Originally Posted by
exwannabe
Not exactly a big surprise. I think everybody though it was always highly likely that the automated controls had pushed the stabalizer trim down. The real question is how and why the pilot reacted. One article notes this:
AFAIK, this is wrong. The trim switches on the yoke will override the autopilot pushing the stabalizer on other 737s, but will not override the MAX's MCAS system. The pilot has to completely shutdown electronic control via a switch then use a hand crank to adjust it.
Presumably the pilot did not mechanically override the system (else the jackscrew would have been screwed back "up" via the cable he would have cranked).
So why?
The bigger question is this. The MCAS system was added because the MAX is not stable w/o it. If the system can not be relied on, is the plane safe?
As far as the software fix, call me a skeptic until and unless it is proved out. If it is no more that basically an emergency shutoff of the system, then you are back to the issue of potential stalls it was designed to avoid.
I think reactions to crashes are generally way oevrblown. But this one could be really bad for Boeing consider how large the order book is for the MAX .
It sounds like a complex scenario, and if the patch is also complex, pilots would be prone to mess it up. Regardless, the patch would need to be tested for a while in real life. I am starting thinking that either way the Max would likely remain a problematic a/c that needs to be avoided. And if this becomes complex to manage, probably switch flying to DL to solve most of the problem would be the answer, for those who can.
Take-off and climb are the most stressful and dangerous phases of flying anyway, I don't need more stress....Even if they are only "incidents", I'd rather not experience any unexpected nosedives and traumatize myself, I will pass...