RatherBeInYOW

You can keep calling MCAS a "stall prevention" system, but that doesn't make it any more true. The MAX is flyable if "control is returned to the pilots" - they just need to keep it in trim manually, and this doesn't "defeat the purpose" of anything, any more than it does any other part of the auto trim system, or the autopilot system, on any plane that relies on such things -- which is to say every modern commercial aircraft.

If you want to use pitot tubes as an example, try this: Incident: Virgin Australia A320 near Perth on Sep 12th 2015, automated flight system issue. Sure "control is returned to the pilots" but then they have to diagnose the issue correctly and still fly the plane. In this case software issues on the A320 prevented a correct diagnosis and nearly led the pilots to stall the aircraft on approach. If they had and 145 people were killed this would be more than just a footnote, it would be up there with AF447. Or how about AoA failures? Accident: Qantas A333 near Learmonth on Oct 7th 2008, sudden inflight upset injures 74 people on board ... uncommanded pitch down based on erroneous AoA, resulting from software bugs - just happened at an altitude that managed not to kill anyone. Returning control to the pilots in the event of catastrophic sensor failures doesn't result in a magically successful outcomes on any commercial aircraft - it requires correct diagnosis of the failures and requires the pilots to fly and land the aircraft in absence of automated systems that they usually rely on, and sometimes requires them to keep fighting those automated systems even when they have "control".

The problem with MCAS isn't that it exists. The problem, from what we know so far, and that has been repeatedly beaten to death is 1) it was extremely poorly designed and 2) it was not properly documented, likely to cut costs. From the preliminary reports we also don't know if it was only MCAS that contributed to the problems that lead to these two accidents, which is why the plane will likely remain grounded in the US much longer than it takes Boeing to get the FAA to approve the MCAS fixes, not to mention the promises of TC and EASA to get involved to certify the aircraft again in Canada and Europe.