The root of the problem with the DC-10 crash at ORD was probably the way its flap and aileron control cables are were routed.

DC-10 engines were (are still?) held on by three bolts, two forward and one aft. If the rear one fails, the engine rotates around the forward ones: forward and up, crushing the leading edge of the wing. On DC-10s that's where the control cables are, though in most other jets they're behind (and protected by) the main wing spar.

Were it not for this, a DC-10 with two functioning engines and the third physically missing should be able to fly enough to get back on the ground safely. The amount of structural and aerodynamic damage that would accompany any engine falling off, and whether the crew would have been able control the dive before they hit the ground, makes it speculative as regards whether that specific situation would have been survivable with a different control layout.

Several DC-10 quality issues have been traced to intense pressure by McDonnell-Douglas management to beat the 747 to the sky - their mantra was "Fly before they [Boeing] roll." However, I don't think that was a factor in this. It takes no longer to design cables aft of the main spar than it takes to design them inside the leading edge of the wing.