Sure. But at the same time, this issue is affecting flight attendants. Not passengers directly. I don’t have the fullest understanding on this safety issue, but what I got out if it is flight attendants aren’t able to grab a handle, which somehow can hamper an evacuation. I’m no flight attendant, so I wouldn’t know. But to me, it seems that the simple fix is to relocate the handle (if it is movable and not part of the door), increase the cutout, or relocate the bulkhead (unlikely the latter would be considered first since that would likely reduce seating capacity at the most). I only flew an A320 twice (once with Delta, and again with Alaska on the old Virgin interior), and an A319 once with Alaska (again, with old interior since none of those have been reconfigured nor have there been any announcements as to when it commences on the A319). I never paid attention to this detail. Also, if it really was a safety concern, why did it take until March 8th, more than two months since the first A320 was reconfigured, for this to become addressed. If this was critical, it should have been noticed almost immediately. And why isn’t it being exposed more? This source seems hard to find on the web.

As far as the FAA credibility goes, I don’t understand why. This 737 MAX issue I feel that they reacted correctly. I disagreed with them initially after the second crash, but they were quick to ground the aircraft after, even if they were the last regulatory agency to do so. You can disagree with me, and that’s totally okay. But this is definitely not the lowest time in the FAA’s history. Look at the DC-10, it was allowed to continue flying after a known design flaw (the cargo door) was uncovered in 1972 during the American Airlines Flight 96 incident (it would be later uncovered that the same cargo door design failed a pressure test during the development of the DC-10 after THY 981 crashed) because McDonnel Douglas made a “gentleman’s agreement” with the FAA, in order to preserve the reputation of the plane and avoid hampered sales because of a grounding. Because of this, 346 people died two years later in an avoidable accident in what became the second deadliest single-aircraft disaster. ValuJet 592 also hampered the reputation of the FAA for somewhat similar reasons: by not requiring safety recommendations from the NTSB after an American Airlines MD-80 landed after a fire in the cargo hold, 110 people would likely still be with us (there’s more to the story, but the FAA took a big hit as a result, with the administrator being fired).

There will be more to come on this issue. But this seems like a detail passengers wouldn’t even know about. It should be fixed, but the fix in my view (remember, I’m not a flight attendant and I’m effectively an “Airbus Virgin,” since I barely fly the type) seems quick and easy, especially considering four Airbuses have the new interior done, with four, maybe five if N624VA is going to GSO for the cabin mods, more on their way). If this was already fleet-wide, that would be more lengthy to rectify. Time will tell. I don’t know if this has an effect on the 737-700s. And while the FAA might be under fire, I don’t think there’s enough evidence to prove any wrongdoing by the FAA’s part both in the certification of the 737 MAX and how they reacted. As a frequent airline passenger (with AS), I still have confidence with the FAA. But again, time will tell.