At least in the eastern parts of China for the main common carrier passenger airports, they don't create massive, predictable backups of vehicles with passengers in them. As we know, vehicles can be made into bombs rather easily and otherwise transport bombs. A pair of such terrorist vehicles spread out and two gunmen can create massive chaos at these bottlenecks. Some Indian airports have been insane in this way; but as one late senior (then-retired) Indian official (with a lifelong government-assigned team of armed security personnel) told me: "sadly, this is a country where the lives of the ordinary citizens are considered cheap except as a bargaining chip or to score votes".

Moderator's Note:
 

Please confine the discussion here to airport/transportation security policy.

The master thread on this topic is in the Europe forum:
Political discussions, such as the roots and causes of terrorism, belong in OMNI/PR.

Thank you,

TWA884
Co-moderator
On behalf of the moderation team

Why the sarcasm or am I misreading your intent? Should TSA be responsible for public side/airport ticket counter incidents? Do you want TSA that far out from the Checkpoint?

TSA already claims responsibility for checking out land-side security at airports in various places -- even airports in Europe.

I just hope that the securocrats -- not just at the EC level but also those at the national level -- don't go with a suggestion considered before by US DHS/TSA and done in some parts of the world even before DHS/TSA existed: mostly/only allowing ticketed passengers and airline/airport-approved employees to access the airport building's "public area" after showing ID/ticket info.

I pray this NEVER happens here & something I never want to be right about, but I,m shocked everyday it doesn't. And as you said TSA imo is a huge reason for this.

More likely with more managed inclusion. As has been discussed in this thread or other threads about Brussels, the bottle neck is an issue.

Under John Pistole TSA response to airport security was:
If we believe Neffenger, he has changed this efficiency outcome, and clear passengers quickly, at the risk of not diligently resolving alarms attitude of TSA Leadership. While Neffenger announced the end of Managed Inclusion II, we know that Managed Inclusion I remains. We also know that TSA operates another program known as Real Time Threat Assessment. The only noticeable difference between Managed Inclusion II and Managed Inclusion I and RTTA is the use of bomb sniffing dogs instead of hand swabs.

We must ask ourselves, does MI I or RTTA make us any safer? Chris Morran of the consumerist reported "TSA Just Decides Everyone In My Line Is Qualified For Expedited Screening" when Morran questioned the TSA about what happened he was told “TSA also utilizes these lanes during certain times for other low-risk passengers who are identified through a real-time threat assessment process,”. Morran goes onto to explain "a man who appeared to be a TSA supervisor stood and declared that my line and the one next to it are now PreCheck lanes."

Here is a archived webpage from TSA about Managed Inclusion which informs "After the initial risk assessment by Passenger Screening Canines and Behavior Detection Officers as passengers move through the standard security checkpoint area." The safety of the traveling public is left entirely too dogs that can be fooled and those who are affectionately term "SPOTNIKS" here on Flyertalk. Most important of Morran's article is:
For sake of argument, consider that Morran account is true a TSA Supervisor announces to entire general public "these lanes are now Precheck". What kind of security is found in announcing to the whole public where the least screening is occurring? Back in the days of hand swab Managed Inclusion, I heard TSA supervisor announce the percentage of individuals who should get their hands swabbed.

As has been revealed recently, TSA will call for more dogs - this was reported as a solution for MSP wait times. So while Neffenger wants us to believe that TSA is now focused on security and not "efficiency outcomes" and that TSA is focused on diligent alarm resolution and not the speed of clearing passengers...nothing has changed in how TSA conducts itself. Dogs and spotniks used to reduce wait times...same song and dance different performer.

Two or three persons pushing luggage carts with IEDs concealed in (or otherwise using) luggage/cargo on them (with the IEDs meant to be detonated landside) could almost as easily have gotten into the FCO T5 and do what was done at BRU today.

If TSA were asked about the situation Morran describes, I'm sure we would be told that although there were no dogs or swabs, BDOs had checked out the pax in the regular line, and based on the BDOs scrutiny, all pax were deemed low-risk.

Awkward time for Neffenger. He's created massive slowdowns in airports around the country - enough to get on the nerves of even infrequent and first-time fliers. Events in BRU have just demonstrated how much this tactic of his is putting people at greater risk.

I wonder if he's still going to extend the completely unanticipated (by TSA) 'spring break' slowdown into and throughout the summer.

With hour plus lines at many airports leading up to the TSA ID checkers an attacker has a large target of opportunity and TSA would be responsible for creating such large backlogs.

Moderator's Note:
 

Does anyone reading this thread have experiences regarding the check in wait (no status line) and TSA no status line (non Priority, non Pre-check) with AA at LAX T4 since the BRU bombing?

I asked in the AA forum with no responses so I thought I'd try it here?

Not LAX, but I'll find out at IAD on Sunday night on my way to LHR.

And...it's started: BPD "securing" downtown subway station
 

Exited Boston's "Government Center" stop (one of the main downtown stops) to see two cops there, in military gear and everything, holding automatic weapons and waiting for the bad guys. Others were milling around outside. One of my friends said it looked like they were preparing for an alien invasion.

So what's my bigger fear, that the terrorists are going to invade our recently renovated subway stop, or that the cops will decide to take aim at, well, anything and end up picking off a couple of commuters.

Bottom line: Don't jump the turnstiles at Government Center.

Mike

Maybe they are paranoid about Anime Boston being on this weekend...

Have they decided to buy some more advanced proximity sensors or other means to try to detect TATP/TCAP/DADP/HMTD and do this at entry points into the airports?

It's not like the TSA and lobbyists are beyond trying to exploit crimes to get more of what they want inside the US and beyond.