were in a lot of countries and many of the Soviet-block ones searched them at border crossings.

However IIRC I was never searched on our first trip when I was 9/10 and almost never on the second when I was 16/17. Furthermore, my mother was blind and carried a folding cane. It takes very little looking to realize that it's hollow by design (it's converted from it's folded form to a rigid form by taking up the tension in a cable that runs through it. While the exact mechanism isn't apparent the fact that it's basically tubing with a cable running through it is quite clear.) and was *NEVER* looked at anywhere.

Is a smuggler never going to hide stuff in their kid's baggage? The first trip I never packed it, the second I rarely did. In fact, once on our first trip I ended up with my father's bag. It was quite a struggle (it was nearly 50% of my body weight) but it was struggle with it or miss the plane. Our bags were strapped to backpack frames and wearing each other's packs was out of the question. (And that almost caused us trouble. This happened in Romania on the way out. The official took one look at me and sent me on through--with a push on the top of the backpack frame. Overloaded as I was there was no way I could keep my balance with that but I did manage to keep my feet under me for a few feet before I hit the wall. The wall turned out to be something awfully flimsy and I would have gone right through it had I not hit something behind it that actually had some strength. Imagine the ruckus it would have made had I crashed through one of their security barriers!)

Although the TSA takes great pride in patting itself on the back each time they catch someone with drugs, this is not a threat to commercial aviation. In fact, here�s a PowerPoint screenshot of the some of the things the TSA is wasting its time on:

I think halls has dealt with TS stuff (if that's what you mean by REAL), but I could be wrong. I heard from a family member that a lot of classified stuff isn't really that secret and makes people take TS less seriously than in the past; sort of like running the tornado sirens when a local baseball team wins . . . credibility goes away.

The major difference is that real classified information has a real Executive Order (EO 12958) which describes what to classify, what NOT to classify, WHO can classify, when to conduct a mandatory downgrade/declassification review, top-level guidelines for CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET information, and penalties for screwing up. The penalties cover infractions not limited to unauthorized disclosure. Penalties are also inplace for overclassifying something, not conducting mandatory reviews, and deliberately classifying something to prevent embarassment to one's agency or to keep unclassified information from Congress or the public. All of this stuff pertains to collateral classified information. Compartmented and Special Access programs have their own additional EOs and agency regulations.

LES/FOUO/SBU/SSI have none of these guidelines or restrictions. There are no criteria for creating this type of information, no paragraph marking requirements, no derivative document, no downgrading instructions, etc. If this stuff is truly sensitive beyond a precinct and is determined to cause damage to national security if disclosed, for Pete's sake, classify it the right way. My experience, including some with a couple of LE agencies, is that they use this informal and unregulated handling system because they are too lazy to set up a real information security program and think it's too much trouble to buy safes, shredders, and encrypted comm.

^^

And their laziness has provided this demonstration of their incompetence yet again.

I think that is a very important point, and one that we should try to get on people's minds right away while all this "TSA secrets revealed; sky falling" nonsense is flying around.

I agree with just about everything you said. My point was that some SBU (as a generic term for all of the others) information could either get someone killed or jeopardize long-term, ongoing investigations. That same information cannot be classified because it has nothing to do with national security. But that doesn't mean it doesn't need protecting. On the other hand, the notes from some deputy assistant Commerce attache's meeting with the minister of chicken farming gets classified under 1.5(d). Doesn't always make sense.

I have to laugh at how on the news they're making it sound like TS material was leaked out on the web and that it takes a real clearance to be able to read.

Clearly, they have no clue what real classified material is, though I'm sure they're falling victim to SSI meaning "Super Secret Information"

i laugh right along with you ^ but it still is bad press for the tsa ^ no matter how the tsa want's to spin it and when it comes to bad press for the tsa, i'm all for it.