why do we lock our doors ... when a window is so easly broken?

It's not just bomb detectors
 

Why do we lock our doors ... when a window is so easly broken?

Indeed.

As the Israeli security chief testified after 9/11, it's foolish to depend exclusively on mechanical screening, the inference being that it can never be 100% effective, or even close. The numerous tests of the system which have exposed holes -- from lax inspection to machine shortcomings -- only confirms this. He said, what's vital is the active acreening, including, yes, profiling and scrutiny at every layer, from booking to check-in to airport police to vendor to cabin crew, to recognize certain behavior and to know the questions to ask and recognize red-flag responses. (Some "dumb" questions are meant more to elicit an affect than a particular answer.) This last part is key and requires formal training.

The problem is analogous to that of SIGINT versus HUMINT, where amongst the factors leading to 9/11 was the over-reliance on signals intelligence (information-gathering by machine), at the expense of human intelligence (people-to-people contact). Yes, we can always improve mechanical screening, but what's more important is to make sure that eyes and ears are kept as sharp as the machinery.

The problem here is that while it's easy for a TSA agent to test the system with a "bomb" in carry-on, it's very tricky actually to play a bad actor. I wonder if the TSA has a test to see if a "terrorist" could be interdicted independent of the machinery. Can an agent be trained, for the purpose of testing the system, to act suspiciously? Again, this is problematic, since detecting suspicious behavior is often a matter of intuition, which means suspicious behavior is infinitely variable and impossible to predict until you see it.

So, here we go back to recognizing that neither mechanical nor human screening is sufficient. Nor is domestic and foreign intelligence. But since the main lesson of 9/11 was that these layers must be complimentary rather than exclusive, the inevitable holes in each will be covered by the other. At least that's how it's supposed to work nowadays. Alas, testing just one layer, like bomb detectors, doesn't tell us the story.

more from Dr. Alford:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk...ly-411338.html

absolutely agree ... just enough security to promote telltale behavior ... and recognizing that behavior ... is probably the best we'll ever be able to do as far as airport screening goes ...

we can't pretend that certain things are impossible or that threats dont exist though ...

And if it is one of the two chemicals: nitromethane, used as a fuel for model aeroplane engines, or nitroethane, which is less well known but equally as effective and has fewer restrictions on obtaining and transporting according to the article, then this is not the same as the liquid bomb plot, which caused the crazy liquid ban. These chemicals would be found via ETD.

A broken window attracts much more attention than someone going thru a door. A lot of people would probably think that someone going thru an open door has reason to be there ... especially in an area where there are a lot of transients.

Except in rare circumstances, someone breaking and/or going thru a window is going to raise red flags with those in the area.

Do your own research; any number have been posted here and elsewhere.

Oh, and by the wayHmmm, disposal products.

Well, guess I was right about nitromethane. And my statement that ETD will catch it is validated. And everything I've said since 8/2006 about the farce of a "threat" from liquids being somehow more than that of the threat from solid explosives (or countless other threats) stands as it did then, with nothing from Dr. Alford to refute me.

The TSA and other security forces around the world are paying far too much attention to the water carnival, which in its obnoxious search for each bottle of water or hand lotion or shampoo is blinding those security forces to much more conventional threats. Weapons and bomb components make it through the checkpoints at an alarming rate, and it's quite arguable that the distractions of the water carnival are a large contributing factor to those failures.

"One of the chemicals, nitromethane, is used as a fuel for model aeroplane engines."

"A similar alternative, nitroethane, is less well known but equally as effective. There are fewer restrictions on obtaining and transporting this chemical. "

"A fourth candidate, methyl nitrate, is unusual in that it will explode as soon as it is combined with another substance. It does not need to be ignited by a detonator device."

ETD or ETP will detect these. X-ray will not.

"It can reliably be caused to detonate by mixing it with ingredient X," said Dr Alford. He was not willing to reveal the name of the activating chemical."

Putz. Ingredient X isn't going to remain a mystery for long. Just come out and say it so we can continue to evaluate the validity of these claims. :rolleyes:

"Liquid explosives would not necessarily be picked up by "sniffer" type security scanners if placed in carefully sealed and cleaned containers, said Dr Alford."

ETD, Dr. Alford. And ETP will still pick up less-than-carefully packed nitrates.

Ingredient X
 

"Nitromethane known to reduce the sensitivity of nitroglycerine. Nitromethane may be added to compositions containing nitroglycerine. The reference further teaches that trinitrotoluene may be added to said compositions. Pyridine is known to be a highly effective solvent for trinitrotoluene. It is also a well-known sensitizer for nitromethane; however, it is seldom used for its sensitizer properties because more effective sensitizers are known and available. Trinitrotoluene was found to be soluble in nitromethane. The US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory was not aware of this property until 1987. "

"There are ways to utilize nitroparaffins as the basis of a binary system. A stable explosive composition can be made by adding a sensitizer, in the form of resin balloons, to nitromethane. It is well known that amines (particularly ethylenediamine) will sensitize nitromethane so that it will detonate with a blasting cap. These mixtures become unstable and decompose after a few days. Most of these sensitizing agents are very toxic and difficult to work with safely. The basis of this patent is that by entrapping air into the nitromethane liquid, by means of micro balloons (resin, glass, etc.), it can be made cap-sensitive. However since the balloons will float to the surface of pure nitromethane, a thickening (gelling) agent must be added to prevent this."

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...ves-liquid.htm

and x-ray will pick up less-than-carefully disguised bombs ...

I wouldnt put too much faith in trace detection nor xray ...

Doesn't matter. You'll still have an 80% chance to get it thru anyway.

And besides, how many terrorists do you think are that stupid?

I put a lot more faith into trace detection, which works rather well, than x-ray which relies on bomber stupidity and x-ray drone attentiveness, and not at all on liquids.

no mention of methyl nitrate ... which mixes with the "ingredient x" ... or did i miss it?

Paragraph #1: Pyridine

Paragraph #2: ethylenediamine

Both are sensitizers for nitromethane, with the latter supposedly being more effective.