I doubt that TSA has sent all screeners through the academy. Even considering overly large class sizes of 100 people and starting a new class every week of the year only around 5,200 screeners could be scheduled each year. TSA has somewhere around 40,000 screeners so it will take some time to cycle all current screeners through this training.

Precisely! They have to do retraining again. They have to be improvement. If they passed the security tests. They will let go to work at airports. They are required to do training for approximately 40 hours in the classroom. Every time they have to get better security training. If they don't, they will lose their jobs.

http://theweek.com/articles/736329/tsa-pathetic-failure

The TSA is a pathetic failure

Matthew Walther

​​​​​​​Have a feeling that this author isn't fond if TSA.

I once had them pilot a new technique at LAS - they had the security line stretched out single file so they could walk dogs up and down it it, and then they were letting everyone through the precheck - they just had all the lanes open and people would randomly be sent through every 1/5th or whatever how many scanners there were.

It freaked people out because the line stretched way longer than normal because of the switchbacks but I got through in about 30 mins.

That's the way it should be done, not by making passengers walk by the dog two times.

30 minutes is too long, dogs or not.

The TSA way of screening is inefficient and clearly not effective. I think the whole concept of how TSA screens needs to be tossed on the garbage pile and start from fresh. The simple fact of the matter is that 99.999% of travelers present zero threat. TSA screens like 100% of passengers are a threat.

I was dropping my minor daughter off for a flight she was taking yesterday, and had a pass to take her to the gate. At the xray machine I realize I have my swiss army knife in my pocket still. I tell the TSA agent at Midway that I forgot I had my pocket knife with me, I try to hand it to him to throw it away, and he tells me to put it in a bin and run it through the X-ray.

My knife comes through to the other end just fine, and my daughter gets flagged for extra screening of her backpack because she had an unopened water in it.

An article from Newsweek calling for the privatization of TSA. I think it has merit.

http://www.newsweek.com/tsa-disastro...vatized-718370

THE TSA IS A DISASTROUS FAILURE AND SHOULD BE PRIVATIZED


edit to add:

sorry about the large text size above but I don't see anyway for users to manage font pitch.

But the optics on the 6:00 news are great. It sends the perception that government is protecting us. (From what? is an entirely different question!)

Who protects us from the TSA?

your point is well taken but more correctly, 99.99 present very low risk; all pose a threat.

In terms of the metric of an equal number of take-offs and landings, air traffic control issues during take-off and landing, uncorrected or unidentified maintenance problems, bird strikes, or microbursts (to name just a few) pose a far greater threat than any passenger getting sniffed or groped at a checkpoint.

Privatization won't do a dadgum thing if the privates are still under TSA's control. Witness SFO.

I don't agree that all pose a threat. I'm personally more concerned about the threat posed by TSA than any imagined threat posed by other passengers.

This goes back to something I've said before, though I can't find the old thread so my phrasing may be a little off.

The word "threat" is used a lot by those in power who use it as a justification for all sorts of actions. Iraq was a threat, so we invaded. Air piracy is a threat so we have to be groped before we get on a plane. Domestic terrorism is a threat so we have to go through metal detectors to enter Disney World, and TSA spews their VIPR teams into our subways. Liquid explosives are a threat so we can't carry bottles of water through security. And on and on.

But "threat" is a very nebulous term, encompassing a wide range of danger levels. I prefer to categorize threats by their likelihood and prepare for them accordingly, rather than treat every threat the same. I like to categorize threats as Theoretical, Likely, Imminent, and Immediate.

• Theoretical threats are those which are technically possible, but are so unlikely that it is a complete waste of time and energy to take anything more than rudimentary, basic precautions against them.
• Likely threats are those which can happen, have happened in the past, and probably will happen again, such as bombings and mass shootings. We know they can happen, we know they'll probably happen again, but we don't have anything that suggests they're going to happen at a specific time or place, or that someone is actively engaged in planning such an event. These threats pose a higher risk and deserve more time and energy to defend against, but since the risk is non-specific, the preventative measures should be limited, regulated, and strictly controlled, otherwise the cure becomes worse than the disease.
• Imminent threats are those for which there is credible, specific evidence, such as the 2010 Yemeni cargo bombs in toner cartridges. Intel on this threat was discovered by the Saudis and communicated to authorities in other nations, allowing the bombs to be intercepted and made safe before they arrived at their destinations and detonated. Measures to interdict these threats should be more extreme than those for likely or theoretical threats, but with a far more limited scope and focus - interdiction is for the duration of the threat only, and not broadly-based, long-term, or permanent.
• Immediate threats are those in progress, such as an active shooter, a live explosive, or a released chemical agent. These threats should be addressed by the most extreme means, but again, the scope and duration of the interdiction measures should be severely limited to the duration and proximity of the immediate threat only.

To bring this thread back to its original topic, I believe TSA fails its tests because its focus is too broad. TSA is so focused on interdicting theoretical threats that they have all but forgotten about many likely threats. And if their reactions to various actual events and false alarms is any indication, they are completely ill-equipped (mentally) to deal with imminent threats. They've also tried numerous times to garner more budget in order to prepare for handling immediate threats, despite the fact that immediate threats are not part of their agency's mission - immediate threats are the purview of law enforcement.

Mis-focus is at the heart of all of TSA's problems and poor decisions, going hand in hand with incompetence, corruption, and bureaucratic bloat as the major causes of the agency's poor performance and terrible reputation among the traveling public.