Originally Posted by
LarryJ
My point has nothing at all to do with whether I think that the AIT scanners are effective.
My point was that the TSA's focus is, and has been, on the detection of explosives. Most of the changes that they have made over the past decade to both procedures and equipment are targeted at improving their ability to prevent explosives from passing through screening.
As far as the definition of "detect"... If you walk through a WTMD with a brick of C4 under your shirt the WTMD will not alarm. If took that same brick through an AIT scanner there's a very good chance that it would alarm. Some are saying that alarm doesn't count as "detecting the explosive" because the AIT scanner didn't label it an explosive. So what? The procedure that follows an AIT alarm will find the brick and the subsequent ETD test will determine that it is an explosive. The result is that the explosive is detected due to the AIT alarm.
Call that whatever you want but it's a lot simpler to say that the AIT can detect hidden explosives while the WTMD can not. If someone can't see the difference between those two screening results then maybe they're getting a bit too wrapped up with their animosity toward the TSA.
Sure, if I walk through AIT with a block of C4 under my arm, it will alarm.
But wait, there's more:
If I walk through AIT with a block of modeling clay under my shirt, it will alarm.
If I walk through AIT with IHOP pancakes in my underwear, it will alarm.
If I walk through AIT with a thick hairdo on my head, it will alarm.
If I walk through AIT with sweat on my body, it will alarm.
However...
If I walk through AIT with a block of C4 in a hidden latteral pocket on my shirt, will it alarm? No? Then I guess it can't detect the presence of THOSE explosives.
If I walk through AIT with a C4 suppository, will it alarm? No? Then I guess it can't detect the presence of THOSE explosives.
If I walk through with a 1/4" layer of C4 inside the soles of my socks, will it alarm? No? Then I guess it can't detect the presence of THOSE explosives.
AIT is worse than useless; it actively misdirects both vast sums of money and huge amounts of attention that might be better spent elsewhere, on technologies or methodologies that would have a far greater and more reliable chance of detecting and interdicting actual explosives. Like, um, screening 100% of all cargo that goes onto planes, or maybe screening the thousands of boxes of frozen Wopper patties that go to airside food courts each year.