Originally Posted by sllevin
I fundamentally believe that analysis is flawed; specifically, the naiveté displayed in the aforementioned sentence above.
Anti-trust action is not cut and dried; there's no specific formula under which "A" is right and "B" is wrong.
The article also fundamentally assumes that codesharing ex-LHR to Europe is the same as codesharing ex-LHR to the US.
The DOJ was quite clear about its concerns about oneworld reducing competition over the Atlantic.
Steve
Originally Posted by HeathrowGuy
At no time has any government authority, on either side of the Atlantic, prohibited AA and BA from engaging in routine reciprocal frequent-flyer activities. The carriers implemented the restriction for commercial reasons - namely, to protect their respective premium traffic flows from poaching by the other airline.
Okay, I went back and dug up the details.
On August 8, 1998 Karel van Miert (Europe's Competition Commissioner at the time) issued his ruling regarding BA/AA alliance. In it he sighted actions the two airlines must take to alleviate monopolistic concerns pertaining to the originally proposed AA/BA code-sharing agreement.
Specifically, the main concerns revolved around dominate position of the hub-to-hub routes (e.g. LHR-DFW/MIA/ORD) and how an allied BA/AA would produce significant barriers to entry to new members on the London - North American sector.
A reduction of 50 weekly frequencies in total by BA and AA on the LHR-DFW/MIA/ORD routes that link BA's major hub to AA's three primary hubs. These slots were to be released to competitors on these routes. [Moreover, these 50 slots also had to be the desirable morning ones]
An additional 217 weekly slots (a total of 267) weekly slots were to be made available for rivals to use for North American services from LHR or LGW, but these could be transferred from other BA or AA routes not necessarily their own transatlantic flights.
All slots were to be released without compensation. (Official Journal, 1998)
"...All slots were to be released without compensation?!" Ouch!
Moreover, "the alliance partners were required to either refrain from pooling their frequent flyer programmes or to allow other airlines to participate in them... faced with giving up so many slots without any financial recompense and with continued uncertainty about whether the United States would approve their alliance and under what conditions, BA and AA decided early in 1999 to downgrade the alliance to a looser and wider marketing arrangement under the Oneworld banner." (Doganis, 2003)
My guess as to what happened is since BA/AA were told they could not "force" FF'ers onto ones FF program (this would have been accomplished via the originally proposed AA/BA code-sharing plan) the two airlines lost their way to protect their elite/business customer base. And so, rather than risk poaching (or the loss of 50 prime + 217 non-prime LHR slots) they simply decided to disallow alternate FF redemption/awards on the Trans-Atlantic operations to appease the regulators.
Neat stuff.
[Edited to Add:] In the spirit of not highjacking the thread... at least any more so, may I suggest that we continue this interseting discussion in either the AA/BA forums?