Originally Posted by
Majuki
I didn't imply that the US was unique in this sense but rather there seems to be some concern that a switch to chip-and-PIN would place a high burden of proof on the cardholder that the transaction was not legitimate. We have read reports of banks refusing to remove fraudulent charges in chip-and-PIN countries. What would allow you to prove that you didn't make the transaction? In the case of your wallet getting stolen by a tag team of thieves who observe your PIN, would the bank say you didn't safeguard your PIN and therefore it's your fault? What about in the unlikely but possible scenarios presented by the Cambridge team? Signature transactions provide enough of a fudge factor and give the benefit of the doubt that a PIN transactions don't have.
It sounds like you're suggesting we should make card security as weak as possible, because the stronger it is, the harder it would be for you to get out of paying for a fraudulent transaction.