Originally Posted by
fumje
Can anyone fill in some context? It sounds like a concern, but I don't know — is it?
More un-organized questions:
Would A320 pilots be likely not to know that there was a tailstrike? I see a report
here that indicates it may not be obvious to the pilots (last paragraph of 'History of flight'). Is there a reporting / inspection procedure after a tailstrike on landing? Who is most likely to notice the tailstrike? And in this case, how was it ultimately known which among the at least eight potential sectors had the tailstrike?
From
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/a...ort/106964/pdf
United Airlines flight 1091 sustained a tailstrike while landing at George Bush Intercontinental
Airport (KIAH), Houston, TX. The flight was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight
from Mexico City, Mexico to KIAH.
According to the flight crew, the captain was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer (FO) was
the pilot flying when they were cleared for the visual approach to runway 27 at KIAH. The
airplane was in the landing configuration and on a stabilized approach at 1,000 ft. above
ground level (AGL). About 60 ft AGL the captain noticed the airspeed begin to decay and
stated watch your speed. The FO subsequently pitched the nose of the airplane down and
added a little thrust. About 30 ft AGL, due to a higher-than-normal rate of descent the captain
commanded flare, flare, flare. The FO flared the airplane which resulted in a firm landing. As
the airplane rebounded from the firm landing the spoilers deployed resulting in a nose high
attitude. In an effort to correct for the nose high attitude, the captain and FO pushed forward
on their respective sidesticks.
The FO stated that the ground spoiler deployment coinciding with the firm touchdown resulted
in an airplane nose-up pitch attitude. As a result, the pitch attitude increased until the tail
struck the runway. After the tailstrike, the remainder of the landing and landing rollout were
normal with no risk of runway overrun or excursion.
The tailstrike resulted in abrasion damage over an area of about 19 feet long by 1 foot wide
along the aft lower fuselage. An inspection revealed substantial damage to the aft pressure
bulkhead and frames.
From
https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/t...ailstrikes.pdf
there was a modification to flight control law since the incident you mentioned.
IMO it appears that the approach destabilized at 60'AGL on this flight. Should captain have called for go around?
how this big of a tailstrike was missed on the walk around ? and the fact it damaged the pressure bulkhead and frame. That is a very serious inflight safety risk on the 7 subsequent flights (if substantiated).