Agree with you to a degree, but the fact that planes _can_ be turned into missles means that even people not on the planes have a legitimate interest in airlines having sufficient security to make that scenario at least very difficult.

I still carry all of this sans torque wrench and the Mag-Lite has been replaced by a P7 Coast.

With what we know now, an airliner can't be turned into a missile without the complicity of the pilots, crew, and passengers. it's not a viable threat vector.

Almost every time. Had to be sure the battery had enough power to turn it on.

I'm with you.

Automobiles, rental trucks, semis, vans, Amish buggies, covered wagons, the Oscar Meyer Wienermobile, hot air balloons, tractors pulling slurry tanks, gasoline and diesel fuel trucks, general aviation aircraft, traffic helicopters, parade floats, UPS and FedEx planes, blimps that cover sporting events even in the ridiculous case that the events are in domed stadiums, dry bulk haulers, and many other conveyances can be rigged with explosives and used as a portable delivery device. Does that mean that people not in these vehicles and potentially victims of these criminals have an enforceable legitimate interest that the drivers and passengers in said vehicles be checked before driving, riding in or otherwise moving said vehicles by a Federal employee before doing so? If the answer is "no" please supply a logical reason why airplanes are different except that commercial airliners go a long way, carry lots of fuel and travel very fast (all at least partially covered in some of my examples). If "yes," how do you propose that these conveyances be checked and under what authority?

IBM introduced it in their laptops (some of them) in 86, some other makers took a bit longer.

I think I only had to boot up once or twice in the 8 years that I travelled with a laptop (int'l from Australia) before 9/11.

My theory is that in the early days, laptops were rare enough that a general rule hadn't been developed; then there was a period when they were more common and got a hand-inspection (including booting); then (well before 9/11) they became SO common that hand-inspection and booting them up would have been too time-consuming. Well before 9/11, it just went through the x-ray machine, although I recall that some (most?) airports required laptops to be out of the bag.

I agree with those who have said that WTMD plus x-ray of carry-ons is reasonably effective and minimally invasive, and I would be happy to return to that. (Actually, for domestic travel in Australia, we still have that.)

Laptop being weighed
 

Ah the good old days ... I remember having to turn on the laptop at many airports - even having to plug it in if the battery was dead.

I specifically remember flying out of MUC and they actually weighed my laptop and compared it to a book listing brands and weights. Don't remember the year but guessing it was around the Pan Am 103 time period.

In 1982 or 1983, I upgraded my HP technical computer, a 9826, with an external 10 Mb hard drive unit that included dual 3.5" FD's. As I remember the unit was about $1000. I also upgraded my ram, adding 4 Mb that came as 4 full size cards, $800 per card, $3200 total, that each took up an expansion slot. They soon released a single card that had the whole 4 Mb on one card for $2000. The HP was Motorola based and did not have a true RAM limit except slots and cash.

There was no commercial software for the computer. My company sent me to HP computer school to learn to write code. They spent about $12000 for four one week classes.

Computers are really cheap and easy now. On the phone with tech support for four hours? Be glad you have someone to call or a tech support to contact.

Not entirely true. Without any level of security, it is a viable threat vector. Get six people into first class, with handguns, sufficient ammunition, and a crowbar, and then could have a reasonable shot at taking the plane. Hence, the need for some level of security (ie. WTMD and X-ray). I certainly agree that, without the means to breach the cockpit door, it's not a viable threat vector.

You've answered your own question. Only commercial airliners go fast enough, are flexible enough in where they go, and, in the absence of security, can be entered easily enough by the general public to create a viable threat of mass casualties beyond those on board the conveyance to justify the associated security.

Cool. I never saw a 9826 with more than 2MB of RAM on-board.

...and detecting any of those those doesn't require body scanners - in fact, WTMDs are are lot better at detecting metal objects carried on the person than the body scanners, as shown by Señor Corbett's video antics (to the great dismay of the TSA and anyone with a financial stake in them.)

Something I've noted. I've joked that, if ALPA really wanted to make a point, they could refuse to fly until every passenger goes through a WTMD, since NoSes are obviously useless at keeping guns and crowbars out.