I read through the report, it is a rather neutral statement of facts.

A few interesting points from my point of view.

1. The runway incursion alarm in the tower went of 7 seconds after the Coast Guard aircraft entered the runway, and was on until 1 second before impact. But this was not noticed in the tower.
2. The runway stop lights at the holding point were not in operation.
3. The coast guard aircraft was instructed to taxi to C5 and told they were number 1 for take off. This was read back correctly, and acknowledged on the CVR.
4. The captain of the Coast Guard aircraft asked the copilot to execute the predeparture check list, which should only happened when they are cleared to enter the runway. Copilot complied.
5. Coast Guard CVR has no indication (in my opinion) of anything unusual until the sound of impact. Though if the coast guard observes a sterile cockpit there was maybe some discussion points about the situation in Komatsu Airport that should not there at the time of departure preparations.
6. The JAL CVR has no indication that the pilots noticed the coast guard plane before impact. The sound of impact and the PF's voice/reaction is recorded at the same time at 17:47:27. The captain takes control 6 seconds later.
7. The CVR recording ends 51 seconds after impact due to loss of power in the aircraft.
8. In the simulator the investigation have made tests on whether it is possible to see the coast guard plane in that position with and without the HUD. (HUD was in use)
Ａ機が停止していた位置は、滑走路中心線灯及び接地帯灯が滑走路面に埋設されている場所で、後方から視認可 能であるＡ機の上部尾灯位置灯（白）、下部尾灯位置灯（白）及び尾部に取り付けられている衝突防止灯（白ス トロボ）は、滑走路中心線灯の列とほぼ同じ線になっていた。The position where Aircraft A was stopped was where the runway centerline lights and ground strip lights were embedded in the runway surface, and the upper taillight position light (white), lower taillight position light (white) and anti-collision light (white strobe) attached to the tail of Aircraft A, which were visible from the rear, were in almost the same line as the row of runway centerline lights. (Google translate)
9. The power loss seems to linked to electrical power distribution center located in the front of the aircraft
10. It was not possible to communicate the evacuation command throughout the aircraft due to the loss of power, doors L1 and R1 was opened at 17:51:30. 3 minutes and 3 seconds after impact, based on the captain giving the evacuation command.
11. Due to fire, and the right engine, it was assessed by the cabin crew by the doors that L2, R2, L3, R3, and R4 could not be opened. L4 was opened later, based on the increasing level of smoke, and ghe cabin crew assessing that it was safe to do so. The angle of the slide was rather steep due to the angle of the aircraft.
12. The captain evacuated from L4 after having checked that all passengers were off the plane.
13. Three of cabin crew had less than 6 months experience. Talk about baptism by fire.

There are lots of other interesting facts. These are my selection of what I kind of payed a lot of attention to when reading. The report ends with a list of further investigative steps to be taken. Which also includes should the JAL pilots have seen the coast guard plane.