Originally Posted by
pitz
How can that be said when non-systemically redundant AoA instrumentation can fail at any time for a number of causes, and there is not a credible fool-proof recovery procedure in place? If either of the two prior incidents were replicated, for any reason, there is certainly the possibility that the crash happens in a populated area, given how significantly populated the lower Mainland, or the GTA is.
Either an aircraft is airworthy, or it isn't. Airline personnel and the on-the-ground public should not be exposed to the risk of flying an unairworthy aircraft, merely for the sake of commercial convenience (such as repositioning to contract maintenance facilities to fit entertainment systems, or cheaper parking spots). The risk is low, but the consequences are severe. Perhaps they should have explored with Boeing the possibility of special training and procedures for the 737 so that MCAS could be locked out, placarded and MEL'ed to make the flights. Maybe that's already the case, hence there should be something in the TC and FAA ferry permits that requires such as a condition of operating authority.
I can understand how, to those not immersed in an industry on a daily basis, that the decisions rendered can seem confusing. When we complain about decisions made by professionals, we usually do so without much understanding of the facts, regulations in effect or other mitigating circumstances. These could be aviation-related or judgements made by a court, parole board, government body or any other area in which we have little understanding.
The airplanes already delivered at the time of grounding last March have not lost their certificates of airworthiness*. They have simply been grounded and banned from operating revenue flights for the time being. The NOTAM banning the operation of the Boeing 737 Max currently in effect in Canada specifically allows ferry flights. As for the training/testing flights, these are conducted with the specific approval of Transport Canada for each individual flight. The regulatory agency doesn't rubber-stamp the approvals for these repositioning or testing flights; they are issued under strict conditions with defendable rationale. The safety of the general public is considered, and obviously in these cases, was determined not to be in peril.
*no new certificates of airworthiness have been issued to any of the Max aircraft not yet delivered to customers, and I understand that Boeing is currently unable to issue these, which was the existing practice prior to the grounding.
To your point about MCAS being "locked out", I'm not a Boeing expert, but I don't think this is a feature that can be disabled at will.