UA was a smaller airline in 2014 than it was in 2011. Fewer mainline ASMs and fewer regional ASMs.

UA's 2014 topline revenue was a mere 4.8% larger than 2011. Consolidated yield was a mere 4.8% larger than in 2011.

For some perspective, all three (now two) of the legacy competitor peers had superior gains in topline revenue and in consolidated yield between 2011 and 2014. DL's topline revenue in 2014 was 15% higher than in 2011. Its 2014 revenue was 7% larger than in 2013. UA? 4.8% revenue growth over three years.

Sure, UA was able to find butts for the seats (albeit slightly fewer butts, as the airline has been shrinking since 2011), but it's clear that some big $$$ passengers left to try DL, AA and/or US.

Have some of them returned? Probably. Have they all returned? Doubtful.

DL's 2014 profit, ex special items and profit sharing, was more than UA's 2012, 2013 and 2014 profits combined (also ex-items and profit-sharing). That's why DL employees' profit-sharing for 2014 exceeds UA's profit-sharing payouts for 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, combined. The DL 2014 profit-sharing will equal about two months' pay.

Lots of management consultant-types argue that a happy workforce is conducive to happier customers and higher profits. No doubt the UA employees are happy as clams with their paltry profit-sharing payouts that will equal less than two weeks' pay when they read about the profit-sharing bonuses over at DL.

Three years of economic expansion following a huge recession, and UA hasn't reaped much of the benefits. Maybe 2015 is the year that UA's revenues will finally begin to grow significantly. If not, then perhaps 2016 is the magic year. With any luck, maybe UA management can grow revenues before the next economic downturn.

Capacity discipline is fine, but it looks like UA management has been practicing revenue discipline instead. If they've given up on growing that revenue, then yes, UA has a cost problem. A big cost problem.