Many of the core arguments made remain consistent with BA's flattish results in 2025. Prior to the Club, I prioritised flying BA and booking every holiday I took with them. I proactively booked all the holidays required for Gold in 2025 before "the Club" was announced. So I still took a number of revenue flights with them across J and F before June 30th.

There's a sharp difference between my travel spend before and after June 30th. While overall spend on travel surged last year (consistent with the growth of the premium leisure segment), for me, that spend shifted from BA before June 30th to QR, Cathay, Emirates, Singapore, JL and Finnair after June 30th. I now only have 2 revenue flights with BA in 2026. Both were made to book all the hotels I required for 2026 where booking via a BA Holiday was somehow cheaper than booking directly with those hotels or via another travel agent. Every other BA flight I'm taking is a redemption. So in 2026, BA slips to 5th place for me in revenue spend behind Qatar, Finnair, Cathay and Emirates. This is compared to 2024 where they had almost 100% of the share.

Of course I'm not reflective of the general population, being in that relatively small intersection of customers that spend a significant amount on travel and also optimise that spend to the last £ to get the best value at the premium end of the market.

Despite my frustrations with BA, I want them to do well. I'm absolutely not in a spiteful camp wanting them to fail because of "the Club". But I still believe they've made the wrong call in its implementation. BA is absolutely right to seek growth in non-flight revenue. That could have come from innovation. Doubling down on cost-cutting has taken the shine off the core product. This is fine in a supply-constrained market like Heathrow. The loss of the rose-tinted spectacles and blind loyalty of the Executive Club will hurt if/when supply constraints are lifted or demand drops below capacity.