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Old Nov 18, 2016 | 7:51 am
  #86  
brunos
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Originally Posted by orbitmic
Yes, but the reason why I made my semantic point was not to be pedantic but to highlight a false logic. If you want to reward purchasers, then the obvious logic is indeed that the most you are given, the more you should give back. If you try to incentivise, the logic becomes wholly different: you effectively need to gauge elasticity (both positive and negative).

Incidentally, it is for the exact same reason that (as many people often complain), the airline may often upgrade a silver pax over a GGL one.



But there is really no relationship between the point I was making and the point you are making, and with which I largely agree! My point is a revenue management point. RM fix prices specifically based on what they believe that they can sell, so from that point of view, my point on the upper end seat is merely a paraphrase of their logic. This is unrelated to the fact that some people might be willing to pay full price even, for that matter, if cheaper fares are available, and which you typically manage not through RM but through ticket conditions.

Three further observations on that however:

1) Very few passengers actually pay full fare. As pointed upthread, for instance, many "full fare" J tickets on LCY-JFK will actually have a lower rate than your Christmas special non-changeable-have-to-book-28-days-in-advance I fare on the same route;

2) The perfect illustration of my point on the lower end is Ryanair. They managed to create buyers for flights to places buyers had never even heard about. Sure, Ryanair prices can be a great way to incentivise that, but BA, LH, or AF haven't got that option because of their costs, so they use other things like FFPs. Again, on this forum, the CTU fares we keep reading about are an excellent example. As reported, the flights did not do well in premium classes. So BA had to rely on people buying up to J for cheap but also on those who saw it as a good way to build TP balances. This is not a viable strategy if this is all you are getting as an airline (hence the route closing since it didn't also have the full fare potential easily enough) but it may be necessary to have those incentivised travellers who would not have flown to the Chengdus of this world anyway. The leisure premium market which is what we are talking about here (the leisure Y market already gets nearly nothing anyway so won't be penalised by a revenue model) is by no means only price-driven, and incentivising with a mix of price and avios/TPs is more economical for the airline than incentivising on cost only which would imply greater reductions in fares to achieve the same result.

3) Can't have it both ways: you're right that the customers willing to pay any fare are rare to come by, but it doesn't make them FFP-sensitive and quite frankly, those I know really aren't. One of my FT friends who mostly flies LX, AF, and Middle Eastern airlines, mostly in F, occasionally in J, and has a very much larger travel budget than almost anyone else I know tried BA for some of his US trips this year, and basically just gave up on them because he found them "rubbish". He did not like the hard product, he hated the airport experience, and he couldn't care less if BA gave him 5 times more avios or TPs (and quite frankly, GGL doesn't compare to HON in terms of benefits and soft perks anyway). So basically, he stopped that experiment and BA lost that particular goose that lay the golden eggs.

So the lower end of the premium market may not be as FFP-sensitive as it is price-sensitive, I'd volunteer the argument that the upper end of the premium market is yet far less FFP-sensitive and that if it is what Walsh and Cruz believe will seduce them, I very much suspect that they are in for a big disappointment, hence my mentioning that in that case, we are indeed heading towards a self-fulfilling prophecy where the FFP will indeed become a cost centre.

And yes, BA have progressively switched from treating BAEC as profit centre to cost centre. They started doing it at times of economic glory so that the changes would be easily absorbed. Whether there is a different cost in forthcoming times of likely crisis is another matter entirely.
I fully agree with your post and previous ones.

And I am confident that Cruz and Walsh have a fairly comprehensive view of the contribution of a FFP. Their problems is that it is difficult to estimate the medium term "reactions" to changes in a FFP. I also believe that their focus is on the bottom line, so that "revenue" is a poor proxy for that. Indeed FFPs are about "incentive" not "loyalty". Giving generous miles/TP to a cheap Y or J pax that would induce the pax to buy BA rather than QR or EK is profitable because it fills a seat that would otherwise be empty. It is an alternative to offering an even lower fare to compete. The contribution to the bottom line might be more significant than offering very generous miles/TP to high fares who have otehr priorities in booking their flight with BA.

But designing a FFP to induce pax to maximize the bottom line is more than tricky given the myriads of profiles. Any simple rule such as revenue-based is suboptimal. I personally believe that having a revenue-based system for both miles (Avios) and status (TP) is a mistake relative to the current system which is already geared toward revenue.
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