I think risk management should take precedence over risk avoidance.
That's true in almost every profession. But, the TSA was started under the guise of law enforcement. The first director, McGaw, was a secret service guy and he filled the senior ranks with people with whom he felt comfortable and were of a similar mindset. I vaguely recall some of his early statements and press conferences in which, if left to his own devices, he was ready to create an armed TSA force with police powers.
As I'm sure you know, the hard-core LE/security community is notoriously risk-adverse. The vastly disporportionate amount of resources the TSA has placed at airports -- the LAST line of security -- is a prime example of risk-adverse thinking. Also, risk-adverse organizations solve problems by throwing people and money at them. They solve
more problems by throwing
more people and
more money at them. By cutting screeners and the TSA budget, Congress is telling the TSA become risk managers. As we've all seen, the TSA is as equally adept at blowing off Congress as they are at blowing off the taxpayers.
Risk-adverse organizations place 100% of the risk on external entities. We all heard it: "You'd better get to the airport 3 hours earlier!" "Leave your luggage unlocked or we may have to break into it!" "It's the airline's decision to make you an SSSS!" "Lines are going to be really long. You better read the website and do everything we tell you!" "If you want to be taken off the no-fly list, change your name!" "We will fine you!" "The entire terminal was emptied and x-hundred passengers rescreened."
The only way the TSA will ever become "risk managers" is with a complete paradigm shift and overhaul. Face it, that's completely impossible with an organization this size with such a firmly entrenched culture. Can you imagine training your fellow screeners and their supervisors to understand and practice risk management??? Regretfully, as I've suggested in other posts, the TSA has become like the old Soviet Politburo. The primary
reason d'etre of both organizations was/is to perpetuate itself.
Your risk management comment is right on, but it would take a small nuclear weapon in the DHS/TSA's head shed to make it happen.