Originally Posted by Doppy
They did it at a number of airports; not sure if DFW was one of them, but that's what this sounds like.
The problem is twofold: (1) the techniques can't tell the difference between someone smuggling drugs or nervous about having "too much" money on them and (2) there are almost no terrorists, but lots of other people doing other potentially illegal stuff.
So what you end up with is a lot of catches of people who are no threat to aviation security. Since I don't favor using the TSA as an arm of the DEA, I've got mixed feelings on such a program.
Actually, as I understand it, it was the behavioral profiling people who said that something was not right with this guy - two days in a row - but the airport security people said he was OK to fly over their objections and let him on.
With regards to Mr. Reid, I think that is what i read somewhere as well. However, it is my understanding that security (both behavioral and regular) said that he shouldn't fly and it was either AA or the ground personel there who overrode their concerns on the second day and allowed him to board. They figured it was the security overreacting.
What I would like to know, and i don't know, is has behavioral screening actually ever failed? I don't consider the Ried case to be a failure, because they caught him, twice only to have someone else override them. I know that behavioral screening will select non-threats, but has there ever been a documented case where behavioral screening totally missed a person who intended to do harm?
If it actually works that is great, all they have to do is figure out how to eliminate the false positives. However, if the failure rate, i.e. missed threats is there, then it doesn't add anything.
One other thing, while I don't necessarily like this, it at least shows me that someone is actually realizing that it isn't the sharp pointy things that we have worry about, it is the person who has them.