Originally Posted by
DenverBrian
For me, I'd word it differently.
There was a design flaw that developed out of an obsessive need to keep a 40-year-old type certification and avoid simulator training.
The design flaw put the pilots in an extremely difficult situation with little time to recover, as the incidents occurred at full throttle during takeoff when the plane was at low altitude.
The pilots reacted in a way that reflected their lack of knowledge of a system that Boeing had not revealed to them or trained them on.
There is always a chain of events that leads to such disasters. The focus should be on the absolute root cause, and then the proximate causes. The absolute root cause appears to be the design and/or MCAS.
The pilots are no longer with us to explain their actions. But systems and processes can be examined in depth.
As a passenger, I want my passenger aircraft to be as mistake-proof as possible. With the pilots as the absolute last line of defense against errors, I want their burden to be lessened over time and new aircraft models, not extended or made more complicated.
Although I am not a pilot and engineer, I’ll share my understanding of the situation and why you’re wrong on key points.
The functionality of MCAS is a certification requirement, not just to maintain the type certification, but to get certified at all. When a pilot pulls back on the control column, pressure should increase as the nose rises and the aircraft pitches up. Under certain conditions, this did not occur on the MAX. Other commercial airplanes have software to address similar conditions because no jet has perfect aerodynamics.
There are two problems with MCAS: first, it gave an unlimited number of nose down commands. It appears this was permitted as both Boeing and the FAA believed pilots would recognize erroneous deployment as runaway trim and respond accordingly. In hindsight, this assumption was wrong. It’s difficult (with info currently available) to attribute any negligence to this decision as a different deployment wouldn’t increase cost.
The other problem is the decision to depend on one AOA. There has not been a good explanation publicly, probably because this will be harder for Boeing to explain. The change is with software, so it may be difficult to attribute to cost.
It it important to remember that Boeing was building the plane it’s customers wanted to buy. While airlines and passengers would love new technology that has step function improvements in fuel consumption, speed and comfort, no one is willing to pay for it. While Boeing needs to own its decisions, the situation and consequences, it is probably appropriate for customers to ask how our demands for cheaper fares (or more benefits at lower cost) is driving the entire aviation industry to the lowest common denominator.