Originally Posted by
nkedel
Among other things, BitLocker doesn't support a lot of the features of TrueCrypt (like deniability, keyfiles, and volume-as-a-file)
The plausible deniability feature is questionable. I'm not convinced (nor is Bruce Schneier:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archiv...ypts_deni.html ) that one can truly hide the presence of that hidden volume. Of course, the data is still encrypted, regardless of how discoverable it is.
While BitLocker does not support keyfiles in same way TrueCrypt does, it does have an equivalent. A key to unlock an OS (or removable) partition can be stored in a file on a USB stick. All the file has is an identifier for the partition, combined with a random 256 bit key. Cryptographically it is probably more secure than the keyfile system (due to the lack of entropy in most file formats), but unlike keyfiles which can be any file one selects, the BitLocker ones are rather easily discoverable.
How to setup a replacement for file containers in BitLocker is actually described on the TrueCrypt site. Scroll down to the section "If you have a file container encrypted by TrueCrypt:".
Originally Posted by
nkedel
Moreover, the TPM support (and secure boot on 8/8.1) features which make Bitlocker more convenient (although neither is mandatory) keep it from being as secure since it unlocks the volume automatically without a user unlock and can be vulnerable to some attacks on that basis.
While the option to only use the TPM as a boot factor is an option, it not the only one. A startup pin/password and/or USB stick can be combined with the TPM for additional security. When using those additional factors, it will mitigate those vulnerabilities you speak of.