Thank you for your feedback, Brian. Very good points, and it appears we are all not that far apart on what we really feel as a comfortable leve of security...differences may still remain in how that security is applied.

Let me comment on a couple points, if I may:

I also balance the cost of 5% too much security (waiting a few minutes in line) with 5% too little (another catastrophe), and find the cost of too little security to be way too high to pay.

I think I would agree that 5% too much security is something we can deal with, and I agree that 5% too little resulting in tragedy is too high a price to pay.

The problem those of us on the other side are having is we dont see things such as TIA, Echelon (sp?), INS roundups, random searches, ethnic screenings, etc as 5% too much security...we see it as acts of tyranny by out of control Federal leadership.

I have no problem with the added layers of "proper and prudent" screening at the airport, but when the government takes it upon itself to peruse my personal life, monitor my activities, or arrest my neighbor for special questioning, that is way beyond 5% too much...it is tyranny and cannot be permitted. It is a violation of our most basic freedoms and rights.

the vast majority of the public has demonstrated confidence and support in the current security system.

I am not sure that the true majority of the public feels this way.

I spend alot of time traveling, and alot of time in the airport...I hear more grumbling from fellow passengers, than acceptance. The rare traveler... the person who flies once or twice a year, might figure it's OK with them, as they dont see the process in as much detail as many of us frequent fliers do.

I think the general public might appear to support these efforts, not because the efforts are valid or effective, but because their mentality is "do anything to protect us".

That is not a valid mentality in a true democracy where people must value their freedoms and be prepared to defend them against aggression...agression can come from a foreign attack, but can also come from within. When John Poindexter decides it is OK to gather data on every single thing I do in my life and run it through a huge database for analysis, that in my mind is an act of agression against my freedoms and privacy.

I dont want to call the general public ignorant or naive, but most people do not understand the true risks and what types of security actually protect against these risks. Many people do not comprehend that nothing is risk-free...especially air travel.

One of the reasons I have been bristling at the sight of some of these "initiatives", is my background. My degree is in Aviation Management. I am a licensed commercial pilot, and as part of my degree work, I wrote many a paper on airport security, which was one of my key interests.

That was back during the first Gulf War...My analysis was that airport security had a low probability of finding a potential attacker. My rationale for this, was that someone who had a clear and deliberate intent to attack and destroy an aircraft would be able to, irregardless of how many checks were done on passengers or baggage.

Sept 11 succeeded, because the organizers of this horror were able to analyze the current security environment and determine they could simply walk on with whatever tools they needed.

If boxcutters and knives were forbidden on 9/11, what alternative would they have taken? Perhaps to have another small group employed as aircraft caterers or cleaners, able to sneak the weapons aboard during the night (remember all these flights were early morning departures). They would have found a way, no matter the obstacles placed before them.

No matter how much we tighten, at best the airport security structure is only able to capture the random attacker...the one taking a chance, or acting as part of a team to see if one out of say, 5, can get through. It wont stop the deliberate, planned, calculated attacks...which are the attacks we should fear the most.

Random searches produce random results...it is not difficult for a potential attacker to circumvent security. It is at this point where you encounter "diminishing returns"...you tighten things up to the point where the public really IS unhappy...but you cannot produce any greater degree of protection.

I think many of the new TSA directives fall under the "diminishing returns" category. Random searches of SUVs, airport vans, etc. cannot be shown to enhance security in any way, when a terrorist can simply pull up in a Toyota Corolla, bypass the checks, and then detonate something in the garage. I wont even go near the topic of a full luggage and pat-down search on an 11year old boy, while someone meeting a "profile" walks right on by. How crazy was that? Crazy enough the Time magazine made it one of their important photos of the year.

I hope my logic makes sense here. The point I am trying to make is that you can tighten security to the point of tyrannical extremity...or nonsensical foolishness (our government is trying both approaches)...neither can, or will result in any actual increase in protection from a deliberately calculated attack. Catch the random attacker? possibly. Catch the careless attacker? possibly. Catch the professional, bent on terror? Probably not.