NYT - Where Should Security Begin?
 

http://jetlagged.blogs.nytimes.com/?8dpc
Should security begin at the airport's front doors? This opinion writer think so. I think the guy has got to have a screw loose.

Where, precisely, is everyone supposed to hang around while they're waiting to be screened? Many/most airports don't have the space to handle a few hundred people standing outside.

Second, this will make it even easier to attack people since they'll be lined up, unprotected, outside. A car bomb would be even more deadly.

Third, what about boarding passes? Are we going to put the ticket counters outside, too, or does he propose doing away with the requirement that you need to have a ticket to enter the sterile area? (Whether you think this is a good idea or not, he didn't address it.)

Well, heck, let's just do the screening at people's homes and businesses. :rolleyes: The further from the airport, the better. :rolleyes:

Or are we going to institute a program like Cairo, where you get an initial screening before you enter the building, and another after you get your boarding pass. :td:

Sorry to say, but this writer is an IDIOT. Moving security checkpoints to airport entrances would inconvenience A LOT of people, especially in bad weather conditions. It's pointless and a waste of time.

What makes me even sadder (and madder) is that he was the Homeland Security inspector general in 2003-2004. Let's just hope he don't give TSA and airport police division any ideas.

I think he's just trying to push for stricter measures because lately there hasn't been anything happening at airports - things has been calmer, and people are more aware now of how silly and pointless airport security is. He's trying to breathe more air in the "War on Terror" - but he miserably failed. Look at the comments - only a very few actually support his proposal. The tide's turning.

Where do you draw the line?

If the purpose is to prevent dangerous items from being brought aboard aircraft, then the current configuration is designed to do just that. However, it comes with the understanding (or what should be understood) that the bad guys could easily come into a crowded airport lobby and shoot it up. But they won't get aboard the airplanes.

If airport security seeks to prevent any dangerous items from being brought into the airport, as the writer suggests, then it becomes very difficult to make the distinctions between permitted and prohibited items. For instance, a pocketknife is prohibited to be brought onto an airplane. However, is it realistic to start prohibiting pocketknives at the lobby entrance from a parent who is dropping off a 5 year old unaccompanied minor (sorry, couldn't avoid that reference :D ) ? And what of the other prohibited items such as liquids, gels and aerosols? It's also not very practical to have one checkpoint that permits certain items but then restricts them at the access to the gate areas. Furthermore, how about travelers who legitimately transport weapons (hunters, shooting competitors, etc)?

I understand the writer's point; however, I don't think it's practical. I think the focus of airport security screening checkpoints should remain as is: preventing items being brought aboard airplanes. The issue of armed gunmen storming an airport lobby is strictly an airport police issue instead of a TSA one.

I'm afraid, though, that there are folks in Washington who can't see the distinction.

JFK used to do security for entry into T2/T3 before you ever got to the ticket counter. I vaguely remember doing it before getting to the DL ticket counter for a trip I had a few years back (though I could easily be mis-remembering it).

DEL scans bags before you get to the ticket counters and actually seals the zippers at that point.

It isn't a completely ridiculous plan, but it also has a number of flaws, many of which have been discussed up-thread. In the end, there is no one silver bullet for security. What we've got today is more theatre than anything else, IMO, but that doesn't mean we can't have open and frank discussions of what better options there are out there. Clearly this guy has an idea (and he's wrong), but that doesn't mean he - and others - shouldn't keep writing and sharing their ideas until we find a solution that actually works.

Plus, it gives us something to talk about on this board :D

Yep, I agree. However, I still think he's kind of an idiot (although entilied to his own opinion) because he believes that terrorists are everywhere, and that the risk is high. He makes it seem like a matter of life or death, when in reality, we have so much more risk of dying from cancer, accidents, heart problems, and even being mugged is a more higher risk than a terrorist attack.

The "War on Terror" is getting really old, and many Americans are no longer accepting it.

Layered Defences
 

A change in the physical configuration of airport security would require significant changes to airport buildings, roads, parking garages, etc.

Experience with post 9/11 security changes reinforces this point. The cost and travel disruptions would be enormous. Also, construction often leads to its own security issues that may or may not be solvable.

I fear that more in this case really means less.

But people, think of the children.

;)

I don't think the proposition of putting security screening at or near the airport entrance is so odd--many, many airports in foreign countries do just that. You have to send your bags through the x-ray machine just to get in the door.

I do take issue with his whole premise, though. From the blog post: "airport terminals...must be an awfully appealing target to terrorists. The largest airports have huge terminals teeming with thousands of passengers on any given day. They serve as conspicuous symbols of American consumerism, with McDonald’s restaurants, Starbucks coffee shops and Disney toy stores." Well, yes, and you've also just described every shopping mall in the country, too. :rolleyes: Should we also x-ray the bags of mall visitors? (Interestingly, this is in fact the practice at some shopping malls in Beirut, among other hot spots on the globe.)

JFK is in some regards already worse than some less developed countries' airports. Does this person now want to have JFK have crazy lines outside the airport terminal just like at Delhi International? That is what this would mean, especially during peak hours.

So instead of the terminal being a target, the lines to the terminal are a target.

And what about airports in winter locales? Are we to now have retirees on their way to sun country stand outside the terminal and risk catching pneumonia?

Good points. However, DEL is a really bad example to use when the lines leading into the international terminal there were known to have been inviting targets for attack; also the x-ray of bags is inside the terminal itself and there is nothing to prevent an in-terminal attack when the weapons or bombs are either not in plain sight or are inside bags being ported in. [There are other airports -- in India too -- where the bags are checked long before they get to within range of the terminal, but the security there is also readily circumventable if someone applies the mind a bit.]

I just passed through HHH yesterday (that's the code for the Hell that is Heathrow at the Holidays) and it just occurred to me how the whole "security" system has created such an opportunity for terrorists. Firstly, they had special bins for confiscated matches and lighters. This is really brilliant -- you have thousands of people in a space with a bin full of flammable materials and explosive gases. All it would take is for one of those matches to ignite and BLAM!

Worse though, is the terror opportunity created by the liquid ban. If I was al-Qaeda, I would rig up a liquid explosive bomb using a juice or soft drink container and either a timer delayed or a mobile telephone triggered detonator. Then all you need to do is allow the device to be confiscated at the check point, and then have it detonate once you are clear. In a crowded security hall like those at Heathrow terminal 3, this would kill many more people than a device on plane, in which maximum potential death toll is limited by the capacity of the plane, somewhere around 500 people. At any given time during the holidays, there must be at least 4x that many going through security at Heathrow. Additionally, a terrorist using this approach wouldn't need to be martyr, and if planned right, he/she wouldn't even get caught -- the sheer volume of stuff being confiscated would make it difficult to determine which particular bottle held the device and who left it there.

"War" has evolved into a peculiar, uniquely powerful magic word (like from a Harry Potter book) that gets people to support whatever the government is doing. It would be unpatriotic, to say the least, not to support the government in times of war, so declare a "war" and -- bingo! -- you get lots of knee-jerk support (from jerks with knees).

They tried this before, with much the same experience, when they "declared war" on drugs. I'm old enough to remember the "war on poverty." Back then, I wondered if we were supposed to look for poor people to kill. :)

Bruce

Then perhaps you can explain the "war on commission" to me. I thought that it was an attempt to eliminate salespeople's incentives, but Mrs. jib tells me that it had something to do with a "book suppository," which must be a miniature Kindle or something... sounds like a dirty war, in any case.