Laptops before 9/11
 

As I'm reading the threads, it made me think of a question that I'm way too young to vividly remember.

I had heard stories that, before 9/11, travelers with laptops would be told, by screeners, to take the laptop out of the bag, turn it on, and show a working laptop, simply to prove to the screener that it's a laptop and not a cache of explosives cleverly packed into a gutted laptop chassis.

Did anyone here ever experience that?

I've always talked about wanting to restore airport security to 9/10, but I'm now thinking more and more that we should revert to absolutely nothing. While the term "security theater" is a post-9/11 term, wasn't pre-9/11 security just as much a show?

Yep. Had to find an outlet to plug the one into that had no battery, just the orange plasma display (old luggable Toshiba, IIRC.)

That is true. It ended approximately at the time of the release of Windows 2.0 (there was no 1.0) and the time to boot up went to about ten minutes for a fully loaded machine. The previous Dos 3.X version would usually boot to a command prompt in a few seconds, less than a minute at the worst.

(I think I may have just given away my age.)

I once had to turn on an external SCSI hard drive, around 1999, even though without a computer to hook it up to the drive is fairly useless.

Kind of like how when VP Gore spoke at my college and I was taking photos for the paper, Secret Service made us take a picture to "prove" it was a camera.

So, yes, security theater's been around for a while.

I do remember that but I never travelled with a laptop then.

I specifically remember being asked to look through the lens of my cameras though.

Heh. Some of us used to cheat and hold down the key to load the BIOS config instead of waiting for the complete boot sequence.

I had to travel with a Corvus external HD once. Same problem.

Is there anyone here on FT who would object to eliminating everything, including the WTMD?

You would not have recognized it as a laptop either. They were called portables. This definition was based on the fact that it had a handle installed that would support the mass of the machine. It contained everything necessary to be a computer, a CPU, a display, and a disk drive. There was an RS-232 interface and later parallel printer ports. Really, really nice ones had an RGB out that would drive a monitor. You did not take the monitor, you would use one on site. The portable units had mono LCD screens and the better ones had mono plasma screens. Many did not even run on battery power and had to be plugged in.

The first several luggables I worked with had mono CRTs, not LCDs. Like the Kaypro II, for example.

Being asked to turn on a laptop was pretty rare. I was going through at least 4 checkpoints a week back in the mid/late 90s, and I was probably asked to take my laptop out and turn it on dozen or so times over those years.

I was also asked to make my pager beep, and to turn on my cell phone a time or two. I did trip the metal detector all the time, but a fast once over with a wand would always show it was just the shoes on my feet and everything was cool.

But, back then, you didn't have to take anything out of your bag. I always had a Leatherman and a Swiss Army knife stuffed in my laptop bag. Along with a bottle or two of water in various amounts of ice form, a can of mousse in my shaving bag, a big tube of toothpaste, a full bottle of shampoo, a big bottle of suntan lotion, a whole variety of things that you can't carry anymore.

And there were the so called "Lunch Boxes": a computer case the size of a catalog case, in which you could mount normal-size (but not full ATX-size) motherboards, HDDs, CD-Drives, not notebook especific parts. The screen were Plasma or LCD (terrible quality, both).

The whole contraption weighted in the range of 20-25lbs.

When I worked in development in the 1980s, my NGO owned Toshiba and HP(?) portables that field managers used (almost) literally all over the world. They looked similar to today's laptops, with integral hinged monochrome screens, but were heavier and less powerful: 2mg RAM, 15-20mg hard drive, 3-1/2" (200kb) floppy drive, 1-3 hours battery life. I recall no complaints about getting them through security procedures. It would have above my pay grade to fix such issues but I would have supported contacts, communications and tracking.

When I began flying with computers myself, the open-and-start routine was requested, but rarely. Security interest would increase for a month or so after terrorist or unexplained crashes such as PanAm 103 and TWA 800.

It was done very often in the months immediately after 9/11. Security was still managed by individual airports; I carried a laptop every flight.

I don't want "no security" in air travel any more than on a city bus, but think a conversation to re-evaluate what that really means, what is possible and what is reasonable is long overdue.

The recent JetBlue incident demonstrated how generalized procedures and practice must mesh with on-the-spot adaptation to unique events to be successful. Pax who were prepared to act were an essential part of controlling that event. Security professionals have been lax in addressing that aspect, because it's so messy. Pax are not only outside line-of-command, the players change every incident! It's easier to stay with the traditional paradigm regarding pax as inert, identical placeholders. Given the essential roles of pax in the Flight 93, shoe- and underwear-bomber events, I believe integrating better understanding of group behavior is necessary to improve preparedness by those designing security policy and procedures. No small part of this is respecting passengers' rights.

Yes, of course.

Yes, I can remember more than once having a screener take my laptop out of the bag and turn it on at the checkpoint. I can also remember cringing every time they hard-crashed Windows 95 while it was still booting up. For the record, I'm younger than you might think someone remembering that would be.

To a large degree, yes, but it was a much less-invasive (and, many would argue, equally effective) show.

And here I thought I was the only one! I was taking pictures of Arizona's governor for my college paper, and one of the members of her security detail waved me over and inspected my camera. When I asked him why, he said that people were putting gunbarrels inside of camera lenses and rigging them to act as a sniper weapon. I thought he was nuts--good to know he's not the only one!

I would. Some level of security is definitely called for. I mean, I wouldn't want a guy with a six-inch knife concealed on his leg to decide that he's going to go all Chucky on the passengers around him. Likewise, I wouldn't wane a firearm sneaking through the checkpoint. Some security is definitely needed, but the hilarious, expensive, theatrical approach is not.

I would, yes. Basically, I want security procedures to take into account the ways that air travel is not like other forms of transport, or just being in public. Knives, I don't really care. Bombs are a bigger issue, since a bomb on a plane can do much more damage than a similar sized bomb in public (i.e. make the plane crash). Weapons or items that can be used to breach the cockpit door, I also want kept off planes (i.e. no issue with brass knuckles, but no crowbars). Guns also, as a higher chance for mayhem (and large #s of casualties) than knives, plus at least the potential to down the plane, or breach the cockpit door).

WTMD plus xray of hand luggage seems to me to be an entirely reasonable level of security, and a fair balance between security and privacy/dignity/convenience/cost.

In the world of my dreams, airlines would choose the level of security they wished to provide and customers could make an informed decision on which airline to use based on their personal preferences. It may be nothing, everything or something in between.

I said I was dreaming, but it is the foundation of liberty.

Had that happen a few times, but not invariably. Concern seemed to be that there were several cases (Pam Am 103 comes to mind) where explosives were hidden in electronics. Also, I've heard (by no means an expert on this) that x-rays, at least at the time, had a hard time distinguishing between battery packs and a similarly-shaped block of plastic explosive.

Excellent post. ^

For those too young to remember PanAm 103: the explosive device was in a suitcase in the baggage hold, placed there by an airline employee with access to the loading process who was part of the plot. The device itself never passed through what carry-on security procedures existed at that time.

Yes, and such a suggestion is the "straw man" that TSA supporters trot out as being the only alternative. That's because it's the only sustainable argument they have.

I like to think that the majority of FT posters are far more sensible.
Huh? Where is there security on a city bus outside of Israel?

http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jun/02/news/mn-36599 <- Actual case of a gun hidden in a camera used to end a hostage situation. Unlike the shoe/underwear/liquid/toner bomb plots, where there has not been a single demonstrated success.

I think you all do have a valid point: WTMDs do keep guns off planes, which can, in fact, be a _huge_ risk if a passenger gets irate.

I saw a pro-TSA article pointing out that, before 9/11, screeners missed 20% of undercover gun-through-the-checkpoint tests--a _huge_ security hole. If the TSA only missed 20% of undercover tests, they'd be trumpeting that off the mountaintops.

It was not uncommon, when we provisioned a laptop for a sales person we always included a bootable dos disk for them to stick in should they be asked. It booted to dos much faster off the floppy

For the young people, floppies were storage devices you inserted into a drive that held about 1.4 megs of data at the time :D

It really did not prove anything, you could still pack a laptop with explosives by removing the CD drive, packing the empty spaces in it, packing half the battery pack and leaving only enough smaller cells to power it up and trigger it, etc. Many laptops could handle two battery packs, but only took one to power up, you could pack the second pack, etc.

Security theater is nothing new, just enforced by new people.

Add a complete set of Torx bits, Philips, and hex bits, a torque wrench, and a 2-C MagLite.

My boss used to laugh at me about the MagLite until we got stuck in an elevator for about half an hour in SF after a minor earthquake, and I let him burn his thumb on his lighter before pulling the flashlight out.

That's a 3.5" HD. Anyone else remember the 8" 180k, or the 5.25" 360k?

That assumption is an unfortunate example of "security" being perceived as extremes of guns, unlawful detention and unwarranted searches. ;)

City buses I use have simple rules about display of weapons (varying by state), threatening behavior, and appropriate use of the vehicle's components. None of these rules prevent threats all by themselves; they serve to screen riders more likely to cause problems. Many buses have cameras, which assist in identifying and prosecuting bad actors as well as accident analysis. Drivers have communication with their base, authorization to eject riders, and high priority if they call LE. ALL of that is security. Pilots have far less flexibility to eject troublesome passenger or call the cops, so adaptation is necessary.

Even LEOs on every corner carrying lethal force cannot provide "security," as anyone who has traveled in certain areas can attest. Security is the reasonable expectation of going about one's daily business unmolested, which is far more complex than mere deployment of force.

I have an 8 inch disk on the wall, the young people ask what's that thing?

I don't remember any laptops though that accepted them :D

Oh, the memories!

But wasn't the 1.4mg 3.5" FD a late improvement in capacity?

Very late. And the last floppy that got wide circulation (there were some variants that were never very popular...)

I remember one "luggable" that did, but it was a custom job.

I was regularly required to turn it on at DCA during the '90's. Especially at the temporary US/DL terminal. I know one guy who ended up with a trashed hard drive as a result of the security folks requiring this, then either shutting it down immediately during the boot or closing the lid early in the boot.

This. And with the newer laptops, a small battery the size of a 9-volt ought to do the trick.

Agree with you to a degree, but the fact that planes _can_ be turned into missles means that even people not on the planes have a legitimate interest in airlines having sufficient security to make that scenario at least very difficult.

I still carry all of this sans torque wrench and the Mag-Lite has been replaced by a P7 Coast.

With what we know now, an airliner can't be turned into a missile without the complicity of the pilots, crew, and passengers. it's not a viable threat vector.

Almost every time. Had to be sure the battery had enough power to turn it on.

I'm with you.

Automobiles, rental trucks, semis, vans, Amish buggies, covered wagons, the Oscar Meyer Wienermobile, hot air balloons, tractors pulling slurry tanks, gasoline and diesel fuel trucks, general aviation aircraft, traffic helicopters, parade floats, UPS and FedEx planes, blimps that cover sporting events even in the ridiculous case that the events are in domed stadiums, dry bulk haulers, and many other conveyances can be rigged with explosives and used as a portable delivery device. Does that mean that people not in these vehicles and potentially victims of these criminals have an enforceable legitimate interest that the drivers and passengers in said vehicles be checked before driving, riding in or otherwise moving said vehicles by a Federal employee before doing so? If the answer is "no" please supply a logical reason why airplanes are different except that commercial airliners go a long way, carry lots of fuel and travel very fast (all at least partially covered in some of my examples). If "yes," how do you propose that these conveyances be checked and under what authority?

IBM introduced it in their laptops (some of them) in 86, some other makers took a bit longer.

I think I only had to boot up once or twice in the 8 years that I travelled with a laptop (int'l from Australia) before 9/11.

My theory is that in the early days, laptops were rare enough that a general rule hadn't been developed; then there was a period when they were more common and got a hand-inspection (including booting); then (well before 9/11) they became SO common that hand-inspection and booting them up would have been too time-consuming. Well before 9/11, it just went through the x-ray machine, although I recall that some (most?) airports required laptops to be out of the bag.

I agree with those who have said that WTMD plus x-ray of carry-ons is reasonably effective and minimally invasive, and I would be happy to return to that. (Actually, for domestic travel in Australia, we still have that.)

Laptop being weighed
 

Ah the good old days ... I remember having to turn on the laptop at many airports - even having to plug it in if the battery was dead.

I specifically remember flying out of MUC and they actually weighed my laptop and compared it to a book listing brands and weights. Don't remember the year but guessing it was around the Pan Am 103 time period.

In 1982 or 1983, I upgraded my HP technical computer, a 9826, with an external 10 Mb hard drive unit that included dual 3.5" FD's. As I remember the unit was about $1000. I also upgraded my ram, adding 4 Mb that came as 4 full size cards, $800 per card, $3200 total, that each took up an expansion slot. They soon released a single card that had the whole 4 Mb on one card for $2000. The HP was Motorola based and did not have a true RAM limit except slots and cash.

There was no commercial software for the computer. My company sent me to HP computer school to learn to write code. They spent about $12000 for four one week classes.

Computers are really cheap and easy now. On the phone with tech support for four hours? Be glad you have someone to call or a tech support to contact.