Originally Posted by
ridefar
No kidding.
I am also having problem understanding how software could fix this.
So the software post fix turns off MCAS more easily? So it isn't really needed in the first place? The obvious inference is that it will be turned off by the software when it is actually needed. In which case the pilot training should not only be for how to shut it off when it activates incorrectly, but how to fly the plane when it didn't activate but should have? Is that type of training being done by AC? Mandated by CTA? FAA? And if the latter is the case, how on earth does this pass the sniff test in terms of being the same plane as the 737 was previously in terms of training and certification?
It seems pretty clear that *IF* MCAS solves a real issue, then it is needed. And if it is needed, the current sensor model (2 sensors only, if they disagree MCAS is turned off--I believe that is what is described as the "fix" in what is know publicly) is insufficient. Therefore software fix alone is not sufficient. Not really sure that Boeing is really trying to do anything other than get their planes back in the air as fast as possible.
Of course, with no complete public disclosure of what the fix is, this post is speculative.
The purpose of MCAS is to make the MAX fly like non-MAX in a very small area of the flight envelope, light load and max aft CoG. The difference between the two is that the MAX requires less back pressure on the yoke. According to Juan Brown (a 737 NG pilot, currently flying 777) in one of the videos I posted earlier, pilots he knows who have flown the MAX say they can barely tell the difference between the MAX and non-MAX with MCAS turned off.