Originally Posted by
JimInOhio
It's hard to see what UA was envisioing when they went down this "return to JFK" path. Frankly, I don't think they ever had a sound strategy to make it work because you can't have such limited service to just two destinations and have that be a sustainable success (as a major airline). So what were they planning on?
1) Acquiring slots from other airlines? You've stated none were ever for sale.
2) Slot re-allocation? Why would UA ever think that was going to happen with a positive result? The FAA hadn't conducted this for years and it's never a good strategy to count on something happening that hasn't happened in seemingly forever. And even if it did, what would UA have received? We all know LCC's are granted preference in accessing airports deemed closed to them. This would mean Spirit, Frontier, maybe Southwest and/or Allegiant would have been the real beneficiaries. If there was anything left over, it wouldn't be enough for UA to have a meaningful and profitable operation. Heck, even Alaska might have wanted more.
So this just strikes me as a "let's throw something at the wall and see if it sticks" kind of move UA made. Predictably, it didn't.
United clearly knew this was a possibility all along, they publicly said as much, but bet on somehow being able to source additional, permanent slots as the pandemic unfolded and they lost access to the temporary slots they flew for the last 18 months. This return was always considered an attempt at toehold, and it just didn't work out.
Regarding your two points:
1) I think United expected to be able to acquire more slots, one way or another. At the same time, from early 2021 onward, there were rumors that the DOJ intended to revisit the AA/B6 NEA. United had a good-faith belief, and probably still does, that it can benefit from a possible JFK slot divestiture (see below), especially if those are to be transacted at market rate.
2) That relies on an assumption that the LCCs actually want to be there. True LCCs, today's ULCCs (Frontier, Allegiant, Spirit... not sure Southwest truly fits in that category anymore given that they are a top 3 player in nearly every major US market) want no part of JFK. Operating costs are too high for their respective models. Southwest allegedly left EWR for operational reasons that would be equally a factor at JFK. United, OTOH, could conceivably make a case for a slot allocation as a JFK outsider, and that its reentry would increase competition in key markets. Alaska, with an existing JFK presence, wouldn't necessarily have an advantage over United in this regard. It's not a low-cost carrier and already has a JFK presence. As to the FAA-mandated slot divestiture, it happens more frequently than you seem to suggest, but certainly not an everyday occurrence as the conditions precedent are usually a merger between one or more incumbent carriers at one or more of the three (3) FAA Level 3 slot administration airports in the country (DCA, JFK, LGA). It also generally happens by settlement agreement between carriers and the DOJ/DOT/FAA, as was seen with the DL/US slot deal about a decade ago (which only closed in 2019). There were also contingent slot divestitures that were part of the approval for the AA/B6 NEA that is now being tried.
So, I don't think it's nearly a foregone conclusion that United doesn't stand to benefit from a JFK slot divestiture from B6/AA, or as part of some agreement to allow the NEA and B6/NK to go forward. Southwest behind the scenes is lobbying hard for increased access at BOS (where gates are the precious commodity) and LGA slots, while United is doing the same for JFK. It will be interesting to see how this works out.