FlyerTalk Forums - View Single Post - BA422 (LHR-VLC) emergency landing in VLC (cabin filled with smoke)
Old Aug 6, 2019 | 8:56 am
  #183  
Waterhorse
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Join Date: Aug 2008
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Originally Posted by HowMayIHelp
I think I speak for every crew member when I say that as crew, we have no desire or plans to go down with the ship. Ultimately, I’m the most important person onboard, to me! If I thought for one moment that my life was in danger in such a scenario, I have the experience and training to allow me to make the decision to evacuate. Questions may well be asked afterwards but ultimately, we are trusted as crew to make informed decisions based on our training. Passengers do not have the same training and knowledge of procedures to make the decision to evacuate because they “haven’t heard anything” from the crew. I trust my Pilots, I trust my Cabin Crew team and communication between us is everything. When the crew are clearly busy dealing with a highly stressful situation, they may well not have the mental head space to take time away to make you feel more at ease. This crew won’t be judged for not making announcements, they will be judged (positively) for getting every single one of those passengers off of the aircraft safely and in the correct circumstances.

Saudia 163 does not compare to this. They had clear signs of fire in the cabin which were declared before the aircraft even landed. What went through the Captain’s mind after landing, none of us will ever know. But it’s known the cabin was pressurised after landing and the wing engines were still running for 3 minutes after the aircraft came to a stop. The fire continued to rage onboard, thick black toxic smoke killed everyone and fire consumed what was left.
Should’ve, Could’ve, Would’ve.
We do know a few things about the Saudia TriStar - the FO was inexperienced, the Captain did not take a great deal of notice of the female purser who was passing info as to the onboard fire. There is speculation that the Arabic culture of relations between the sexes had some play on this. The American Flt Eng was dyslexic and had a poor training record, he seemingly found it very difficult to manage to the QRH drills ( several were in play) even referring to the Fat Crago bay rather than the Aft Cargo Bay. He failed to complete the drill and left the aircraft pressurised and in this state the doors could not be opened. The captain was singing prayers on the approach and it has been hypothedised that he had "given" up. The FO failed to make any real impact on the event. The only crew member who appeared to have a grasp of events and their seriousness was the purser ( other cabin crew may well also have been fully aware but did not appear on the CVR). The Saudia event was primarily a CRM nightmare that lead to the deaths of all aboard.
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