p. 27:

No terrorist has attempted to take an explosive on board an airplane through a U.S. airport since approximately 35 years ago. Exhibit K, "American Airlines Flight 444," Wikipedia (Last Updated Sept. 28, 2013). All of the explosives brought on board airplanes discussed in the administrative record happened outside of the United States. And, even on the global scale, including Middle Eastern countries with extreme civil unrest and a high prevalence of improvised explosive devices in use on the ground, explosives on airplanes are extremely rare. For example, the TSA analyzed hijackings in 2007, and found 7 hijacking incidents across the globe, but none of them involved actual explosive devices. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doe. 136, p. 2196 (U//FOUO).

The hijackers on 9/li had no explosives; only knives. Notwithstanding, the government concedes that it would be difficult to have a repeat of 9/11 due to hardened cockpit doors and the willingness of passengers to challenge hijackers rather than assume a hijacking merely means a diversion to Cuba. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 136, p. 2197 (U//FOUO). The government also credits updated pre-flight security for that difficulty assessment, but the assessment was written before the en masse deployment of body scanners and before the update to the pat-down procedure. Id. Further, the government admits that there have been no attempted domestic hijackings of any kind in the 12 years since 9/11. Id.

This begs the question, then, of what evidence the government possesses to rationalize that we should be so afraid of non-metallic explosives being brought aboard flights departing from the U.S. that we must sacrifice our civil liberties. The answer: there is none. "As of mid-2011, terrorist threat groups present in the Homeland are not known to be actively plotting against civil aviation targets or airports; instead, their focus is on fundraising, recruiting, and propagandizing." Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 137, p. 2219 (U//FOUO).

p. 31:

For the reasons explained herein, both the nude body scanners and the pat-downs are more extensive and intensive than necessary to detect non-metallic explosives in light of available alternatives. Additionally, they are ineffective at addressing the threat at hand and are incredibly invasive, which is to be balanced against the risk of a threat for which the TSA has admitted there is no evidence. Accordingly, both procedures are independently unconstitutional.

p. 35:

The TSA has conceded that it is aware of no one who is currently plotting a terror attack against our aviation system using explosives (non-metallic or otherwise). The TSA has conceded that other changes in aviation security, implemented before the invasive pat-downs, have made another 9/11 difficult [15].

[15]: It would be more reasonable to say that another 9/11 would be impossible. If five men with box cutters on a flight of 200 passengers stood up and announced a hijacking in 2013, they would be lucky to survive the beatings they would immediately receive by a travelling public that has learned the lessons of 9/11. Further, the armored cockpit doors, as well as the Federal Flight Deck Officer program that arms pilots with firearms, make targeting an aircraft in such a manner to be the definition of insanity.

p. 42:

The documents that the TSA has labeled "FOUO" are two threat assessments that are 2 and 5 years old, respectively. These documents contain no information relevant to a specific criminal investigation, and would not qualify for any law enforcement exemption under the Freedom of Information Act. It is in the public interest to release these documents because they contain the bombshell revelation that the TSA has literally zero evidence that anyone is plotting to blow up an airplane leaving from a domestic airport. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 137, p. 2219 (U//FOUO).