PV: Screening before the checkpoint is back in style
Apr 25, 2009 | 12:19 am
#16
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It's very short-sighted that they only start worrying about us at "curbside." They should also send someone to drive you (very carefully!) to the airport and carry your bags for you (so you don't risk a back strain). Abundance of caution and all that. [/sarcasm]
Apr 25, 2009 | 1:27 am
#17
Join Date: May 2006
Location: Tampa, FL
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Certainly don't want that back. Going to the airport was like entering a war zone.
Apr 25, 2009 | 1:47 am
#18
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Umm, brandinius2 and I were being sarcastic, playing off the claim in the TSA blog that they feel responsible for us from "curbside to cockpit". IMO, screening should be done only at the checkpoint, ideally by a private company that is accountable for its policies, in a polite, efficient and effective manner. (Hey, I can dream, right?)
But what's the deal with "curbside to cockpit"? Did I miss the memo about pax being allowed on the flightdeck again?
But what's the deal with "curbside to cockpit"? Did I miss the memo about pax being allowed on the flightdeck again?
Apr 25, 2009 | 4:32 am
#19
Join Date: Dec 2008
Posts: 1,444
First, let me make it 100% clear that I do not support the use of SPO.
However, a question that arises to me is why, if you can have systems that do not generate nude images of people outside the checkpoint, the virtual strip-search MMW machines are being introduced within the checkpoint. Either the passive system is no good and does not detect what it should (and therefore should not be used) or it is good, and can be used without privacy concerns within the checkpoint.
Anyone have a valid explanation???
However, a question that arises to me is why, if you can have systems that do not generate nude images of people outside the checkpoint, the virtual strip-search MMW machines are being introduced within the checkpoint. Either the passive system is no good and does not detect what it should (and therefore should not be used) or it is good, and can be used without privacy concerns within the checkpoint.
Anyone have a valid explanation???
Apr 25, 2009 | 4:56 am
#20
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Apart from the fact that with TSA there's no rhyme or reason?
You're absolutely right. I wrote about this in an earlier thread. The output from the sensor doesn't need to be turned into an image; it can be processed to just give an indication of whether anything unusual is found (a set of "bright" pixels against a background of "dark".) My guess is that different companies have built the two systems and chosen to implement different outputs. But it's only a guess.
You're absolutely right. I wrote about this in an earlier thread. The output from the sensor doesn't need to be turned into an image; it can be processed to just give an indication of whether anything unusual is found (a set of "bright" pixels against a background of "dark".) My guess is that different companies have built the two systems and chosen to implement different outputs. But it's only a guess.
Apr 25, 2009 | 7:16 am
#21
Join Date: May 2008
Location: BOS
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Posts: 455
SPO-7 Passive MMV is made by a company called QinetiQ.
The checkpoint MMV/Whole body imager is made by military/homeland security-industrial complex favorite L3 Communications.
Apr 25, 2009 | 10:30 am
#22
Join Date: Dec 2008
Posts: 1,444
Yes.
SPO-7 Passive MMV is made by a company called QinetiQ.
The checkpoint MMV/Whole body imager is made by military/homeland security-industrial complex favorite L3 Communications.
SPO-7 Passive MMV is made by a company called QinetiQ.
The checkpoint MMV/Whole body imager is made by military/homeland security-industrial complex favorite L3 Communications.
Apr 25, 2009 | 1:13 pm
#23
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Florida
Posts: 3,006
With the walk through MMW you have a controlled environment that is tuned to allow the sensor to see through clothing.
With the passive MMW it relies on ambient radiation. Because the ambient radiation varies by location the reliability of the machine is lower.
Apr 25, 2009 | 3:17 pm
#24
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Chicago
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This is an illegal search that violates the 4th amendment under Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)..
Kyllo dealt with:
- A search of a home, one's castle: "“At the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)."
- A search that can show intimate detail: "The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider 'intimate' . . ." (This is Scalia being cute-- he's really saying that the themal image can tell when a couple is having sex-- and in what position(s))
- A search the target didn't know about.
None of those three apply to this new toy.
Apr 25, 2009 | 4:20 pm
#25
Join Date: Dec 2008
Posts: 1,444
In a word, reliability.
With the walk through MMW you have a controlled environment that is tuned to allow the sensor to see through clothing.
With the passive MMW it relies on ambient radiation. Because the ambient radiation varies by location the reliability of the machine is lower.
With the walk through MMW you have a controlled environment that is tuned to allow the sensor to see through clothing.
With the passive MMW it relies on ambient radiation. Because the ambient radiation varies by location the reliability of the machine is lower.
Apr 25, 2009 | 5:33 pm
#26
Join Date: Apr 2008
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Apr 26, 2009 | 4:24 am
#28
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Florida
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No it isn't.
Kyllo dealt with:
None of those three apply to this new toy.
Kyllo dealt with:
- A search of a home, one's castle: "“At the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)."
- A search that can show intimate detail: "The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider 'intimate' . . ." (This is Scalia being cute-- he's really saying that the themal image can tell when a couple is having sex-- and in what position(s))
- A search the target didn't know about.
None of those three apply to this new toy.
Amendment 4 - Search and Seizure. Ratified 12/15/1791.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Your whole argument that Kyllo ruling hinged on the "home is a castle" thought process is wrong. Kyllo ruling hinged on the fact that using technology to detect legal as well as illegal activity where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, without a warrant, is unconstitutional. The fact that the area being searched was a home is irrelevant.
In ILLINOIS v. CABALLES the justices affirmed the Kyllo ruling goes well beyond the confines the "castle".
ILLINOIS v. CABALLES
This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001). Critical to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity--in that case, intimate details in a home, such as "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." Id., at 38. The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001). Critical to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity--in that case, intimate details in a home, such as "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." Id., at 38. The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
KYLLO v. UNITED STATES
In assessing when a search is not a search, we have applied somewhat in reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). Katz involved eavesdropping by means of an electronic listening device placed on the outside of a telephone booth-a location not within the catalog ("persons, houses, papers, and effects") that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches. We held that the Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping because he "justifiably relied" upon the privacy of the telephone booth. Id., at 353. As Justice Harlan's oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. See id., at 361. We have subsequently applied this principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment search does not occur-even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned-unless "the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search," and "society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable." Ciraolo, supra, at 211.
In assessing when a search is not a search, we have applied somewhat in reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). Katz involved eavesdropping by means of an electronic listening device placed on the outside of a telephone booth-a location not within the catalog ("persons, houses, papers, and effects") that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches. We held that the Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping because he "justifiably relied" upon the privacy of the telephone booth. Id., at 353. As Justice Harlan's oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. See id., at 361. We have subsequently applied this principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment search does not occur-even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned-unless "the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search," and "society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable." Ciraolo, supra, at 211.
Katz v. United States
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 385 U. S. 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 274 U. S. 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 385 U. S. 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 274 U. S. 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
The posting of the signs is meaningless and does not dilute the Constitutional protections of the 4th Amendment. Contrary to your contentions, the blind, stupid or illiterate have the same Constitutional protections as the literate, sighted and intelligent.
We have not even touched on the fact that the TSA is illegally acting outside their administrative search boundaries.
I am sorry your argument to this point fails miserably.
BTW Unless you read something I didn't, Scalia was not implying sex with the use of the word "intimate".
I look forward to your counter argument.
Last edited by Trollkiller; Apr 26, 2009 at 4:27 am Reason: Fixed a broken quote
Apr 26, 2009 | 4:30 am
#30
Join Date: Jul 2008
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