Keeping in mind that these are pilots who are evaluating overall airport security not just the checkpoints. I don't want to generalize all pilots, however, a lot of the ones I encounter have a prima dona attitude. They feel they are above airport security screening and should be exempted from it. I'm not so sure they're completely wrong with that assumption. After all, if we can't trust the pilot, then who can we trust? It doesn't make sense to me to get wrapped around the axle because a pilot happens to have a pair of cuticle scissors in his kit bag when he could simply drive the plane straight into the ground. (When I was a contract screener, we were very very liberal with the way we screened pilots and first officers...of course, all of that changed with TSA.) I mention this point because when pilots are complaining about checkpoint screening, I believe they are complaining about the fact that they have to undergo checkpoint screening rather than complaining about what passengers have to go through.
I'm going to call some of you on the employee screening issue and challenge you to lay your cards on the table. I find it hypocritical that some of you believe that airport employees should be screened yet want to see a registered traveler's program for frequent flyers. This is a classic confrontation between a risk avoidance versus risk management approach to security. Under a risk management approach, employees would have to undergo the scrutiny of a thorough background check and be issued security cards that allow them to bypass security on a strict "must-have" basis. I believe that certain airport employees such as flight crew members, mechanics, airport management, etc would qualify whereas the minimum wage airport McDonalds fry cook would still have to process through the checkpoint. Under the same philosophy, frequent flyers would be exempt from selectee screening (keeping in mind that I strongly oppose the concept of selectee screening) based on their background checks and an accurate identification method that goes beyond the mere checking of a photo ID. Perhaps a biometric pass (fingerprint, retina scan, bar-coded "smart card," or some other similar methodology). 100% daily screening of airport employees (and airline crew members) is a risk-avoidance method that falls right in line with what many of you refer to as the "shoe carnival." Of course, there has to be an effective background check method in place that is subject to continuous scrutiny so that we don't end up with convicted felons being hired as ramp workers.
Same applies to cargo screening. I am a strong advocate of screening everything that goes on board a commercial airliner, including cargo. I am not a strong advocate of screening all cargo planes. There are other risk management-oriented methods to inspect cargo planes and crew that are an acceptable alternative to 100% screening of cargo. The other point here, as I've mentioned in other threads, is that a very small percentage of cargo is placed on board of commercial passenger planes, and when it is, it is done with the airlines' knowledge, permission and authorization. Of that small percentage, some of it is screened by TSA, depending on size among other factors, and some of it is not. As stated previously, I believe in screening everything that is placed in a commercial passenger airplane.
I find it ironic that in the shoe carnival threads many of you harshly criticize TSA for getting wrapped around the axle x-raying shoes based on one single incident. The logic your argument follows is that it would be an acceptable statistical risk to either not screen shoes or, for some of you, screen only the obviously thick soled shoes, rather than the current procedure being used. Under this logic, I am curious why so many of you are so worried about the surface-to-air missile threat when we haven't had one single incident of a passenger airliner being shot down in the United States with one of these. I personally don't dismiss the SAM threat; however, I see this as something that needs to be put into proper perspective---in all fairness to shoe carnival critics---much like the shoe bomb threat needs to be put into proper perspective. Just pointing out the inconsistency of some of your criticisms.
I agree that self-defense training is something that flight crew members should have. Hate to stereotype here, but a petite little flight attendant doesn't stand much of a chance when confronted by a physically stronger adversary. However, with the proper martial arts training, she can at least buy time by defending herself from attack long enough for an on-board LEO (or fellow crew members and/or passengers) to physically overwhelm the aggressor before he has a chance to threaten the flight. I'm not necessarily talking about terrorists; there are many other situations that result in physical confrontations ranging from air rage to the fact that some people suddenly freak out at 30,000 feet in the air. Self-defense training is not the cure-all against a determined and probably superior-trained terrorist; however, it is better than no training and is effective for other physical confrontation situations.
I find it somewhat contradictory that these pilots rate baggage screening satisfactory yet criticize the fact that cargo is allowed aboard commercial airliners. (I also find it interesting that these same pilots allow such unscreened cargo to be placed aboard, but I digress.) Perhaps they're referring to baggage screening itself and the cargo issue is a caveat rather than the center of the argument.
Reinforced cockpit doors was something long overdue since planes were being hijacked to Cuba during the 70's. However, this is an effective measure only if the pilots lock the doors and refuse to heed any threats made by hijackers. This would include the horrifying scenario of threatening to kill a passenger's infant unless they opened the doors.
I throw my challenge out to you again to discuss these issues without resorting to your daily whining about shoe carnivals and erosion of constitutional rights. My money is on the fact that you cannot avoid the temptation to default to your tired old hyperbole, but I'll wait and see.