Originally Posted by
milepig
At this point, even if UAs birds are 100% safe and the pilots are perfectly trained, the optics that they chose to not pay something safety related are horrible and UA has some 'splainin to do.
If UA's management (the pilots have nothing to do with aircraft buying decisions) knew that that MCAS system was (a) on the plane, (b) was tied to only a single sensor, and did not have redundancy with the other sensor, then I think that they made a horrible decision and have a lot of explaining to do. My strong guess is that those buying the plane at United has no clue that Boeing would be so negligent as to have an automated system that was tied to only a single sensor, a sensor that had nearly caused other air-crashes, and as such no need for the extra warning/safety systems.
So yes, I agree the optics for UA are bad, but my guess is they knew as little about the MCAS system and how it worked as did the pilots, and can't fairly be faulted.
Originally Posted by
MarkyMarc
I just find this to be stunning. Given that the second AoA sensor is standard equipment, tying together the two sensors and using a processor to sourt out disagreements and display a warning, can't have cost more than $5K/plane, likely much less. Yet, Boeing was asking an airline like UA to pay an extra $12M. You can bet that Boeing
gouging its customers for a "safety feature" that is only needed because of their own
grossly negligent design is going to be exhibit 1 if any of the death cases ever go to trial. Really, really, really bad fact for Boeing.
Originally Posted by
EWR764
AOA indicators are installed for procedural reasons, primarily where airlines conduct, as a matter of policy, manual approaches in instrument conditions (e.g., HUD-assisted CAT III approaches). In visual flying, or autoland approaches, it's of minimal utility, unless UA decides to start doing carrier landings. United's 737s don't have HUD either; does that make them unsafe, too?
You are missing the entire point. Yes, on the NG that was what the AoA indicators was for. But on the MAX Boeing tied a single AoA sensor to a system that would - unless the pilots figure out what the hell was going on - crash the plane as it overrode the pilots inputs, when as history shows they would, the AoA sensor had a bad reading. On the MAX this additional safety equipment was vital to address the flaw in Boeing's design of the MAX.
Again, I doubt that United (or any airline for that matter) knew how crappy of a design, and how dangerous of a design Boeing had for the MCAS system, a system designed to make up for flaws in the air-frames handling as Boeing over stretched the design, but a system - which was an "option" on the MAX, and a profit center for Boeing at $80K/plane - was vital on the MAX.