Originally Posted by
Transpacificflyer
I don't think there is anything "wrong" with the aircraft itself. After a bit of listening to and reading commentary from actual experts, I have come to the realization that the issue is in large part related to two interrelated key aspects, neither of which is mechanical/technical; Sales practices and the closely associated training of pilots. These two issues should be known to Air Canada and hopefully a strategy is in place to address them.
I have had a few flights on the 737MAX with China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines. There are 11 aircraft at the airline now with the first deployed towards the end of 2017. No issues reported. My understanding is that there are in 58 Max in use with Chinese airlines, with no issues reported. Either the Chinese aircraft are magically protected, or the Chinese airlines have effectively trained their flight crews to respond to a flight control crisis on the aircraft.
The aircraft is sold as an easy step up for pilots who are flying older B737 models and AB319/320 models. The promotional material highlights the ease of transition and the cost containment associated with fleet changeover etc. Perhaps the promotional material has not emphasized the need for a pilot skill upgrade. The issues to date seem to relate to the flight control system changes and the need for a quick manual over ride when necessary. This requires intensive training and continual reinforcement. I note that Thai Lion is a relatively new airline and one with a rather poor reputation. Ethiopian has its own flight school and training facilities so it will certainly be of interest to Air Canada if the Ethiopian pilot training was faulty, or inadequate. I also note that both crashes have occurred with recent aircraft deployment.
The Max is the first airliner since the BAC 111 that is not inherently stable throughout its operation envelope. Because of its larger engines, a proper design would have entailed redesigning the horizontal stabilizer. Which Boeing demed too expensive; instead they implemented a software fix, more or less a bandaid solution called MCAS. It appears that in the Lionair case because of a single faulty signal from an angle of attack probe, the MCAS pushed the nose down until the plane hit the ground.
The issue is specific to the max. Does not affect earlier 737s.
I do not believe for a cleansheet design, any manufacturer would even consider building an airliner that is not inherently stable throughout the envelope. The case of the BAC-111 and the deep stall issue first occurred a long time ago when things were quite different, and the issue was discovered way after the plane entered in service. In the case of the max though, it was purely an economic decision, however dubious technically. To me that's wrong.
BTW last time I was on a max was less than three weeks ago. Only flight that day between Olbia and MXP, so no real choice except flying to LIN. So yes, while I did not like it, I bit the bullet.