<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by lowfareair:
The 5.88 statistic is also misleading.</font>
Although I haven't checked, the 5.88 figure sounds like the accident rate for the airline when it was doing business as valujet. I don't think that includes the time since it has been doing buisness as AirTran. The problem with a combined AirTran/valujet figure is if it should include the pre-merger AirTran with the pre-merger valujet.
The airline known as valujet had an accident rate, and an incident rate, far in excess to what the rest of the industry was recording. At one point in the late 1990s, valujet had an accident rate such that if American Airlines matched that rate they would have been having a reportable accident every two to three days.
Many people beleive that valujet had only one accident, the crash into the everglades. valujet had quite a number of accidents, the everglades crash being the only fatal accident. In addition to the high accident rate, valujet had a very high rate of reportable incidents. The difference between an accident and an incident is the amount of damage done and incidents are always non-fatal.
As to the cause of the vj592 crash, valujet actions were listed as one of the three causal factors by the NTSB. Additionally, valujet actions were mentioned again as contributing factors.
Here is the complete NTSB statement of probably cause from vj592:
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of the accident, resulting in a fire in the Class D cargo compartment from the actuation of one or more oxygen generators improperly carried as cargo, were: (1) the failure of SabreTech to properly prepare, package, identify, and track unexpended chemical oxygen generators before presenting them to ValuJet for carriage; (2) the failure of ValuJet to properly oversee its contract maintenance program to ensure compliance with maintenance, maintenance training, and hazardous materials requirements and practices; and (3) the failure of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require smoke detection and fire suppression systems in Class D cargo compartments. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FAA to adequately monitor ValuJet's heavy maintenance program and responsibilities, including ValuJet's oversight of its contractors, and SabreTech's repair station certificate; the failure of the FAA to adequately respond to prior chemical oxygen generator fires with programs to address the potential hazards; and the failure of ValuJet to ensure that both ValuJet and contract maintenance employees were aware of the carrier's no-carry hazardous materials policy and had received appropriate hazardous materials training. (NTSB/AAR-97/06)</font>