What report are you quoting?
The BEA report reads:
The loss of the wear strip from the thrust reverser door on the Continental Airlines DC-10 originated from lack of rigorous maintenance. In fact, over a period of a little more than a month, the part had been replaced during a C-check, had become detached and twisted and had again been replaced, this time by apart which was not in acccordance with the manufacturer's specifications, this one being the one which fell off on 25 July 2000. Of course, this is not a critical part from the airworthiness perspective, but true safety implies strict respect for precedures, without any personal interpretation.
Facts established concerning the metallic strip and the aircraft reveal inadequate adherence to maintenance procedures by the various workshops that carried out work on the reverser cowl. Thus the engine cowl suppport was drilled with 37 holes whereas the installation of the strip requires only 12; equally, a titanium piece was used in Houston along with a mastic which is not normally used for this operation; finally the lower right wear strip was too long compared to the specification, which helps the explain the successive tearing off of the strip located opposite.
There there you go, it is interesting that you failed to quote that part of the report.
I find it telling that you desribed the above as an 'unpreventable misfortune", which it clearly was not. I also find it interesting that the report concludes:
The spacer on the left main bogie had not been re-installed during replacement of the bogie on 17 and 18 July. This omission did not contribute to the accident
Yet you choose again not to quote this part.
While I am unfamiliar with your posts on FT, I find this bit of "French baiting" annoying, andd if I find other instances of gratuitous anti-French positions, I'll be sure to point them out. If you want to fault AF for faulty procedures, then fault AF, not 'French neglicence". Using your biased rationale, one ought to point the finger at "American maintenance procedures" for the disaster.
As far as your potshot at the crew is concerned, the report reads:
The shutdown of engine 2 before reaching 400 feet resulted from the Captain and FE 's analysis of the situation. Indeed, less than 3 seconds after the failure of engine 2 was announced by the FE and the controller had informed the crew of the presence of flames at the reqar of theaaircraft, the engine's fire alarm and the associated gong sounded. The exceptional enviroment above quite naturally led the FE to ask to shut down the engine. This was immediately confirmed by the Captian's calling for the engine fire procedure. The engine had in fact pratically been at idle power for several seconds and the fire alarm was ounding....
The crew had no way of grasping the overall reality of the situtation. THey reacted instinctively when they perceived an extremeley serious but unknown situation, which they were evaluating by way of their sensory percetpions. Each time the situation allowed, they applied the established procedure in a professional way
This kind of baiting has no place on FT. I call it like like I see it.